Building More Bombs: The Discursive Emergence of US Nuclear Weapons Policy by Valdez, John
 
 
 
 
BUILDING MORE BOMBS: 
 
THE DISCURSIVE EMERGENCE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
JOHN M. VALDEZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
Presented to the Department of Political Science 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
June 2018 
ii 
 
 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: John M. Valdez 
 
Title: Building More Bombs: The Discursive Emergence of US Nuclear Weapons Policy 
 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Political Science 
by: 
 
Jane K. Cramer  Chair 
Gerald Berk       Core Member 
Lars Skalnes      Core Member 
Greg McLauchlan  Institutional Representative 
 
and 
 
Sara D. Hodges  Interim Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School 
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded June 2018. 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2018 John M. Valdez 
  
iv 
 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
John M. Valdez 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Political Science 
June 2018 
Title: Building More Bombs: The Discursive Emergence of US Nuclear Weapons Policy 
 
This dissertation investigates the social construction and discursive emergence of 
US nuclear weapons policy against the backdrop of the nuclear taboo and its associated 
anti-nuclear discourse. The analysis is drawn from poststructuralism with a focus on the 
discourses that construct the social world and its attendant “common sense,” and makes 
possible certain policies and courses of action while foreclosing others. This 
methodology helps overcome the overdetermined nature of foreign policy, or its tendency 
to be driven simultaneously by the international strategic environment, the domestic 
political environment, and powerful domestic organizations, and while being shaped and 
delimited by the discourses associated with the nuclear taboo. I apply this method to three 
different cases of presidential administration policymaking: Eisenhower, Reagan, and 
George W. Bush. In each, the analysis illuminates the coherent discourses that emerged, 
crystallized, and either became policy, or were usurped by competing discourses and their 
associated policies. I follow the actions of key actors as they stitched together existing 
discourses in new ways to create meaning for nuclear weapons and the US arsenal, as 
well as to limit what could and should be done with that arsenal. The case studies reveal 
the content of the strategic international, domestic political, organizational, and 
normative bases of US nuclear weapons policy. These results suggest that most 
challenges to the nuclear policy status quo emerge from new presidents whose own 
discourse is built upon personal conviction and critiques of their predecessors. Upon 
taking office, these sources compete with discourses emerging from organizations, 
especially the nuclear weapons complex, and anti-nuclear forces including: activists, the 
scientific community, the international public, US allied governments, and the US public. 
It was this political conflict and confrontation that made possible the pattern of nuclear 
weapons policy that characterized each administration. This work points to the strength 
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of the nuclear taboo, and the effort that must be expended for its associated discourses to 
impact presidential policymaking. This insight provides an opening for managing the 
nuclear threat posed by the Trump administration’s new nuclear weapons policy. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In July 1939, scientists Leo Szilard and Eugene Wigner, met with Albert Einstein 
at his home in Long Island, New York. They had become alarmed at the possibility of 
weaponizing the sustainable nuclear reaction upon which they worked. Einstein at once 
realized the tremendous and terrifying potential of the scientific advancements taking 
place and worked with Szilard and Wigner on a letter to be delivered to President 
Franklin Roosevelt.1 The letter would elevate the notion of a nuclear reaction from an 
obscure topic of scientific inquiry to one of national security, and would mark the birth of 
nuclear policy discourse.  The interaction would, in some ways, reflect the policy 
confrontations that checker the history of nuclear weapons policy in the United States. 
Einstein, a devoted pacifist who would spend a great deal of time on peace and nuclear 
disarmament work before his death in 1955, had just made Roosevelt aware of the 
scientific possibility of the atomic bomb which would be dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki at the end of WWII.2  
 The beginning of nuclear weapons history already showed the elements that 
would compose its politics to this day. Einstein’s later nuclear disarmament position 
suggests that he had intended the letter as a warning, not as a call to build—and use—the 
weapon first. But the call to action would carry the seeds to do just that. Roosevelt took 
the suggestion seriously and established, less than two years later on June 28, 1941, the 
                                                 
1 Albert Einstein, “Albert Einstein to Franklin D. Roosevelt,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (online) 
August 2, 1939. Accessed 7 September 2014, 
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/pdfs/docsworldwar.pdf. 
2 For an example of Einstein’s anti-nuclear activism see, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell et. al. “The 
Einstein-Russell Manifesto,” Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (July 9, 1955). 
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Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) Section on Uranium or S-1, the 
predecessor to the Manhattan Project.3 The use of the products of the Manhattan project 
would lead Einstein to regret the letter, calling it “the one great mistake in my life.” 4 
 The interaction above is a microcosm of the broader nuclear weapons politics that 
would shape policy into the future. The Einstein-Roosevelt interaction foreshadowed 
decades of political conflict in which policymakers would be confronted with concern 
about the nuclear arsenals of US’s adversaries side by side with moral reservations and 
deep anxiety about nuclear weapons. US policy has emerged out of this struggle, 
sometimes driven by intense fear of the nuclear stockpiles of the Soviet Union, and at 
other times restrained by scientists, the public, and a sense that using nuclear weapons to 
wage war is immoral, unethical, and unproductive. In this dissertation I explore the ways 
in which policy emerged against that backdrop: policymakers simultaneously interpreting 
and articulating the international threat environment, and finding their prescriptions 
regarding nuclear weapons and their use highly constrained by powerful, socially 
maintained norms. The research presented here seeks to answer the question: how has US 
nuclear weapons policy’s emergence been shaped by the nuclear taboo? I also address the 
question of what kinds of methodology are appropriate for illuminating and 
understanding the policymaking process given US nuclear policy is shaped by political 
elites and social norms including the nuclear taboo. The former question will be taken up 
throughout the next four chapters, the latter question is addressed below. 
                                                 
3 For a history of the Manhattan Project see Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1986). 
4 Linus Pauling, “Notes on Conversation of Linus Pauling with Albert Einstein,” November 16, 1954, 
Special Collections & Archives Research Center, OSU Libraries, Oregon State University, E: Individual 
Correspondence, Box #107.1. 
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The Problem: Socially-Constructed Taboo, Insular Policymakers 
 The inherent complexity of the politics of nuclear weapons presents a unique 
tension. On the one hand, from the mid-1950’s onward, the public has been an active and 
powerful force in shaping nuclear weapons policy. The public, through formal 
organizations, mass movements, popular culture, and Congress, have exerted significant 
pressure on policymakers of all political stripes. Policymakers that have attempted to 
ignore or re-shape public opinion—as Eisenhower and Dulles did early in their 
administration—have found themselves confronting a determined public.5 These 
presidential endeavors have sometimes ironically strengthened opposition groups who 
viewed hawkish presidents as both a threat and an organizing opportunity.  
 On the other hand, nuclear weapons policy is among the least democratic, most 
secretive areas of foreign policy. Foreign policy itself has often been characterized as the 
area of policymaking most insulated from the public. Officials often have privileged 
access to information about the international strategic environment, as well as more 
complete knowledge of their own state’s capabilities. In addition, the public is often 
uninterested and uninformed about issues in international relations, making it easier for 
policymakers with an opening to manipulate public opinion.6 Nuclear weapons policy 
                                                 
5 In particular, Eisenhower argued at a press conferences on March 16, 1955 that nuclear bombs should be 
used “just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” The effort backfired and instead generated a 
media outcry. The Quemoy-Matsu crisis that precipitated the effort ended the next month without the use of 
nuclear weapons. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The President's News Conference," March 16, 1955. Online 
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10. See also Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United 
States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge University Press 2007), 130.  
6 See Oli Holsti who points out, “Not only do polls repeatedly reveal that the mass public has a very thin 
veneer of factual knowledge about politics, economics, and geography; they also reveal that it is poorly 
informed about the specifics of conflicts, treaties, negotiations with other nations, characteristics of 
weapons systems, foreign leaders, and the like” (“Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the 
Almond-Lippmann Consensus,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992), 447). 
4 
 
takes the secrecy of foreign policy a step further.7 Nuclear weapons were first developed 
in the highly secretive Manhattan Project on an isolated plateau in Northern New 
Mexico.8 The locations of many deployed weapons are a secret known to only a few, and 
while the science of the weapons is readily accessible on the internet, the engineering 
challenges associated with isolating fissile material, and then successfully building a 
weapon around that material are tremendous. In addition, the concept of deterrence is 
complex, counterintuitive, and contested.9 Consensus among the popular press or 
political elite is therefore rare.10 This gives policymakers latitude and incentive to make 
policy as they see fit. 
 The tension that entails from these two points provides the background for nuclear 
weapons policymaking in the US. In practice, policy has been the product of this 
conflictual social process since the early 1950’s. The process has also evolved along with 
                                                 
7 On this point see Francis Gavin who argues, “the world of nuclear policy was and remains, for 
understandable reasons, veiled in secrecy, and getting access to the full documentary record is 
difficult…figuring out the real story is particularly difficult with nuclear matters.” See History, Theory, and 
Statecraft in the Nuclear Age (Cornell University Press, 2012), 17. 
8 For a detailed description of the Manhattan Project written shortly after the production after the first 
atomic bombs see Henry De Wolf Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the 
Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945. 
(Princeton University Press, 1947). For a more exhaustive and contemporary account see, Cynthia C. 
Kelly, The Manhattan Project: The Birth of the Atomic Bomb in the Words of Its Creators, Eyewitnesses, 
and Historians (New York: Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers, 2007). 
9 For a review of nuclear deterrence in theory and practice through 1979, see Robert Jervis, “Deterrence 
Theory Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979): 289-324. Other contemporary theoretical 
and practical challenges for deterrence are addressed by T.V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, and James Wirtz eds., 
Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age (University of Chicago Press, 2009). For a feminist 
critique of the “technostrategic” language used to discuss and debate nuclear weapons strategy see Carol 
Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," Signs 12, no. 4 (1987): 687-718. For 
the alternative take on the concept of deterrence favored by the George W. Bush and Trump 
administrations, see Keith Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1996). 
10 Gavin (2012, 17) also argues that public rhetoric and policy are often at odds. 
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the nuclear taboo, the public itself, and the presidents that have occupied the White 
House. This dissertation will examine the social processes and social movements that 
have affected nuclear weapons policymaking in the US. Since those processes have acted 
on the president and his advisors, my research considers the avenues through which 
certain policies gained favor with presidents, and why particular policies were enacted 
while others were abandoned, marginalized, or defeated. This expands upon existing 
work by integrating the insights of the nuclear taboo literature into a broader examination 
of the production of nuclear weapons policy.11 The evidence presented here shows that 
functioning of the nuclear taboo even outside crises or war—nuclear weapons policy is a 
product not only of the threats and imperatives of the international strategic environment 
and the push and pull of powerful domestic groups, but also profoundly influenced by the 
nuclear taboo’s prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons on the battle-field. 
Investigating Foreign Policy 
 The problem of understanding the sources of nuclear weapons policy and the 
processes that support its emergence is not that there is a shortage of explanations, but 
that there is an abundance. This problem hails the notion of levels of analysis as a tool for 
sharpening claims of causation in answering questions about the formation of foreign 
policy. Waltz offers the most often cited version of this concept in which causation is 
conceptualized as originating in one of three images: the individual, the state, and the 
                                                 
11 For more on the nuclear taboo see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo (Cambridge University Press, 
2007); T.V. Paul, "Taboo or Tradition? The Non-use of Nuclear Weapons in World Politics," Review of 
International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 853-63; Theo Ferrell, "Nuclear Non-use: Constructing a Cold War 
History," Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 819-29; and Richard Hanania, "Tracing the 
Development of the Nuclear Taboo: The Eisenhower Administration and Four Crises in East 
Asia," Journal of Cold War Studies 19, no. 2 (2017): 43-83. 
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international system.12 Others have broadened the individual level, which focuses on the 
causal role of particular individuals, and added additional levels such as the 
bureaucracy—a level between the individual and the domestic.13 The question then, is if 
one endeavors to explain something about foreign policy, how should they choose among 
the various images, levels, or sources? Ikenberry and Trubowitz propose three ways of 
dealing with this question.14 First, analysts may turn to the empirics of their subject to 
determine which sources should be privileged in their explanation. While this may at 
times show that one level or another is most appropriate, it may preserve the problem by 
showing that multiple levels provide useful and plausible explanations. Second, theories 
may be compared on their “logical rigor” or their regularity, reliability, validity, 
prediction, and parsimony. Third, theories may be compared and selected by utilizing the 
most useful pieces of various levels in light of the questions being asked. This can be 
carried out though picking and choosing explanations that work best, or by building 
“synthetic models” which bring together multiple levels in building explanation.  
The theoretic approach proposed here addresses the overdetermined nature of 
foreign policy by focusing on the discourses articulated and rearticulated by the subjects 
themselves. This focus helps identify the concerns actors themselves considered as they 
built policy, and avoids the problem of scholars imposing their own theories onto 
policymakers of the past. In short, focusing on the discourse produced and deployed by 
                                                 
12 Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).  
13 See for example, J. David Sanger, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in Klaus 
Knorr and Sydney Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton University Press,  
1961); and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University 
Press, 1976), Chapter 1. 
14 G. John Ikenberry & Peter Trubowitz, “Introduction” in Ikenberry & Trubowitz eds., American Foreign 
Policy: Theoretical Essays, 7th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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powerful actors can illuminate the sources, or images, of policy. Inevitably, nuclear 
weapons policy is a product of the combination of individual characteristics, domestic 
politics, and the international system—so rather than focusing on one or another level of 
analysis, this work focuses on the particular mix of motives as it is constituted by 
discourse, and the ways in which these various forces are woven together by actors in 
order to forge policy. Details of this theoretical approach are below. 
The Literature 
The literature on nuclear weapons policy is vast, though little of the literature 
attempts to consider the formation of policy against the powerful backdrop of anti-
nuclear politics, and much of it is not focused on the social emergence of policy. This 
dissertation builds on several strands of literature, each of which contributes to questions 
and analysis here. First, the research builds on historical accounts of the Eisenhower, 
Reagan, and George W. Bush presidencies, as well as accounts of the Cold War era, and 
the post-Cold War era. Historical accounts provide several benefits to this research. They 
provide vertical history, or the chronology of the events and actors at the center of the 
inquiry.15 Part of the methodology of this dissertation is a strategy of reading material to 
determine the discourses being drawn upon at any particular moment. Good historical 
scholarship reveals important events and actors, and provide glimpses of moments when 
actors forged or amended discourse to build something new and meaningful that would 
echo into the future. Well-written and researched history should additionally provide 
horizontal linkages to show the context in which actors found themselves and important 
                                                 
15 For a relevant discussion on the practice of history scholarship and the particular challenges of nuclear 
history see Francis Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age, Cornell 
Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012). 
8 
 
events took place. Context is especially important here, with discourse analysis stressing 
the ways in which pre-constructed discourses embedded in the social milieu provide 
actors with a sense of their world and the tools they may bring to bear on problems 
therein.  
History 
The early nuclear era (Truman and Eisenhower administrations) is a highly 
scrutinized period of American history with an abundance of well-researched books and 
articles. Much of that research is highly detailed and chronological. Bowie and 
Immerman use this technique to show how the Eisenhower administration amended the 
chaos of the Truman era with regard to foreign policy and nuclear weapons, and set the 
stage for the international politics of the Cold War era.16 Likewise, Ambrose uses a 
chronological approach to detail the unfolding of Eisenhower’s presidency.17 While the 
level of detail in these works is useful for locating important interactions and pieces of 
discourse, the density of material and relentlessly linear chronology makes them less 
useful for understanding the nuclear politics of the day. Other works such as Gaddis’s 
history of the Cold War, provide a more foreign-policy oriented history, with primary and 
secondary sources supporting arguments about nuclear weapons policy and a temporal 
focus that extends through the end of the Cold War and thus including the Reagan (and 
George H.W. Bush) administration. For example, Gaddis traces the emergence of 
Eisenhower’s view that nuclear war might be unwinnable in the conventional sense, as 
                                                 
16 Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War 
Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
17 Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). 
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well as the implications for planning that emerged from this conclusion.18 While these 
sources are useful for the scope of their coverage, they pay inconsistent attention to 
particular topics and are best utilized as a resource to locate important artifacts of the 
discourse that has supported US nuclear weapons policy.  
Doctrine and Foreign Policy 
Other sources utilized here explicitly focus on foreign policy and nuclear posture. 
Jones traces Eisenhower’s attempts to undermine the nuclear taboo and provides a 
detailed nuclear-oriented history.19 Chernus argues that nuclear doctrine from the 
Eisenhower era can be thought of as “apocalypse management.”20 The threat of nuclear 
war as well as the problem of managing relations with allies and the economy are 
conceived of as discursive projects that must be managed for the long term with 
apocalyptic consequences from mismanagement. Chernus’s explicit focus on discourse is 
highly relevant here, and provides an opening for research built on identifying the sets of 
discourse from which policy emerges. Wirls provides a contemporary political history (of 
the Reagan era, and the Reagan through Obama era), as well as a theory that connects 
domestic institutions with the US’s “irrationally” large defense budgets.21 Vipin Narang 
argues that nuclear posture or strategy in the South Asian states under study is driven by: 
the availability of a great power sponsor; the nature of the target or adversary; the 
                                                 
18 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).  
19 Brian Madison Jones, Abolishing the Taboo: Dwight D. Eisenhower and American Nuclear Doctrine, 
1945-1961 (Solihull, West Midlands: Helion & Company Ltd, 2011). 
20 Ira Chernus, Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity, Stanford 
Nuclear Age Series (Stanford University Press, 2008). 
21 Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1992). See also Daniel Wirls, Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense from Reagan to Obama 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
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character of civil-military relations; and the amount of resources that can be brought to 
bear in support of strategy.22 While Narang’s investigation into nuclear strategies in 
South Asia would superficially resemble this dissertation’s investigation into US nuclear 
weapons policy—as both try to understand the sources of nuclear strategy—the focus on 
South Asian states makes his theory as is, ineffective for understanding the US case. That 
said, he identifies the perception of conventional superiority, and the character of civil-
military relations as explanations of nuclear posture, both of which are useful to consider 
in an effort to understand US policy.  
This dissertation also builds on the research into the origins of military doctrine. 
Barry Posen argues that organization theory and structural realism are powerful 
explanations of military doctrine.23 His research shows that in periods of peace, military 
organizations have leeway to make their own doctrines. During these times they will 
choose offensive doctrines aimed at reducing uncertainty in potential battles, increase the 
mission-space of the organization or the tasks for which they are formally responsible. 
They may also seek to increase the organization’s prestige, budget, and autonomy, 
consistent with the predictions of organization theory.24 In periods of crisis however, the 
                                                 
22 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, 
Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton University Press, 2014). Nuclear posture 
is defined here as “a state’s operational, rather than declaratory, nuclear doctrine,” and is used 
interchangeably with “strategy.” 
23 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, 
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
24 Posen builds on “organization theory,” a view that explains and predicts sub-rational behavior by large 
organizations. Since large organizations confront inherent problems with complexity and coordination, they 
develop routines, standard operating procedures, and rules which may actually hamper the organization’s 
ability to maximize efficiency in its responses. At the same time these organizations may have multiple 
conflicting goals, some consonant with their parent organizations or governments, and others parochial to 
sub-units. These goals may include increased mission-space, autonomy, budget, and prestige—all of which 
may run counter to broader interests, national interests, or even those of other sub-units in the organization. 
For an early explanation of organization theory see James G. March, “The Business Firm as a Political 
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civilian government is likely to successfully intervene and alter military doctrine to make 
it consistent with the apparent dictates of the international strategic environment. As this 
behavior is consistent with structural realism, Posen concludes that this theory holds 
sway in explaining the sources of military doctrine.  
Kier uses the empirical case of France between the world wars to challenge 
Posen’s assumption. Her work argues that the international system is indeterminate with 
regard to a particular state’s doctrines, and that civilians intervene often and with a 
concern about the potential of the military to threaten domestic sovereignty.25 This leads 
militaries to sometimes prefer defensive doctrines (as in the case of France during the 
interwar period), and suggests that culture is a key source of military doctrine and not the 
international system as argued by Posen. This scholarly debate is taken up by this 
dissertation in multiple ways. First the competitive contest between organization theory 
and structural realism is addressed methodologically. Far from denying that the 
international strategic environment matters, the methods used in this dissertation focus on 
the ways in which concerns about the international system are mobilized into discourse. 
Examining the discourse should reveal the extent to which the international system 
mattered, as well as illuminating the process through which it came to matter. Similarly, a 
focus on discourse points us toward the ways in which military leaders lobbied 
successfully (or not) for pieces of offensive doctrine. It may well be that powerful 
                                                 
Coalition,” Journal of Politics 24, No. 1 (February 1962): 662-78. For an application of organization theory 
to nuclear weapons politics, see Scott Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” Chapter 2 in Scott Sagan and 
Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2003). 
25 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars, Princeton 
Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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domestic organizations are behind US nuclear weapons policy—if so, we should see 
powerful actors forging the offensive minded discourse that supports policy. Kier’s 
argument is also addressed here. If civilians and culture are behind military doctrine, this 
should be reflected in the dominant discourses that support official policy. Indeed the 
nuclear taboo literature is consistent with Kier here, arguing that powerful social forces 
constrain policymakers who would like to use nuclear weapons, much as Kier argues that 
civilian culture restrains military culture. Since both Posen and Kier provide detailed 
arguments and rich evidence, the current work will take all of their key insights seriously, 
looking for sources of nuclear weapons policy in the international strategic environment, 
powerful domestic organizations, and civilian and popular culture.  
A foundational claim for discussing nuclear weapon in international relations is 
posited by Jervis, who argues that nuclear weapons led to a “revolution” in statecraft.26 
The revolution entails in a fundamental change in the way the nuclear armed states must 
reckon with one another. The most striking implication is that states winning in war 
against a nuclear armed adversary would be worse off than if it had avoided war in the 
first place—a stark change from the pre-atomic era. Nuclear armed states thus find 
themselves stuck in a condition of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD). Potential 
escapes from the condition of MAD carry the risk of nuclear disaster. The revolution 
from this perspective is Janus faced: on one hand, nuclear armed states have powerful 
incentives to avoid war, on the other nuclear annihilation is the consequence of failure to 
                                                 
26 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, 
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
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perpetuate MAD.27 Given the potential for either peace or nuclear war, Van Evera 
concludes, “…the effects of the nuclear revolution are indeterminate. They hinge on 
perceptions and policies of governments.”28  
The impact of this insight opens space for this dissertation: if nuclear weapons 
revolutionized international relations, policymakers would need to actively determine 
what this revolution meant for policy. Even if this revolution was controversial, it would 
yield debates out of which policy would be constructed. The current work provides a 
view of some of the avenues through which the implications of the nuclear revolution 
were incorporated into discourse, and as a result, policy. Debate about the character of 
the nuclear taboo builds on Brodie and others who pointed out as early as 1946 that the 
atomic era would be fundamentally different and that policymakers would need to re-
think international relations.29  
“Nuclear Weapons Policy” 
 Explaining US nuclear weapons policy requires grappling with theoretical issues, 
but first it is necessary to precisely clarify the concepts that will be addressed.30 This 
                                                 
27 This point is made by Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 
253-4. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Bernard Brodie, Frederick Sherwood Dunn, Arnold Wolfers, Percy Ellwood Corbett, and William T. R. 
Fox, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, 1st ed., Yale University Institute of 
International Studies (New York: Harcourt, 1946). 
30 Glaser’s investigation of nuclear weapons policy employs a narrower definition of the concept, focusing 
on strategy and force requirements. His investigation emphasizes MAD as the condition under which 
nuclear weapons policy is forged. This dissertation will build on his research into the strategic implications 
of MAD, inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), missile defense and other concepts, but will consider 
the non-strategic aspects of nuclear weapons policy such as anti-nuclear movements and civil-military 
relations. For more detail see, Charles Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton University 
Press, 1990). 
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project investigates the process through which nuclear weapons policy emerges against 
the backdrop of a socially constructed nuclear taboo. Nuclear weapons policy is 
composed of everything that is being done with nuclear weapons in a particular time by 
the state.31 This includes which weapons make up a state’s arsenal—how many, what 
size these weapons are in explosive yield, where they are held, where they are designed 
and constructed, and how the fissile material is made or procured. It includes the 
readiness of those weapons: whether they are mounted on solid-fueled inter-continental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ready to launch, or whether they are partially disassembled in 
remote bunkers. It also includes the set of delivery systems associated with the nuclear 
weapons arsenal. In the United States this has included the nuclear triad: nuclear-capable 
bombers, nuclear-armed ICBMs, and nuclear-armed submarines carrying submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). While most nuclear-armed states use some version 
of these three delivery systems, one could conceive of other methods of delivery. Nuclear 
weapons policy also includes the set of documents, statements, bureaucratic policies, 
traditions, and other discourse produced by policymakers which spell out, explicitly or 
implicitly, the purpose and potential uses of a state’s nuclear weapons arsenal. States may 
release formal documents that spell out these purposes in great detail, or the purposes 
                                                 
31 The definition of nuclear weapons policy that I use here is broader than the notion of nuclear posture 
used by Narang. Narang defines nuclear posture as, “the capabilities (actual nuclear forces), employment 
doctrine (under what conditions they might be used), and command-and-control procedures (how they are 
managed, deployed, and potentially released) a state establishes to operationalize its nuclear weapons 
capability” (2014: 4). This may also be thought of as nuclear strategy. Nuclear weapons policy as I use it 
here is broader in that it subsumes Narang’s definition, but also includes domestic public relations efforts to 
normalize nuclear weapons, civil-military relations over nuclear matters, and missile defense systems 
(deployed or not). My wider definition includes strategy (which is focused outward, at the world) as well as 
domestic policies regarding the design, construction, and testing or nuclear weapons. This definition is 
more appropriate as the case studies in this dissertation are focused on the US alone and its peculiar set of 
policies, while Narang’s narrower definition was appropriate for his comparative study of postures across 
South Asia. 
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may be strongly implied by historical circumstance.32 States may have a nuclear weapons 
policy even if they do not yet have a physical nuclear weapon. Having a nuclear weapons 
program that is advancing toward a working weapon forces other states to reckon with 
the potential, and forces the developer to articulate its own policy.  
 In the US, every president since Franklin D. Roosevelt has inherited a nuclear 
weapons policy when they took office.33 While administrations have changed, the vast 
nuclear weapons complex that created the bomb—originally the Manhattan Project, has 
persisted. So when new leadership approaches the problem of nuclear weapons policy, 
they do not do so from scratch—instead they have had to contend with the living reality 
of an expansive and dynamic set of forces that together constitute nuclear weapons 
policy. As stated above, the insular nature of the complex provides elites some cover to 
take action and change policy without any immediate checks. At the same time however, 
the size of the complex makes enacting change difficult. Institutions and individuals 
benefiting from the status quo may stymie leaders seeking change. The sum of these 
phenomena is a stickiness to US nuclear weapons policy—a strand of continuity that 
persists even in the face of leaders who would have liked to dramatically overturn the 
policies of their predecessors.  
                                                 
32 Narang is careful to note that his use of “nuclear posture” refers to operational rather than declared 
nuclear doctrine: “states care more about what an adversary can credibly do with its nuclear weapons than 
what it says about them” (Narang 2014: 4). The methodology employed here is adept at ferreting out 
important statements, documents, and other artifacts that credibly construct nuclear strategy, rather than 
those that repeat propaganda. However, since propaganda about nuclear weapons is policy—but not 
strategy—my research will sometimes, as in Eisnehower’s Atoms for Peace speech, consider its source and 
function. 
33 For the first interaction between a president and the notion of nuclear power, see Albert Einstein (August 
2, 1939). 
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 The discussion so far provides both a theoretical and empirical opening for my 
research. First, foreign policy analysts have found an overabundance of theoretical 
approaches to their questions. Foreign policy comes from individuals and domestic 
institutions, but it is also the result of and a response to the international strategic 
environment. Efforts to isolate causation consistently runs the risk of ignoring important 
drivers at other levels of analysis. And second, the historical record shows that nuclear 
weapons policy is the result of strong presidents re-defining policy, but also of an ever-
strengthening military-industrial complex driving policy in spite of presidential 
preferences. That is, this work recognizes that nuclear weapons policy is being driven by 
the international strategic environment, domestic institutions, and a handful of powerful 
individuals. Within the state, there also exists a struggle between presidents and other 
elites in the executive branch, and the institutions that physically build, maintain, oversee, 
and manage the weapons. Their privileged positions provide plausible avenues to check 
powerful executives and add meaningfully to the emerging shape of nuclear weapons 
policy.  
The research presented here does not put an end to debate over appropriate 
methods for foreign policy analysis, nor does it settle the question of where nuclear 
weapons policy comes from once and for all. Instead, this research will build on existing 
theory to clarify the theoretical approaches to understanding nuclear weapons policy, and 
will suggest that poststructural discourse analysis has the potential to untangle the various 
drivers of policy and deepen our understanding of the process of nuclear weapons 
policymaking. As this approach requires careful consideration of empirical data, it also 
has the potential to clarify the complex interplay between powerful presidents, the 
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military-industrial complex, and the bearers of the nuclear taboo. The sample of literature 
presented here is foundational for this work, but is not exhaustive—each empirical 
chapter will incorporate the insights from the seminal works discussed above, as well as 
incorporating primary and secondary sources that uniquely elucidate particular cases.  
Research Hypotheses 
In particular, this research will address three hypotheses, each are taken up in turn 
below: 
Hypothesis 1: Elite policymakers make nuclear weapons policy in accord with their 
assessment of material consequences. Moral and ethical considerations are secondary. 
Preliminary research and other literature show that it is typically new 
administrations that launch genuine challenges to the nuclear taboo. Eisenhower oversaw 
a tremendous buildup in the US nuclear arsenal and determined to use nuclear weapons 
over Quemoy and Matsu during his first term in early 1955; Reagan entered office with a 
plan to expand the US nuclear arsenal, its delivery systems, and its missile defenses; 
George W. Bush entered office with a plan to build a new generation of more useable 
nuclear weapons while doubling down on missile defense; and the Trump administration 
has thus far emulated the Bush administration with regard to nuclear weapons and missile 
defense. These cases show that challenges to the nuclear taboo—major changes to 
nuclear weapons policy—came from presidents themselves, who were not privy or not 
concerned with the prohibition of the nuclear taboo or any other norm that might limit 
their latitude of action. This project will explore this phenomenon in greater detail to shed 
light on just how presidents come to understand nuclear weapons, and the processes 
through which they settle on changing existing policy. 
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Hypothesis 2: Building new, and more useable nuclear weapons, as well as threatening 
to use nuclear weapons in battle, serves the organizational needs of the military-
industrial complex. 
While major changes to the nuclear weapons policy status quo seem to take place 
during new president’s first terms, these changes do not materialize out of the ether. 
Instead they likely serve the interests of another powerful entity that has access to the 
president: the military-industrial complex. This project will look for the avenues through 
which presidents sought to upend the status quo, but will additionally look for other 
actors that likewise, pushed presidents to adopt more aggressive nuclear weapons 
policies. It is clear that organizational leaders have at times seen a more aggressive US 
nuclear posture as a means to enhance their own agencies prestige, budget, or importance. 
This research will look closer at particular instances of organizational push to determine 
the content of their efforts, and why they did or did not succeed in influencing the 
president and/or their policies. Was it the presidents’ individual mindsets that made them 
susceptible to lobbying by hawkish military leaders or eager nuclear scientists? Or were 
such representatives of the military-industrial complex simply able to package their 
argument in a manner convincing to the president and other key policymakers? 
Answering this question will require a close reading of the interaction between leadership 
and the military-industrial complex, or an appreciation of the interaction between these 
first two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3: The public finds nuclear weapons morally unacceptable and reflexively 
rejects their use.  
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The last of the three major hypotheses suggests the public’s role in enforcing the 
norm against using nuclear weapons in battle, or the nuclear taboo. This piece tends to 
pull in the opposite direction from the previous two hypotheses. While presidents, 
sometimes goaded by elites in the military-industrial complex, have sought new missions 
for existing nuclear weapons, and new weapons altogether, one of the means through 
which these efforts have been checked or rolled back has been the action of the broader 
public. The nuclear taboo literature has documented the important role that both domestic 
and international public opinion has played in restraining hawkish nuclear weapons 
policies. Here the research will address the specific content of the public’s reaction. What 
sorts of behavior did the public respond to in these cases? How did the public’s 
interpretation of the international strategic environment differ from that of the executive? 
Also, why has the public managed to succeed in these instances? Ultimately, this work 
aims to show how competing conceptions of the problem of nuclear weapons and their 
utility, were synthesized into policy. Special attention is paid here to efforts by elites to 
manipulate and manage public opinion. Preliminary study suggests that in some cases 
these efforts had the ironic effect of galvanizing public opinion against hawkish policies 
proposed or implemented by elites.  
The foregoing are not “testable hypotheses” insomuch as this study is designed to 
prove their “truth”. Instead, they guide a process-focused study aimed at uncovering the 
complex interaction of numerous powerful actors wading their way through a strategic 
environment that they themselves interpreted in a variety of ways. The next section will 
argue that particular methodological approaches that have become popular in 
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international relations relatively recently offer great potential for shedding light on these 
complex problems. 
Poststructural Discourse Analysis 
 Explaining foreign policy—and nuclear weapons policy as a subset—is difficult 
because of the multiplicity of sources and potential answers. In considering solutions to 
this problem as it relates specifically to the making of US nuclear weapons policy, it is 
useful to consider what foreign policy entails. Any foreign policy requires “an account, or 
story, of the problems and issues they are trying to address: there can be no intervention 
without a description of who the underdeveloped are, where they differ from the West, 
and how they can transform their identity.”34 From this perspective, foreign policies 
reflect, constitute, and potentially transform the identity of the states that are 
implementing them.  
Language is especially important here, as it is through language that reality is 
constructed.35 Material “stuff” is only meaningful to people because of the language with 
which it has become as becomes associated.36 Collective understandings, articulated over 
and over about a particular thing endow that thing with meaning, and make it possible for 
it to be meaningfully related to other things. This semi-stable sets of meanings 
                                                 
34 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Routledge: New York 
2006): xiv. 
35 This insight is drawn from Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (London: Peter Owen 
1960). 
36 Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillips use the example of a flood. A flood is a material event with 
material consequences for those caught in rising water. However, those perceiving even may attribute the 
calamity to the science of meteorology, the consequences of political mismanagement, or “God’s will.” 
These varied accounts constitute the discourse through which the flood becomes part of social reality, and 
thus entail particular appropriate responses while vacating the possibility of others. See Discourse Analysis 
as Theory and Method (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks 2002), 8-9.  
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collectively make up a discourse.37 To understand policy as following from powerful or 
dominant discourses is to understand identity and policy as constitutive of one another. 
Identity does not cause policy as it were, instead policy makes and reaffirms identity and 
identity does the same for policy. This mutually constitutive process is captured in 
discourse, which is then an appropriate object of analysis for understanding the unfolding 
and content of the process.38 
Approaching foreign and nuclear weapons policy in this way widens the focus 
from the narrow set of elites responsible for enunciating policy or putting their name on 
formal policy, to a broad set of actors including the media, academics, the broader public 
(both domestic and international), and oppositional politicians, all of whom collectively 
endow nuclear weapons, the international strategic environment, and the rest of the 
content of nuclear weapons policy with meaning, and in the process create coherent 
discernible discourses. In addition, addressing nuclear weapons policy as constitutive of 
identity addresses the material versus ideational methodological debate. Clearly, any 
analysis of nuclear weapons policy must account for the physical weapons themselves. 
However, a strictly materialist account of nuclear weapons policy would have trouble 
dealing with many kinds of specific questions such as: why did the US stockpile get so 
                                                 
37 Language can only be said be semi-stable since there is no inherent connection between the words we use 
and physical reality. In addition any particular word’s meaning derives from the meanings of words with 
which is either linked or differentiated from. As the relationship between words and physical reality can 
change, so too can words relations to each other rendering meanings “semi-stable” as they are part of a 
malleable social institution. See Jorgensen and Phillips (2002: 11).  
38 Charlotte Epstein makes this point in arguing that discourses “‘do’ two things of concern here. First they 
constitute a ‘space of objects’” and they “constitute the identities of social actors, by carving out particular 
subject-positions, that is, sites from which social actors can speak, as the I/we of a discourse.” In other 
words discourses make things real for people, and provide a place for them to speak and be understood. See 
The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press 2008). 
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large?39 Given the obvious shortcomings of pure materialist accounts, but also the 
necessity of considering the impact of the material reality on prevailing ideas, an 
approach that considers the inseparability of ideas and material factors is necessary. The 
poststructural approach applied here intertwines the two by shifting focus away from 
ideas or material factors as causal variables and toward policy and identity as mutually 
constitutive. Identity here is built by social, discursive processes—it emerges through the 
process of articulation and rearticulation of self and other. Otherness, or creating an 
account of what one is not, powerfully shapes identity. In foreign policy, one only need to 
think of popular conceptions of “terrorist,” “underdeveloped,” “backward,” or 
“communist” to see how language is deployed to underscore the threat of the other, while 
at the same time rearticulating and reaffirming a positive identity.  
Much of what constituted the Cold War emerged from a set of documents which 
painted the Soviet as the US’s radically threatening other. The “X” Article, NSC 68 and 
others are discursive artifacts from a project that loaded with meaning the words “Soviet” 
and “communist” and in the process shaped the post-war identity of the US. Nuclear 
weapons and the discourse that surrounds them has been an important part of this process 
of shaping US state identity through foreign policy. And since identity and policy are 
mutually constitutive, the nuclear weapons policy that entailed, emerged side by side with 
the associated identities.  
                                                 
39 In 1960, the US possessed more than 18,000 nuclear weapons in its stockpile. No country that developed 
nuclear weapons after the US and Soviet Union ever approached such large numbers—ostensibly because 
no material case could be made for why such large arsenals would be needed. See Robert Norris and Hans 
M. Kristensen, "Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945−2010," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July 1, 
2010).  
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 This approach to the hypotheses proposed above suggests where one might look 
to shed light on the hypotheses above. Hansen suggests it leads to “an empirical research 
agenda that examines how foreign policy representations articulated by oppositional 
political forces, the media, academe, and popular culture reinforce or contest each 
other.”40 The research that follows applies this concept: if the identities associated with 
policy are social and relational, then much can be learned by studying the social 
production of those identities and the “knowledge” upon which they rely. Any claim of 
authority to make foreign policy must be built on some claim of knowledge. These claims 
of knowledge are linked together through references intertextually.41 Key phrases, 
understandings, arguments, and examples, appear over and over in documents, speeches, 
testimony, and other artifacts of discourse. In this way they gain legitimacy for 
themselves and reinforce the legitimacy of that from which they draw. They also 
stabilize, if only temporarily, sets of meanings and associations that can be observed and 
understood as the meanings on which policy is constructed.  
At the same time, oppositional or alternative discourses emerge that build upon 
wholly different sets of knowledge claims. These alternatives may use entirely different 
language, or they may interpret discursive artifacts mobilized by the hegemonic discourse 
in a different way. In either case, the discourses construct webs of meaning or fields of 
signification by linking or differentiating meanings.42 Positive linkages connect related 
                                                 
40 (2006: 7) 
41 For details on the concept of intertextuality and the related concept of interdiscursivity see Jorgensen and 
Phillips (2002: 73-4). 
42 The set of meanings connected through linking and differentiation that constitute language have been 
called webs of signification (Hansen 2006: 17) 
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concepts in a process that reinforces meanings that together constitute the discourse. At 
the same time, these meanings are juxtaposed against things that they don’t mean, or are 
contrary to, through differentiation. This process which creates meaning and identity is 
unstable and never creates truly fixed or permanent meanings and identities. Instead work 
must be done, or performed, to continually reinforce the linkages and differentiations 
which are prone to shifting as meanings are contested and as rearticulations by actors 
vary. In this way, while meaning and identity may be stable in the short term, all that is 
discursively maintained is subject to “slips and instabilities.”43 If people begin to make 
linkages in a different way, for example associating “nuclear” with “genocide” instead of 
“strength,” then the dominant meaning of the discourse on “nuclear” weapons might shift 
which might upset the consonance of identity and policy built on a particular account of 
the discourse and could potentially lead to a change in policy.  
Epistemology  
 This dissertation investigates the discursive emergence of two competing 
conceptions of nuclear weapons, and their place in US foreign policy and international 
relations. The first is the discourses developed and propagated by elites and soon-to-be 
elites that became or nearly became the policy of the United States. As the discourse 
articulated by the president and his staff, this discourse is typically hegemonic. The 
alternative discourse emerged first in response to the US nuclear attack of Japan, but 
established itself in earnest as US nuclear testing and the tension of the Cold War ramped 
up during the 1950’s. The analysis that follows will focus on showing how these 
discourse created “structures of signification,” how they “produced” the world in which 
                                                 
43 Ibid.: 18 
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they operated—particularly the “common sense” and policies of the time, and how they 
were practiced, or how effort or work was expended to (re)produce the discourses and 
their inherent conflict. These three foci are consonant with the “three analytically 
distinguishable bundles of theoretical claims” that characterize studies within the 
discourse analysis research program; these include “systems of signification,” 
“productivity,” and “play of practice.”44 Each is taken up in turn in the following 
sections. 
Systems of Signification 
 As suggested above, the approach here conceives of meaning as produced through 
discourse, and made intelligible and semi-stable through the juxtaposition of one meaning 
to others through linking and differentiation. If these semi-stable structures of meaning 
built on “webs of intelligibility” produce meaning, it is possible to use texts to triangulate 
these meanings or “relational distinctions and hierarchies that order persons’ knowledge 
about the things defined by discourse.”45 Essentially, this piece of the analysis establishes 
what the discourses look like at a point in time. Adding texts from other points in time 
that produce and reproduce the same discourses can show change over time, or the 
slippage of meaning including both gradual evolution of particular meanings, to rapid 
punctuated change. While a single text is insufficient to say anything about a discourse, 
since discourses are socially produced, the number of texts to use to establish the 
existence and nature of a discourse is driven by however many it takes to establish stable 
                                                 
44 Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 5, No. 3 (1999): 228. 
45 Ibid.: 231 
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theoretical categories.46 That is, at some point additional texts reproduce categories 
already established by the researcher without adding anything new. Texts should be those 
generated by a variety of subjects authorized to speak and act within the discourse in 
question.  
 For the current undertaking, presidents and their closest advisers are those most 
obviously authorized to articulate and rearticulate the dominant discourses. Their words, 
symbols, and metaphors create the sets of meanings upon which policy will be based. The 
key producers of the alternative or oppositional discourses are less obvious. However, 
they are also necessarily vocal and through a careful historic review as well as the 
investigation into the hegemonic discourse, these creators of the alterative discourse can 
be revealed. The analysis here will focus on the competing representations of nuclear 
weapons and their place in US foreign policy by these two discourses over time. Part of 
the driving motivation of this research is that insufficient attention has been paid to the 
impact of the nuclear taboo on policy. To remedy that deficiency this research will pay 
close attention to the construction of the concept of the nuclear taboo, but also to the 
ways in which those in the hegemonic discourse have both tiptoed around the taboo while 
also doing the work of its very constitution. The research will shed light on the ways in 
which the nuclear taboo has been given life through discourse, and the ways in which that 
discourse has interacted with the hegemonic discourses constructed by those who would 
oppose the taboo’s very existence.  
                                                 
46 Texts “embody and produce” discourses, but do not themselves constitute a discourse. Instead 
researchers must look to “bodies of texts” which encompass “the interrelations between texts, changes in 
texts, new textual forms, and new systems of distributing texts.” Taken together these elements constitute a 
discourse over time. See Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes 
of Social Construction, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002): 5. 
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Productivity 
 Consistent with discourse analysis, this research also investigates the manner 
through which the discourses under study produced the world by privileging certain 
actors to speak from inside the discourse, producing a sense of what kinds of policies 
would be logical and appropriate, and ultimately providing a broader “common sense” 
for the rest of society.47 In particular, this research shows how the production of a 
“regime of truth” enabled foreign policies. For the presidential administrations at the 
heart of the case studies this meant a regime of truth from which a more aggressive 
nuclear weapons stance logically followed. Building more, or new nuclear weapons can 
only be justified if the discourse includes a story about the threats confronting the US, 
and the manner in which the proposed changes to nuclear weapons policy would address 
those threats and ultimately advance the security of the US. This productive activity is 
carried out through articulation—a process that uses the raw materials of language and 
culture to produce discourse.48 This process in addition produces subject positions which 
calls on subjectivities to take the identities prescribed by the discourse and to then speak 
and reproduce that discourse.49 
 In this research, the focus will be on the related processes of producing a need for 
new or better nuclear weapons, as well as one which does the opposite. The case studies 
pay close attention to texts which construct an emerging common sense about what 
should be done about US nuclear weapons. Consonant with this attention, this work 
                                                 
47 For a discussion of the discursive production see Milliken (1999: 236) and Epstein (2008: 9-10). 
48 Milliken (1999: 239) 
49 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 163. 
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highlights the subject positions created by powerful speakers within the respective 
discourses. For example, the Eisenhower case study shows efforts to normalize nuclear 
weapons and justify continued testing, a process which produced a “common sense” that 
this was the only path forward in light of the discursive production of the threatening 
Soviet Union. This process created space for individuals to become pro-nuclear, or 
patriotic in support of the hegemonic discourse at the heart of the status quo. At the same 
time an oppositional discourse, uneasy about nuclear weapons and increasingly fearful of 
nuclear testing, created the subject position of the anti-nuclear activist—a new identity 
that persists to this day.  
Play of Practice 
 Finally, following Milliken, this research uses the juxtapositional method and 
“subjugated knowledges” to highlight and understand the contingent nature of the 
discourses that are produced. These methods advocate pairing hegemonic representations 
with alternatives to show how the dominant “truth” is contingent, and built upon 
particular notions of what things are, or what things mean. By juxtaposing official or 
hegemonic accounts against those generated by the alternative discourse, it becomes 
possible to see clearly the contingent, discursive edifice upon which policy is built. These 
methods also shed light on the ways in which alternative discourses are constructed, and 
how they can be mobilized to resist the power of the hegemony.  
 These methods lend themselves especially well to the research undertaken in this 
dissertation. This research began with the assertion that the nuclear taboo is real, but that 
contemporary scholarship has not done enough to consider the broader ramifications of 
this insight. Instead most scholarship has labored to convince readers that indeed a 
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socially constructed taboo has a powerful effect on the prospect of nuclear weapons use. 
The success of scholars in making this case and at the same time highlighting the social 
processes that constitute the taboo raises the questions about the implications of the 
existence of the taboo in cases outside of those used to demonstrate the taboo’s existence. 
From the perspective of this dissertation, much can be revealed about that question by 
juxtaposing the sets of knowledge and discourses that support hegemonic policy, or the 
policies implemented by presidents, with the emerging knowledge and discourses that 
powerfully opposed those policies and in the process yielded the nuclear taboo. 
Understanding the competing definitions of the same objects and events has the potential 
to clarify the political processes underlying nuclear policy construction and deepen our 
grasp of broader episodes of foreign policymaking.  
Case Studies 
 Cases in this research were chosen with an eye toward the ways in which they 
illustrate the subject of inquiry. Following Phillips and Hardy, the three case studies 
summarized below and explored in depth in the following chapters, are “extreme” cases, 
or those in which the “theoretical implications are likely to be more visible”.50 While this 
research suggests continuity in the discourses that support the nuclear taboo, the content 
of these discourses is most sharply and often articulated when challenged.51 At the same 
time, challenges to the nuclear taboo are moments when policymakers are most affected 
by the power of this norm. During periods in which presidents uphold the status quo, or 
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make no moves that increase the likelihood of nuclear use, the bearers of the nuclear 
taboo have less incentive to articulate their position, or to expend the energy to affect 
policy. From a research perspective this means fewer and less powerful texts to draw 
from to identify and understand the discourses they produce. Nevertheless, even though 
the case studies are focused on the presidential administrations of Eisenhower, Reagan, 
and Bush, the cases require research into the historical contexts that existed as each 
president began their tenures. That means that the administrations of Truman, Carter, and 
Clinton will all require scrutiny to understand the respective status quos that their 
successors would inherit. In addition, the chronological spread of the case studies allows 
for a meaningful look at the dynamics of the processes under consideration over the 
entire history of nuclear weapons themselves. This dissertation will conclude in part with 
a mini-case study considering the early nuclear weapons policy of Trump. The next 
sections will summarize each of the main case studies. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 In the early 1950’s, much of what became fundamental about nuclear deterrence, 
prospects for nuclear war, and the nuclear taboo, had yet to be institutionalized in the 
thinking and policies of elites, or in the discourses of the wider public. However, the era 
would be marked by increasing awareness of nuclear weapons as the problem in foreign 
policy. On one hand, George Kennan and others had labored in the late 1940’s to 
convince US policymakers that the Soviet Union could not be negotiated with, but that 
they would respond to force. At the time the US was rapidly expanding its nuclear 
capacity, testing the world’s first hydrogen bomb in 1952, a project undertaken in part 
because of the Soviet atomic bomb test in 1949. As Eisenhower took office, officials 
31 
 
lamented the perceived edge the Soviets carried in conventional weapons, but thought 
that the US edge in nuclear weapons could be exploited to stave off war, or win it if need 
be. On the other hand, the use of atomic bombs on Japan had spawned the anti-nuclear 
movement. In 1947, John Hersey published “Hiroshima,” a harrowing look at six 
survivors in the aftermath of the first US atomic attack.52 The push and pull of these two 
forces—the belief that the Soviet Union was an irrational expansionary power, and 
increasing public anxiety about all things nuclear—would be the central conflict that 
would shape nuclear policy in this era. Eisenhower tried to escape from the emerging 
social prohibition on nuclear weapons through both reassurance as in the December 1953 
“Atoms for Peace” speech, and through outright argumentation, as he and Dulles set out 
to do in March 1954 as they tried to expand their options in Quemoy and Matsu. 
 Efforts to condition the public to be more comfortable with nuclear power only 
stoked growing public anxiety. Throughout the middle and late 1950’s, hundreds of 
nuclear tests and the nuclear fallout they generated fueled scientific and public awareness 
of the widespread hazards of radiation and nuclear fallout. The Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) devoted tremendous resources to beating back the emerging 
consensus that radiation from nuclear testing posed a danger to the US public. This case 
study shows the emergence of the powerful discourse at the heart of the nuclear taboo. 
Eisenhower’s first year was marked by efforts to assuage public concerns about nuclear 
power, and prime the public for what the administration believed was a real possibility 
that nuclear weapons would be deployed in war. “Atoms for Peace” and their efforts in 
the late 1950’s under the auspices of the AEC did the opposite: the public became even 
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more alarmed, all the while the scientific community piled on evidence that nuclear 
testing posed a danger to the broader public. By the time Eisenhower left office, an 
entrenched and powerful anti-nuclear discourse had taken hold among the public in the 
US and other countries, notably the UK and Japan. When, just a few years later, the 
world narrowly averted nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the foundation was 
already in place for a move toward arms control and away from the unconstrained arms 
racing that characterized the 1950’s. 
Ronald W. Reagan 
     In Reagan's case discourse analysis shows the intermingling and conflict between 
a president's own convictions—and associated discourses to which the president further 
lent power and legitimacy—and a widespread and powerful anti-nuclear weapons 
discourse. The showdown between competing conceptions of the role nuclear weapons 
should play in US foreign policy shaped the broader arc of nuclear weapons policy 
throughout the 1980's, a decade which would begin with a major defense and nuclear 
weapons buildup and conclude with the signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
and substantive progress on what would become the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 
later signed by George H.W. Bush in 1991. Focusing on discourse reveals much about 
the turnabout that took place over the course of the Reagan presidency. 
The shift in policy from buildup to treaty-building reflects the underlying clash 
between the Reagan discourse and the Nuclear Freeze Movement. Reagan first discussed 
nuclear weapons in 1945, beginning with the conviction that nuclear weapons should be 
abolished. As governor of California in 1967 he met with Edward Teller, father of the 
hydrogen bomb, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in northern California. The 
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conversations there would lead to the centrality of missile defense in Reagan's 
conceptualization of US nuclear weapons politics. By the time he took office, he had 
been repeatedly persuaded not only of the viability of missile defense as part of US 
forces, but also that the Soviets had already deployed missile defense, and that the US 
deterrent had eroded. 
All the while, the powerful anti-war (and anti-nuclear) sentiment that had built up 
during the Vietnam War would congeal into resistance to the initial Reagan defense 
stance. Their activity however had not been consequential—that would change due in 
part to the rise of Reagan, and more importantly the discursive work and activism of 
Randall Forsberg who founded the Nuclear Freeze Movement. From humble beginnings 
in 1980, the movement rapidly gained popularity culminating with a massive march in 
Central Park in June 1982. In addition to gathering and empowering various stripes of 
anti-war and anti-nuclear activists, the movement caught the attention of Reagan. Reagan 
tried unsuccessfully to undermine the group in various ways including claiming the 
movement had been founded by Soviet agents. The efforts did little to undermine the 
broad public support for the movement, and against the defense buildup in progress 
throughout the early 1980's.  
Instead, Reagan's own conception of the Soviet Union as an "evil" expansionary 
power, and his Strategic Defense Initiative only underscored for the public the need to 
bring the nuclear arms race to a "freeze." Faced with overwhelming pressure, and the 
1984 general election looming, Reagan's rhetoric began to shift. He said for the first time 
public, on March 31, 1982 that "I don't think there can be any winners" in a nuclear 
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war.53 That summer nearly a million gathered in New York’s Central Park in favor of the 
freeze movement.54 The following year Reagan built upon his earlier rhetoric, telling the 
UN General Assembly that, “the elimination of these weapons-the zero option—is the 
best.”55 The following month he suggested to an aide that maybe he should propose 
eliminating all nuclear weapons. This shifting rhetoric was direct result of the power of 
the nuclear freeze movement. While Reagan's position on missile defense remained the 
same, his newfound openness to arms control tracks closely with the rise in popularity 
and influence of the Nuclear Freeze Movement. The renewed focus on arms control and 
subsequent successes cannot be understood outside of Reagan's serious confrontation 
with the Nuclear Freeze. 
George W. Bush 
 In this case, I trace the emergence of the major challenge to the deeply entrenched 
nuclear taboo that took place under President George W. Bush between 2001 and 2005. 
Early in the Bush tenure, the administration launched a multiple-year effort to fund a new 
generation of low-yield nuclear weapons and nuclear-tipped earth penetrating-weapons—
the so-called “bunker-busters.” The discursive space for the push began almost 
immediately after Clinton defeated George H.W. Bush for the presidency in 1992. At that 
time, hawkish analysts and future members of the George W. Bush administration got to 
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work laying the discursive foundation of what would become a major push for a new 
generation of nuclear weapons. On December 31, 2001, the administration delivered the 
Nuclear Posture Review to Congress. The document and others that followed made the 
case that the emerging threats posed by rogue states and terrorism necessitated new types 
of nuclear weapons. In particular the administration stressed the need for low-yield 
nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed earth penetrating weapons (EPWs). They argued that 
the former would more effectively deter rogue states and terrorists, as well as providing 
more options to the president in case deterrence failed. EPWs were considered necessary 
to threaten enemy “hardened and deeply buried facilities.”56 
 In the fall of 2002, the plans were introduced in Congress, and a debate which 
would run well into 2005 began. The conflict would reveal much about the state of the 
nuclear taboo and the contours of the prohibition given the particular content of the 
contending discourses. On the floors of the House and Senate, in the popular press, and 
among nuclear strategists, analysts, and scholars the debate raged. Discursively, the Bush 
administration sought to reconstruct and rearticulate the notion of deterrence. Dr. Keith 
Payne and others were enlisted to problematize “deterrence” and link the state of 
deterrence with their ongoing critique of the weakness of Clinton administration. They 
connected deterrence with terms like “inadequate,” “Cold War,” and “Soviet Union” in 
order to build the case that deterrence should be “enhanced.” The Bush administration 
and supporters began touting “enhanced deterrence”—a concept to be differentiated from 
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“traditional deterrence” or the practice used during the Cold War toward the Soviet 
Union which relied on “modest accuracy with large warhead yields.”57 
 The alternative discourse, rearticulated and extended the discourse at the heart of 
the nuclear taboo, and in the process, eventually defeated the “Advanced Concepts 
Initiative” which included the “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” (RNEP). By contrast 
this discourse cast the proposed projects as undermining the practice of deterrence by 
refocusing the US nuclear arsenal on “warfighting” rather than deterrence. In addition, 
the alternative discourse succeeded at linking the new generation of nuclear weapons to 
the US nonproliferation efforts. From this perspective new nuclear weapons would 
undermine US leadership in the international nonproliferation regime, violate the spirit of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and encourage others to ramp up their own nuclear 
weapons programs with larger, more sophisticated arsenals. The discursive efforts 
capitalized on widespread public support for nonproliferation goals, and aversion to 
nuclear war. Although the new weapons programs secured modest funding in FY2003 
and FY2004, the alternative discourse eventually included even powerful members of the 
GOP. During the FY2005 budget debate it would be Republican David Hobson who 
played a pivotal role in the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations 
Subcommittee. From his position he satisfied organizational demands for funding—even 
if not for RNEP—while articulating the anti-nuclear discourse and effectively killing the 
program. Even though Hobson bucked the party line, it is telling that he confronted little 
pressure from Congressional colleagues or the White House. In all the episode showed 
the strength of the nuclear taboo discourse as its activation overwhelmed Bush 
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administration efforts to redefine deterrence and aggressively build up the US nuclear 
arsenal. 
 
 In the final chapter, I argue that the evidence compiled here shows a complex 
policymaking process through which organizational interests and presidents’ own 
personal experience and biases confront the collection of forces that constitute the nuclear 
taboo head on. This confrontation provides an opening for dramatic results. In the 1950’s, 
the central confrontation began. The latter part of the decade saw the emergence of a 
nuclear politics that would begin to include the anti-nuclear movement, much to the 
chagrin of the Eisenhower administration. Various strands of the movement would be 
part of the maintenance of the nuclear taboo from that point to the present. During the 
1980’s, the anti-nuclear movement and associated discourses pushed Reagan to engage in 
serious arms control efforts with the Soviet Union—a result that might have seemed 
unheard of to those who had listened to his campaign rhetoric. During the Bush years of 
the early 2000’s, the heirs to the anti-nuclear discourse once again checked presidential 
ambition. Bush succeeded at dramatically increasing defense spending, but failed to 
secure the new generation of nuclear weapons he sought.  
 Finally, these conclusions will be used to make tentative observations about the 
Trump administration and the newest push for a new generation of nuclear weapons. 
Superficially, the current challenge resembles that of the George W. Bush administration. 
In fact, Keith Payne, lead architect of the Bush discourse on nuclear weapons and their 
utility also co-authored Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review released in February of 2018. 
The final chapter will consider the emerging discourse on which the Trump challenge is 
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constructed, and build on the case studies to suggest the direction in which the 
confrontation is headed and areas on which activists, journalists, and scholars should 
focus as the process unfolds. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION: EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY 
 
 
In the years that followed the end of World War II in which the US first 
developed and used the atomic bomb, policy with regard to the new weapons and the 
technology from which it came, struggled to keep pace with a continually contested and 
dynamic reality. During those years, the Truman administration compiled a mixed legacy 
on atomic weapons. Truman made the infamous decision to use the atomic bomb against 
Japan, and it was under his watch that the US began the most massive accumulation of 
destructive capacity in history, a course of action that coincided with reductions in 
spending on conventional arms—the result of which would be a greater reliance on the 
still fledgling nuclear arsenal. At the same time, Truman also took steps to establish the 
categories of “conventional” and “weapons of mass destruction.” He refused to treat 
atomic bombs as any other weapon, and indeed prevented military leaders from planning 
to use the weapons. In addition, the first Atomic Energy Commission head Thomas 
Murray—who emphasized the moral threat of nuclear weapons—helped shape Truman’s 
thinking on nuclear weapons.58  
In spite of Truman’s reticence, the trajectory of nuclear weapons policy inherited 
by the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration was one of major growth in nuclear 
stockpiles, with those weapons playing a major role in defense planning. The struggle 
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against the Soviet Union during the Cold War was supported by nearly universal elite 
agreement that the Soviet Unions was expansionist and hopelessly uncooperative. With 
this worldview prominent among the executive agencies and military staff, Eisenhower 
took the helm in January 1953. This chapter reexamines primary source materials in an 
historical case study on the emergence of nuclear weapons policy during the Eisenhower 
presidency against the backdrop of a developing taboo on the use of nuclear weapons in 
combat. The history, and the discursive artifacts of that history, are examined through the 
lens of discourse analysis. As such, the research was conducted with an eye for the ways 
in which actors created texts, rhetorically or in letters, documents, or other 
communication in which they articulated and rearticulated the ensemble of beliefs and 
symbols that (1) shaped and reshaped the Cold War, and (2) established or restated the 
evolving thinking and official policy on the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War (3) 
constructed and reconstructed norms on the appropriate uses of nuclear weapons 
especially, but not limited to, the nuclear taboo. 
The primary research in this chapter is based on materials housed at the 
Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas. There, the research focused on three 
areas within the broader umbrella of nuclear weapons policy during the Eisenhower 
presidency: the emergence of “Atoms for Peace” as both a speech and a set of policies; 
discussions of nuclear weapons testing, and proposals to ban atmospheric testing; and 
documents related to the administration and AEC’s management of radioactive fallout 
from nuclear testing and its human consequences. This paper also employs secondary 
research focused on Eisenhower’s experience with nuclear weapons before he became 
president, as well as his administration’s management of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 
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late 1954 until April 1955. These episodes were chosen because they include moments in 
which officials extended, clarified and rearticulated the discourse on the appropriate role 
for nuclear weapons in US strategy.  
This case was chosen because of its place as a “political moment,” a time when a 
new social or institutional order is possible, and the future is uncertain. Edkins describes 
the political moment as giving rise to a situation, “in which people are forced to make 
decisions, to ‘act’, in a manner for which they can find no guarantee in the social 
framework. That same framework is precisely missing, suspended, because it is in the 
process of reinvention.”59 In the current context, the state of nuclear weapons politics of 
the early 1950’s remained unsettled, and provided an opening for the political moment. 
Truman’s ambivalence toward nuclear weapons, characterized both by a stated 
abhorrence of their destructive capacity but also a willingness to build up the US 
stockpile in number of weapons and destructive yield, left the door open for—and indeed 
obligated—the Eisenhower administration to forge a new policy. This openness was 
supported by a rapidly changing nuclear technology in the US, and a dawning realization 
of the increasingly destructive nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union. Deep uncertainty 
about how the immediate future would shake out provided opening for the administration 
to establish a new set of policies, behaviors, and norms about nuclear weapons as well as 
a conceiving of a whole worldview consistent with this new discourse.  
At the same time, another political moment brewed at the level of public opinion. 
The same forces of technological change and a lack of established thinking or hegemonic 
discourse presented the US public with their own political moment. Immediately after 
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WWII, the public overwhelmingly approved of the use of atomic bombs in Japan, with 
half “not at all worried” about the atomic bomb.60 By the early 1950’s, however, both of 
these features were poised to change. Approval of the bombings of Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima came with the public largely ignorant of the danger of radiation, and the 
notion of widespread regional and even global threats to public health. In addition, in the 
year Eisenhower took office, the Soviet Union detonated their first hydrogen bomb. The 
two superpowers now possessed weapons that could clearly cause catastrophic 
destruction, and for many that meant a decisive weapon now lay in the hands of the 
enemy. The public stood at a moment of openness in which any number of takes on the 
emerging technology could have become preeminent. This chapter will explore the ways 
in which the public experienced that openness and moved from a wide and general 
anxiety about nuclear weapons—but one which did not exert influence over elite 
policymaking—in the beginning of the decade, to a place at the end of Eisenhower’s 
tenure, in which large organized international movements had begun to exert influence 
over policy at the highest levels.  
Pre-Presidency: The Eisenhower Discourse from 1945 to 1953 
 Central to understanding the emergence of nuclear weapons policies out of the 
discursive milieu is the role played by the discourses informing a president’s approach. 
Eisenhower played central and active role in the construction of nuclear weapons policy, 
and indeed in the forging of the meaning of nuclear weapons for both the US national 
security apparatus. These meanings, and the discourses in which they were embedded, 
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were inherited from the Truman administration, military strategists, atomic scientists, as 
well as Eisenhower’s own formative learning on nuclear strategy and politics.  
The future president’s first interaction with the atomic bomb took place with the 
first atomic explosion near Alamogordo, New Mexico in July 1945, after which he 
expressed “grave misgivings” to Secretary of War Stimson.61 Those misgivings aside, 
there is dispute as to the degree to which Eisenhower objected to the deployment of the 
atomic bomb during WWII. Alperovitz claims that Eisenhower registered an objection 
with Stimson after the first test in New Mexico, specifically arguing that he felt Japan 
would be defeated, and that use of the atomic bomb would turn world opinion against the 
US.62 Bernstein disputes the credibility of Alperovitz sources, as they were only the 
words of the president himself in an interview in 1960, and his 1963 memoir. Instead, 
Bernstein suggests that Eisenhower would have shared the conviction of General George 
Marshall who at the time insisted that atomic bombs should be used only on military 
targets, and also seemed to assume that war in the Pacific would continue well into the 
fall of 1945. Bernstein’s account rests on charging Eisenhower with lying repeatedly, and 
inferring his own opinion from a mentor. For the purposes of the current endeavor it is 
sufficient to say that Eisenhower had become critical of the use of the atomic bomb in 
Japan specifically and also about its more general use in war by 1946, though it is also 
difficult to argue that he would feel the need to revise this history in memoirs written 
almost 20 years later. While others in the military and government would push for 
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preventive war with the Soviets as early as 1948, Eisenhower had apparently been moved 
by works such as Bernard Brodie’s The Absolute Weapon, which he distributed to his 
staff in his capacity as Army Chief of Staff. Among other foundational arguments Brodie 
argued, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. 
From now on the chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful 
purpose.”63 Whatever his particular reaction to Brodie, Eisenhower would remain 
opposed to preventive warfare time after time beginning in as early as 1946, when he 
argued to his son John, “The readiness of people to discuss war as a means of advancing 
peace…is a contradiction in terms.”64 
Advent of the Cold War 
 Amidst rumblings in Eastern Europe and increasing tension between the 
remaining superpowers, Churchill famously contended in March 1946 that “an iron 
curtain has descended across the continent.”65 In February 1946, George Kennan 
submitted his “Long Telegram” where he argued that the rivalry between the US and 
Soviet Union was a showdown between communism and capitalism, and one which 
would lead the Soviet government to expand and attempt to dominate foreign 
governments.66 On September 24 of that year Clark Clifford delivered the Clifford-Elsey 
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report, a highly influential and circulated document that reiterated the threat of the Soviet 
Union while additionally advocating for a policy of containment.67 
 Truman’s national security strategy developed against this backdrop of increasing 
suspicion and fear of the freshly articulated Soviet threat. The “Truman Doctrine” came 
in response to events in Turkey and Greece which seemed to confirm the conclusions of 
Kennan, Clifford, and others. In Turkey, the Soviet Union pushed for territory on the 
Dardanelles straits, a geo-strategically important seaway, with direct access to Greece, 
where the British were running low on funds to support the nationalist government 
against communist dissidents. According to the Clifford-Elsey report, the Soviets would 
use this crisis to set up a friendly government in Greece consistent with their expansionist 
ideology. The Truman Doctrine then built on the perception that the Soviet Union’s 
behavior in Turkey, Greece, Iran and elsewhere was aggressive and threatened the 
security of the US. Truman announced the doctrine in a speech to Congress on March 12, 
1946, in which he pledged US support for states threatened by authoritarian forces. The 
pledge broadened the circumstances in which the US would intervene on behalf of other 
states, and underscored the claims made by Kennan and Clifford.  
                                                 
policy recommendations in the Clifford-Elsey Report. See Clark Clifford & George Elsey, September 24, 
1946, “American Relations with the Soviet Union”, Harry Truman Library, Conway Files, Truman Papers, 
https://trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4-1.pdf. Kennan published 
the views the following year under the pseudonym “X” in Foreign Affairs. See X. "The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct". Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947): 566–582. 
67 “Containment” in 1946 had little substance in terms of policy. It would work as a guiding principle for 
policy makers from 1947 until Eisenhower took office in January 1953 (Bowie & Immerman 1998: 12). 
46 
 
 On November 24, 1948, Truman approved a statement of national security 
strategy, NSC 20/4.68 The document captured the mood of US policy makers since 1946, 
painting an image of a hostile and expansionist Soviet Union, and advocating “short of 
war” responses aimed at undermining Soviet efforts. This entailed building alliances, 
employing propaganda, and using economics to disrupt Soviet designs and strengthen 
those of the US and its allies. Also, notably here, the document contended that while 
Soviet ground forces might be able to overrun Europe and the Middle East, and at least 
cause major damage to the UK, they would be deterred from carrying out such an action 
by the US monopoly on atomic bombs.  
 Consonant with the specific role now envisioned for atomic bombs in the US 
strategic plan, Truman also created the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in March 1946. 
SAC would blossom as the branch of the Air Force that would be responsible for the 
delivery of atomic bombs. In 1948, a few events led to the increased salience of SAC. 
First, a communist-led coup took place in Czechoslovakia in February, supporting the 
working assumptions of top officials. Second, the Soviets blockaded West Berlin in 
March preventing US, French, and British supplies from reaching the city which had 
been isolated and surrounded by Soviet controlled East Germany at the conclusion of 
WWII. These two events convinced James Forrestal and others that Truman’s reticence at 
increasing defense budgets would need to be overcome. However, in spite of the threats 
apparently conveyed by the events in Europe, Truman refused to lift his previous 
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constraint on the defense budget and it remained at $14.4 billion.69 The lower budget 
would mean a larger role for air defense and nuclear weapons, with a corresponding 
smaller role for conventional forces. The US had by this time increased the number and 
variety of atomic weapons significantly with total weapons going from 9 in 1946, to 50 in 
1948, and 841 by 1952.70  
As mentioned above this increase in weapons would coincide with the increased 
salience of SAC. In October 1948, Curtis LeMay assumed the position of commanding 
general of SAC. LeMay improved SAC both in its capacity to carry out the missions 
associated with strategic air defense, as well as its position in the national security scrum 
for resources and favor.71 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) codified this larger role being 
carved out for nuclear weapons in December 1949 with Offtackle, a “Joint Outline 
Emergency War Plan”. The plan covered the US response to a Soviet attack: major 
atomic retaliation against both urban and industrial targets followed by extended full-
scale conventional war.72 1949 also saw the end of the US atomic monopoly, as the 
Soviets tested their first atomic device in Kazakhstan in August. Although the 
development had been widely anticipated, it occurred sooner than many expected. In 
response Truman expanded nuclear production facilities in October, and in January 1950, 
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approved the development—and soon after production—of “the super”, or hydrogen 
bomb. 
NSC 68  
 By 1950, the prospect of an atomic-armed Soviet Union as well as a future fusion 
bomb led the administration to reappraise the US strategy. The result—NSC 68—would 
be written primarily by Paul Nitze as part of a State and Defense department working 
group.73 Because many of the assumptions and arguments made by document would 
carry over well into the Eisenhower administration, it is worth noting the important 
points. First, it had already been assumed that the Soviet possessed superior ground 
forces—and with their first atomic bomb test it was now assumed that by 1954, the “year 
of maximum danger”, that they would be able to launch a devastating attack on the US. 
The main departure of NSC 68 from the status quo strategy was urgency.74 Even while 
policy makers considered the Soviets a threat from 1946 to 1950, NSC 68 upped the ante, 
“The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only 
of this Republic but of civilization itself”.75 The dire language came from an appreciation 
of the growing atomic capability of the Soviets. For policy, this implied a more positive 
approach—for fear that “defensive containment” would be ineffective against a 
maniacally expansionist and atomic armed power. Although the document left the precise 
meaning of this positive approach vague, it most definitely included a major military 
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buildup including a major buildup of US atomic weapons, continued development and 
eventually production of the hydrogen bomb, and a buildup of conventional arms 
including by NATO allies whose forces were under the command of Eisenhower. In 
terms of relations between the US and Soviet Union, NSC 68 warned that major 
agreements and cooperation would be contingent upon the buildup achieving a retraction 
of Soviet power, and changes in the Soviet system. SAC, which had grown in 
prominence under LaMay, interpreted NSC 68 to mean that their forces should be able to 
“destroy Soviet war-making industry, to neutralize its atomic delivery capacity, and to 
delay the Soviet advance into Western Europe.”76  
The Early 1950’s: No Consensus  
 The final two years of the Truman administration featured consistent infighting 
over the appropriate budgets, the role of nuclear weapons, and the prospects for fighting 
conventional war in Europe. Although “Offtackle” planned on responding to a Soviet 
attack with a major SAC offensive, the assumption remained that the attack would not be 
decisive and that a major mobilization and conventional war would follow in Europe.77 
However, plans for building up the militaries of Europe ran into economic constraints, 
even as the US confronted its own budget difficulties. Easing tensions on the Korean 
Peninsula in 1951 as well as deficits projected by Bureau of the Budget increased 
pressure to slow military spending. All the while Nitze and others continued to argue that 
such levels of spending would be insufficient to achieve the strategy of NSC 68. The 
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result of this tension would be “stretch-out”—a compromise that capped military 
expending at $44 billion in FY52 and $60 billion in FY53.78  
 Two documents capture the evolving debate over strategy vis-a-via the Soviet 
Union at the end of the Truman presidency. Truman approved the first, NSC 135, in July 
1952.79 While affirming the primary objectives of NSC 68, NSC 135 took a more 
sanguine view about the potential behavior of the Soviet Union. In NSC 135, Charles 
Bohlen—a State Department official, and the primary author—argued that the Soviets 
would prioritize security of their own regime more so than had been emphasized in the 
past. From Bohlen’s view, the Soviets were less likely to start a war if they had doubts 
that the regime would survive. As a result, they could be deterred with a force that could 
put the Soviet regime at risk with a strong US retaliation.    
Along with this argument came a prescription for measured, rather than 
aggressive, pressure on the Soviet Union with an understanding that even many of the 
measures underway might not reduce the threat to the US. This view concurred with a 
1952 CIA report which argued that the Soviet regime showed signs of stability.80 Such 
stability would not be easily shaken through the sort of “short of war” pressure that the 
US had been applying. NSC 141 continued the theme, revealing that military programs 
had not been adjusted to seriously confront the force requirements central to the 
objectives of NSC 68. Nitze, as the mind behind NSC 68, criticized the revised strategy, 
asking if “we are really satisfied with programs which in fact have the objective of 
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making us a sort of hedge-hog, unattractive to attack…”81 His question implied the de 
facto strategy that had emerged. NSC 141 conceded that the US would not have sufficient 
conventional forces for up to three years even with increased spending on particular 
programs. If conventional forces would not be up to the moderated objectives of NSC 
135, the US would be left with nuclear deterrence as its bulwark against the Soviet 
Union. US reliance on nuclear deterrence was unprecedented, with Nitze warning that 
SAC might not actually be able to mount a retaliation if the hypothetical Soviet first 
strike hit US forces while they were still on the ground. NATO shared this dissatisfaction 
with the status quo and debated among other things, the impact of nuclear weapons on 
strategy from 1950 through 1952. As the Truman era came to a close, no consensus 
existed about what should be done about the Soviet Union or with nuclear weapons, 
either in NATO, or even within the administration’s agencies and branches.  
 This brief look at the politics that surrounded atomic weapons in the period 
leading up to Eisenhower’s presidency reveal a few major discourses that would be 
powerfully affect the policy that would emerge throughout the 1950’s. Eisenhower 
himself was apparently moved by what he read from Brodie, and his co-authors.82 The 
discourse tapped into and powerfully rearticulated by The Absolute Weapon was ahead of 
its time in some ways. Many who saw the destruction wrought by atomic bombs were 
unconvinced of the military and political implications of the weapon, and their critiques 
of Brodie’s conclusions found an audience. However, soon after Eisenhower took office 
the US would test the hydrogen bomb. The awesome scale of the new weapon, and near 
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certainty that Soviets would also have the capability to build their own in a short time, 
convinced many that indeed atomic weapons would be transformative with regard to 
warfare and international relations.83 It would seem that Eisenhower had become aware 
of the danger of escalation in total war when both sides have nuclear weapons, the 
difficulty of defense, and the prospect that war between nuclear armed states would not 
be winnable without tremendous suffering well before those points would be underscored 
by the hydrogen bomb. In addition senior military and national security staff had 
conflicting views about the prospects of “rolling back” the Soviet regime per NSC 68, 
and building up conventional forces in order to achieve those objectives. The 
disagreement stemmed from a fundamental divergence over whether the Soviet Union 
would continue to be deterred by atomic weapons and what was widely agreed to be 
insufficient conventional forces. Adjudicating these competing discourses in order to 
form new policy would be the challenge for the new president, sworn in on January 1953. 
The Early Eisenhower Administration: Candor and Atoms for Peace 
 Eisenhower entered the White House with major critiques of Truman’s 
management of the budget and resource disputes, and with his own dynamic views about 
the role atomic weapons would play in the broader security policy of the new 
administration. These views had been shaped by Brodie, the Smyth report, and two 
Atomic Energy Commission briefings that had taken place shortly after the election.84 
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Upon taking office, a special panel appointed by outgoing Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson presented the new president with an intensive study of the role of atomic 
weapons in the US arsenal as well as the prospects for disarmament. Although the 
document was ordered by the Truman administration, it would be central to the unfolding 
of thinking and policy in the new administration. As with Brodie’s influential book, 
Eisenhower distributed the report to his staff—this time the NSC, and asked they become 
familiar with its prescriptions.85  
“Armaments and American Policy” 
 In the summer of 1952, Acheson appointed a panel consisting of Vannevar Bush, 
John Dickey, Allen Dulles, Joseph Johnson, and Robert Oppenheimer with McGeorge 
Bundy as secretary (the Oppenheimer panel), to produce a study on disarmament and US 
policy, which they completed in January 1953.86 At that time the panel passed on the 
newly completed document, “Armaments and American Policy” to the incoming 
Eisenhower administration.87 In the first part of the study, the panel paints a grim picture 
of the process and results of arms control negotiations. From their view the US had been 
stymied in its goal of arms control in spite of sincere effort, “The proposals of the United 
States were the result of the most searching study, and they were presented with genuine 
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good will with a major attempt to bring a terrifying new force under international control, 
even at a time when the US had a monopoly on atomic weapons. But in all the debate and 
discourse which has followed on Mr. Baruch’s opening speech, there has never been any 
sign that agreement was remotely likely.”88 From the panel’s view, Soviet policy and 
personnel were the obstacle. They argue, “The general record of the Soviets in diplomacy 
is one in which the meaning of words has been distorted, the privacy of discussions 
violated, and trust repaid by trickery.”89 In addition to Soviet intransigence, the authors 
point to failed efforts to limit arms during the interwar period in both Europe and the 
Pacific as evidence that arms control is inherently tied to larger international issues such 
that it is impossible to take on disarmament without considering the wider context of the 
contest between the West and the Soviet Union. This last argument, would be one that 
would become part of the larger discourse on arms control throughout the 1950’s, with 
this being perhaps the first time that it would be made to Eisenhower himself.      
 Part II of “Armaments and American Policy” makes three important points which 
would be important for emerging nuclear weapons policy. First, advances in the science 
and industrial processes associated with atomic energy were leading to more efficient 
production and a massive accumulation of destructive capacity for the US and Soviet 
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Union. Importantly however, they concede that while they can guess at Soviet production 
of fissile material from the three atomic tests, “From this sort of information it is not 
possible to make any close estimate of Soviet atomic strength.” In spite of this, they note 
that advances in the science has multiplied the destructiveness available from the same 
amount of fissile material, and that there is no reason that the Soviet Union will not 
experience the same sorts of advances. The document argues that when stockpiles reach a 
certain size, and even to some degree at present, the operative variable is not 
destructiveness—which is not in question, but the ability to deliver these atomic 
weapons. They go on, “constantly expanding stockpiles cannot in and of themselves 
bring catastrophe. It will be necessary for those that wish to have a full use of their 
atomic ammunition to spend great efforts on carriers of one sort or another, and it will be 
possible to attempt a defense against such carriers.”90 This insight foreshadows the 
central role that delivery systems would end up playing in arms control for decades to 
come. The debate over the possibility of defense against nuclear weapons is noted by the 
panel who urge more study, but also make a theoretical argument that with enough 
weapons the Soviet Union will be able to destroy the US economy completely. The 
exercise in considering the implications of ever-increasing stockpiles led the panel to the 
possibility of stability through nuclear deterrence, “If the atomic arms race continues, 
therefore, we seem likely to have within a relatively few years a situation in which the 
two great powers will each have a clear-cut capacity to do very great damage to the other, 
while each will be unable to exert that capacity except at gravest risk of receiving similar 
terrible blows in return. And this situation is likely to be largely unaffected by the fact 
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that one side may always have many more weapons than the other.”91 In such a situation 
they argue, stability may arise from both sides being unwilling to “flip the switch.” They 
note however that the road to such a stability might be hazardous, with both sides being 
tempted to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike. 
 The second point made by Part II is that nuclear weapons had functionally placed 
the hearts of the two societies in the front lines of any future conflict. While in the past 
wars between great powers often took place far away from the capitals or social bases of 
the respective societies, a future world war would bring the battle to the doorsteps of each 
society. The fact that capitals and major cities could now be completely destroyed 
rendered them potentially decisive targets. They do not discount the role of conventional 
armies or the fact that war may still be fought over territory at the margins, only that the 
two major powers were now “strategic neighbors,” able to put each other’s heartlands at 
risk with atomic weapons.92 
 And finally, the last point rehashes the major decisions undertaken by the US 
since the advent of the atomic bomb, and notes the danger of the de facto posture. The 
panel lists the key decisions in US policy including: the development of the atomic 
weapons; use of the bomb against Japan; maintaining a monopoly on control of the 
atomic bomb; the decision to build weapons in quantity; the incorporation of atomic 
bombs into military planning; and planning any major war to be characterized by a major 
atomic strike on the military and industrial centers of the enemy—an “overpowering 
strategic blow.” It is this last piece that the panel found problematic. They foresaw any 
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major war effort against the Soviet Union being characterized by a major SAC offensive 
in which as many atomic bombs as possible would be dumped on strategic targets in the 
Soviet Union with great speed—a necessary component in such an attack. While such an 
attack could have been successful, other studies such as “Offtackle” maintained that a 
strike as such would not be decisive, leaving the conflict in the hands of conventional 
forces.93 The Oppenheimer panel conceded that the strength of conventional capabilities 
possessed by the US at this time left no choice but to escalate to atomic war—even in the 
face of studies suggested that such an attack would not be decisive. The panel goes on to 
underscore what such a strike meant for the prospects for defense, “The object of the 
attack is to ‘saturate’ the defense, and the whole concept seems closely connected with a 
sense that defense against this kind of warfare—for us as for the enemy—is not really 
possible.”94 This insight brought to the fore the imbalance between concern with what to 
do with the US atomic bomb and what to do about the Soviet atomic bomb. This stems in 
part from, “the simple but unpleasant fact that the bomb works both ways.”95 
 In the final section the panel makes recommendations based on their conclusions.  
These recommendations include: a policy of candor toward the American people with 
regard to the atomic age; harmonizing atomic weapon policy with the goal of building 
community among the “free world”; focusing on building a continental defense; 
disengaging from disarmament talks under the auspices of the United Nations; and 
improving communication with the leaders of the Soviet Union. These recommendations 
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carried real weight with Eisenhower and the administration and would be topics that 
would echo through the administration’s eight years. The first recommendation of candor 
toward the American people would be a major component of the administration’s 
approach to atomic weapons during its first year.  
NSC 151 
 Acheson had commissioned “Armaments and American Policy” in April 1952, 
with the final report being delivered on January 19, 1953. The report came up for 
discussion at a meeting of the NSC on February 18. The president and his advisors 
discarded the recommendation that the US disengage from disarmament talks under the 
UN, noting the psychological impact of doing so. However, on May 8, an interim 
report—NSC 151—issued by a new ad hoc committee of the NSC showed the progress 
of administration implementation of the policy of candor with the American people with 
regard to nuclear weapons.96 The original presentation reasoned that wise governments 
depend on the support of the people, and that the danger of the arms race as it unfolded 
had not been sufficiently conveyed to either the people or even most policy makers. The 
rapidly increasing danger of the arms race, and the growing potential of the Soviets to 
also wield atomic weapons, had left the American public and its government 
“dangerously unaware.”97 The document goes on to recommend the adoption of a policy 
of candor and begins to define what that will entail. While technical information about 
the bomb would of course remain secret, the committee recommended that a program be 
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adopted where the essential facts of the arms race and its associated danger would be 
conveyed to the public regularly. They argued that disclosure of these dangers, “would 
mean that the President and his principal officers, would regularly take the people into 
their confidence in the conviction that in a democracy an informed public is the best 
safeguard against extreme public reactions, such as frightened despair on the one hand or 
an impulsive sentiment for preventive war on the other.”98 In addition to their concern for 
democracy and informed decision making on the part of the public, the government, and 
even allied states, NSC 151 points out the vacuum in meaning that still existed in the 
rapidly developing atomic age. This represented an opportunity for the US government to 
build a meaning that would serve its interests. Specifically they argue, “No physical 
phenomenon is inherently good or bad in itself. Atomic weapons must be considered part 
of our overall weapons system, so that the question of morality will relate only to the way 
in which this or any other weapon is used. This will give us greater freedoms of action 
with respect to all elements of our military strength.”99 The argument would likely win 
favor with a president characterized by a style of respect for the dignity of the office, “a 
need for restraint on the tremendous power of the executive office…, and a conviction 
that a president must not exploit his powers for any purpose beyond the scope of his 
constitutional duties.”100 The report and its recommendations then appealed directly to 
Eisenhower’s convictions about the role of government vis-à-vis its people. 
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 In its discussion, NSC 151 also considered benefits of candor with the US public 
on relations with the Soviets as well as with allies. The Soviets, they argued, would not 
become privy to any new information of which they were not aware through the various 
programs of candor. Information that might be novel to the Soviets would only be 
released if such revelation provided a net advantage to the US. Further, they contend that 
greater and more accurate information about US capabilities would keep the Soviets 
aware of the danger posed by a US retaliation and could aid in deterring a first strike. 
Allies would benefit from having a clear picture of US policy, and of the potential 
efficacy of the atomic deterrent.  
 The report included an annex that discussed type of information to be shared with 
the American people. The emphasis here underscored the danger and reality of the arms 
race as it unfolded. Several important points were thought to be worth sharing with the 
public under the banner of candor. First, though the US had a lead in atomic production, 
that lead was temporary, and would be meaningless when the Soviet Union reached a 
point where they could “injure the US critically”; at that point the US would have no 
effective defense.101 This was tied to the argument that after a certain point in the 
development of atomic science, advances in weapons production proceeded rapidly—and 
there was no reason to believe that Soviet development would not keep pace with that of 
the US. In addition, large stockpiles would shift importance to delivery systems.102 The 
Soviets already had intercontinental delivery methods, with these methods improving for 
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both sides over the next ten to fifteen years. In addition, and foreshadowing “Atoms for 
Peace,” the document called for candor about the prospect of peaceful atomic capabilities 
developing which could elevate the living standards of the “free world nations.”103 And 
finally, the authors saw value in sharing their conviction that, “The atomic weapon varies 
only in degree from other weapons…Moral objections to the use of atomic weapons 
should be on the same basis as for other weapons capable of destroying life and inflicting 
damage.”104  
Psychological Warfare 
 Concurrent with discussions that led to the candor portion of Eisenhower’s Atoms 
for peace, the administration began pursuing efforts at “psychological” warfare that 
aimed at improving relations between the superpowers, or at least the US’s position in 
that contest. Eisenhower had been impressed by a report generated by a conference on 
psychological warfare in 1952. As president, he appointed one of the conference’s 
leaders, CD Jackson, a magazine executive, as his assistant of psychological warfare.105 
Jackson’s idea for a “psychological offensive” on Soviet satellite states coincided with 
calls from Charlie Wilson and Vice President Richard Nixon to make a bold peace offer 
to the Soviets.106 Eisenhower concurred and tasked Secretary of State Dulles with 
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overseeing an effort to include Jackson, Chip Bohlen, Emmet Hughes and Paul Nitze, to 
craft such a proposal. Only a couple of weeks after the decision to proceed, reports 
reached the US that Joseph Stalin was close to death. The leadership including 
Eisenhower and Jackson felt that the unexpected event should be exploited and “chaos” 
should be promoted in the Soviet Union.107 Throughout March and April, the State 
department and the Psychological Strategy Board headed by Jackson sparred over the 
content of the proposal. They sought to balance the goal of undermining the Soviet 
position, with maintaining progress on building the European Defense Community, and 
per Eisenhower, “make a serious bid for peace.” Emmet Hughes produced one of the later 
drafts of what became known as the “Chance for Peace” speech. During the debate 
leading up to the speech as delivered on April 16, 1953, Hughes tried unsuccessfully to 
untangle whether the speech should be a genuine effort toward peace, or whether it would 
be a piece of propaganda aimed at undermining the Soviets during a time of crisis. While 
Eisenhower himself reiterated the need for a genuine efforts at peace, the consensus in 
the NSC and State department seemed to be a speech that would effectively manage 
both.108 
The actual speech, delivered to the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the 
Statler Hotel in Washington and broadcast on television and radio, hammered home 
much of the Cold War discourse that had become hegemonic among elites.109 
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Eisenhower built a dualism between the open and free societies of the West which 
achieve security through mutual aid and cooperation and the Soviet Union which chooses 
to pursue security through force. The path to peace in the speech called for the Soviet 
Union to broker a lasting peace in Southeast Asia, to allow Germany to be united and 
become a part of the European Defense Community (EDC), and even for the Marshall 
Plan to be extended to Soviet states in Eastern Europe. The call is actually consistent with 
that of “Armaments and American Policy” which had argued no disarmament 
negotiations would be fruitful without settling the major outstanding issues in 
international politics. The calls for Soviet action did not include specifics or timetables, 
and were ultimately seen by the Soviet elites as propaganda. On the contrary they 
considered Dulles’s less conciliatory speech delivered two days later to capture the truer 
intentions of the US.110 Soviet skepticism notwithstanding, Eisenhower believed that the 
speech brought the dialogue closer to the non-confrontational tone that would be 
necessary for disarmament negotiations to take place. 
A Chance for “Peace” 
Chernus argues that Eisenhower’s rhetoric in the “A Chance for Peace” speech 
invokes multiple meanings of the word peace. In contrast to Truman who advocated only 
military buildup in order to deter Soviet attack, Eisenhower sought peace also through 
mutual concessions and disarmament. In terms of actual policy though, the speech gave 
few concrete details and per Chernus, betrayed multiple competing definitions of peace 
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that would impact national security strategy and the emergence of nuclear weapons 
policy going forward, and offered few concessions on the part of the US. “Peace” as used 
by Eisenhower in the “Chance for Peace” speech and in other discourse going forward 
meant one of three things: “the expansion of the American way throughout the world. A 
second assumed the Iron Curtain as the limit to that expansion, but it foresaw a day when 
communist nations still existed but no longer posed a threat. A third denied that such a 
day could ever come. It implied that peace meant not expanding, but perceptually 
defending the border of the ‘free world.’”111 The first definition might imply either the 
eventual demise of the Soviet system from within or with the help of US coercion. The 
latter two definitions of peace leave room for stability through deterrence and for the 
continued existence of the Soviet Union, though in the second it is not clear if the regime 
would be intact. For Chernus, the speech and these definitions of peace ruled out major 
concessions by the US in favor of a powerful rearticulation of Cold War rhetoric in which 
the US system inherently represents peace; thus the tension, arms buildups, and proxy 
wars of the Cold War were the result of Soviet intransigence. So while Eisenhower’s 
rhetoric on the one hand took a self-righteous view of the US and condemned the Soviets 
for causing the Cold War, it also made a plea for peace through negotiation. This view 
would make any progress in the called for negotiations impossible. The Soviets saw that 
they had not been offered any real concessions and they would not receive an offer that 
would disadvantage the US. Eisenhower and Dulles were aware that their demands were 
unacceptable, but believed that the inevitable Soviet refusal to cooperate would make 
them look intransigent—and thus reinforce US portrayals. All of this amounted to the 
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notion of the “long haul,” the Soviets would remain the enemy of the US and peace 
would have to be pursued alongside a state of tension and insecurity.112   
 The process that culminated in the Eisenhower’s “Chance for Peace” speech, and 
John Foster Dulles’s two days later revealed a great deal of uncertainty in the 
administration. Although Eisenhower had entered office with some ideas about the 
fundamentals of nuclear weapons in US foreign policy, the dynamic international 
environment, the advancement of technology, and the need to make actual policy 
condemned his first year in office to a search for meaning. Shortly after the speeches 
above, on May 8, 1953, Eisenhower met with top aides to do just that. The meeting 
would be on the broad strokes of the rivalry between the Soviet and US and would result 
in “Project Solarium.” The project, conceived by Eisenhower, had as its aim, the 
redefinition of US national security policy though a competitive appraisal of alternatives. 
Three teams were named, each tasked with advancing and championing a different 
strategy. Team A built the case for security through the strengthening of allies, and the 
undermining of the Soviet Union through political, economic, and psychological 
measures short of war. Team B advocated drawing a line around the Soviet bloc and 
threatening war in the case of a breach. Team C advocated rollback or systematic 
coercion by the US meant to weaken the Soviets and strengthen the West. Risk of major 
war between the two superpowers was inherent in Team B and especially Team C’s 
recommendations. Organizers also considered a “Team D” to examine the prospect of 
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preventive war against the Soviets. However, the notion that any atomic exchange would 
result in catastrophic consequences for the US would become formalized in SE-46, 
though Eisenhower had previously expressed doubts about any favorable outcome of an 
atomic exchange.113 
 The plans were submitted to Eisenhower in a long NSC meeting on July 16. 
Eisenhower reiterated at that time a commitment to fiscal responsibility, a reaffirmation 
that any plan must be supported by US allies. He also rejected any plan that posed too 
great a risk of general war. Bowie and Immerman note his pointed take on “winning” a 
global war: “only thing worse than losing a global war was winning one; …there would 
be no individual freedom after the next global war.”114 Eisenhower noted many 
similarities between the presentations, though the task forces themselves disagreed, 
arguing that the assumptions and recommendations made by the respective task forces 
were incompatible. In spite of these reservations, the task forces’ recommendations 
would be central to the building of NSC 162/2, a new Basic National Security Strategy, 
with the conversations echoing through the production of nuclear weapons policy 
throughout the 1950’s.  
 As work on the new strategy proceeded through the summer and fall of 1953, the 
role of nuclear weapons continued to be of central concern. As soon as the new JCS were 
set to take office in August, they were tasked by Eisenhower with providing of “fresh 
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view” of the strategic situation, and the various roles of the service branches, as well as 
the role of atomic weapons. The study, led by JCS chairman Arthur Radford, concluded 
that the ability to retaliate with a devastating nuclear strike would remain crucial. So 
while they were asked to provide a “fresh look,” the JCS extended and rearticulated the 
discourse on the uses of nuclear weapons already being favored by Eisenhower and 
others in his staff. In fact, rather than provide more detailed policy recommendations, the 
JCS simply noted that a “positive policy” should be announced about the use of atomic 
weapons as soon as formulated. They also recommended, that the US redeploy resources 
toward continental defense. This underscored their commitment to basic concept of 
deterrence through assured nuclear retaliation, though they added little in terms of 
guidance. The exercise revealed a rift in the JCS and the administration over the idea of 
depending on a deterrent strategy. Army Chief of Staff Ridgway and others argued that 
the threat of nuclear retaliation would be no substitute for conventional forces, especially 
in the vulnerable regions of Europe. Further, relying on deterrence would not result in a 
need for fewer troops, but in more—which they argued would eliminate the savings 
supposedly realized by a deterrent strategy.115 The argument mirrored Eisenhower’s own 
dilemma regarding national security that arose from his identities as both a fiscal 
conservative, but also a military leader. Balancing costs with security, and understanding 
the role in which nuclear weapons would play in the equation would be an important 
problem in constructing the new strategy. 
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Candor and the Soviet Hydrogen Bomb 
 As US policymakers struggled with building a new national security strategy, the 
Soviet Union fulfilled the warnings of “Armaments and American Policy” and others 
when they detonated their first thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb.116 Eisenhower 
addressed the development in a news conference on September 30, 1953, where he was 
asked by Merriman Smith of United Press whether the Soviet thermonuclear test would 
play into the Eisenhower administration’s defense budgeting. Eisenhower’s reply 
betrayed the dilemma of the JCS and others working on national security policy. While 
being careful not to downplay the gravity of this new fact, he admitted that the reaction 
would be muted, “I should say that it is a fact that is probably causing each of us more 
earnest study—you might say almost prayerful study—than any other thing that has 
occurred lately.”117 He went on to add an important caveat to the notion that the problem 
is still being studied, “I believe we have gone far enough in this so you could say that the 
only possible tragedy greater than winning a war would be losing it. Just war should be 
out from the calculations of all of us...”118 Consistent with the debates within his 
administration over the content of NCS 162, the president noted both a loss at exactly 
what is to do about the grave problem, but also a conviction that whatever would be done, 
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would be in the interest of avoiding war—a clear public declaration that a nuclear war 
between the US and Soviet Union could not be won in any meaningful sense. 
 The speech also carried forward an important component of Eisenhower’s broad 
approach to nuclear weapons policy, namely candor with the American people. He notes 
that after some period of study, when the administration has “straightened out” the 
intricacies of nuclear politics, he will “go before the United States and tell them—be very 
frank in telling them—the facts on which my studies have been based and the conclusions 
that the administration and I have reached. Just when this can be done I am not prepared 
to say.”119 Although he did not know when such a moment would arrive, the details of 
candor were being diligently considered.  
“Armaments and American Policy”, a product of the Truman administration, but 
enthusiastically considered by Eisenhower in his first days in office, made a strong 
argument for a program of informing the American people of the challenges, threats, and 
details of the US relationship with the Soviet Union and the evolving place for nuclear 
weapons therein. On June 9, 1953, James Lambie, Special Assistant in the White House, 
wrote Claude Robinson, the president of the Opinion Research Association in Princeton, 
New Jersey.120 The letter, initialed by Eisenhower, lays out some of the problems and 
goals for the new policy of Candor. Lambie argues that among other goals the 
administration should establish that the danger associated with the situation vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union would be a new normal in American life; to this end Lambie quotes the 
president, “we live not in an instant of peril, but in an age of peril.” He went on to ask for 
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Robinson’s help in understanding the extent to which Americans already knowledgeable 
on the issue, in order to more effectively tailor the content of Operation Candor. In 
addition, Lambie contacted George Gallup who noted that the two would be able to help 
each other with the operation, and Gallup had on hand polls showing that most 
Americans did not believe Soviet policy had changed since Stalin’s death.121 By July, a 
program had been developed by Lambie and CD Jackson which called for a series of six 
television or radio broadcasts, each of which would take up a different aspect of the “Age 
of Peril,” with topics including, The Nature of Communism, the Capabilities of the 
USSR, the Threat to the US, the Free World and the UN, Communism at Home, and 
What Good Citizens Can Do.122 The president would introduce each broadcast, and 
would deliver the final broadcast, with other members of the executive including Allen 
and John Foster Dulles, J. Edgar Hoover, and Admiral Arthur Radford speaking to their 
respective areas of expertise. 
 The program of Candor was not without its critics. John Foster Dulles did not see 
disarmament as possible with the intransigent Soviets. He subscribed to the discourse on 
the Soviets as belligerent and unreasonable, thus averse to any agreement with the US. 
Lewis Strauss, head of the AEC and an important advisor to Eisenhower on all things 
nuclear agreed. He later argued that any program of information would have benefitted 
Soviet “espionage.”123 Although Eisenhower continued to insist that the public needed to 
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understand the destructive capacity of the new weapon, he pushed CD Jackson in drafts 
of the planned “Candor” speech to avoid scaring “the country to death.”124 In addition, 
the dire warnings from Dulles and Strauss convinced Eisenhower of the need to find a 
means of recasting the message of the “age of peril” as a one of hope.  
 Though a formidable task, on September 10, 1953, Eisenhower shared a potential 
solution with Robert Cutler, who sent a memorandum on the discussion to Jackson and 
Strauss. In discussing the progress of NSC 112, Eisenhower “suggested you might 
consider the following proposal, which he did not think anyone had yet thought of. 
Suppose the United States and the Soviets were each to turn over to the United Nations, 
for peaceful use, X amount of fissionable material. The amount X could be fixed at a 
figure which we could handle from our stockpile, but which it would difficult for the 
Soviets to match.”125 The proposal had a clear lineage to the Acheson-Lilienthal report, 
and the failed Baruch Plan of 1945.126 Each of these earlier plans had advocated 
international control of fissile material, though both went further in their proposals for 
controlling and eventually outlawing all nuclear weapons. This new proposal had several 
advantages from Eisenhower’s perspective: it would not require inspections and thus 
violations of sovereignty; it would show that the tremendous effort of building nuclear 
weapons was not carried out only in the interest of destruction; the US could “afford” to 
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contribute a great deal more fissile material to the international pool and still improve its 
relative position; and the deal would address the looming danger of the current arms 
race.127   
 Strauss replied to Cutler’s memo on the president’s proposal consistent with his 
skepticism with regard to Candor. On September 17, he submitted that reply to the 
president declaring, “the proposal is novel and might have value for propaganda 
purposes. It has doubtful value as a practical move for the following reasons.”128 He first 
disputes the president’s contention that the US would be able to contribute a greater 
amount of fissile material to the pool than the Soviets. He argued that US intelligence had 
not determined the amount of fissile material held by the Soviets, nor were their 
capabilities to cultivate more known. What he did know is that once the US discovered 
naturally occurring precursors to fissile material and the processes to enrich them 
(something the Soviet had clearly also done), production efficiency rapidly increased. 
From this he surmised that the Soviets might be increasing their production at a much 
greater rate than the US. He went on to argue that debates about the amount of fissile 
material in each state’s stockpile are somewhat less important in the age of thermonuclear 
weapons, where fissile material is needed only for the trigger. Finally and in the same 
memo, Strauss weighs in on the recent Soviet hydrogen bomb test. Although by hydrogen 
bomb standards it was small—only 400 kilotons—he argues that it may have been only to 
prove the principle. As such, it made little sense to compare its destruction with similar 
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US tests.129 His opinion on the near future production of thermonuclear weapons by the 
Soviets is redacted, but the tone of the section seems to suggest he believed the Soviets to 
be following a similar nuclear development trajectory to the US. 
 On November 6, under continued pressure from Eisenhower to study the idea of 
an international pool of fissile material as part of a larger effort at disarmament, Strauss 
submitted a draft of what such a proposal might look like.130 The draft drew on 
conversations with Secretary Dulles and Director of Policy Planning Staff Robert Bowie 
on the previous week in which they discussed regulating the mining and production of 
fissile material directly in addition to such material being contributed to an internationally 
controlled pool. The Baruch Plan had been unacceptable to many for requiring countries 
to submit to an invasive inspection regime that some equated with a check on 
sovereignty. The plan as now envisioned by Strauss and consistent with Eisenhower’s 
September suggestion, would avoid the problem of such a regime by requiring 
contributions to an international pool without also exercising control over or outlawing 
existing nuclear weapons. Although this would address some of the problems associated 
with the failed Baruch Plan, the JCS still rejected the plan as arms control—something 
they would not abide without a comprehensive plan that addressed other problems in 
international affairs.131 The controversy led to the omission of the plan from the later 
drafts of the speech.  
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  In the late fall, Candor and the Eisenhower’s proposal were brought together in 
drafts of the speech that would become “Atoms for Peace.” This famous piece of oratory 
brought together several of the existing discourses into a single articulation that would 
echo through arms control and nuclear weapons policy for years into the future. The 
difficulty in preparing the speech came in part from trying to balance the goals of Candor, 
and warning of the “age of peril” without causing a panic.132 The speech was thus meant 
to be a message of hope while at the same time meeting conditions enumerated by 
Secretary Dulles: first that the proposals be novel and acceptable to the Soviets “if they 
wish coexistence; second that the conditions would be tolerable to the West if accepted; 
and third that rejection would place the blame for an ensuing arms race and war on the 
Soviets.”133 On December 8, 1953 Eisenhower delivered the speech to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in New York. The culminating oration built on nearly a 
year of discussion and debate, striking Eisenhower’s own personal balance between many 
competing priorities. The president began with a note about danger, building on the work 
that had once gone into Operation Candor, “The atomic age has moved forward at such a 
pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in 
comparative terms, of the extent of this development of the utmost significance to every 
one of us.”134 In formally launching the policy of candor with the American public, 
Eisenhower notes the forty-two test explosions to date, the tremendous and continued 
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growth in destructive capacity of the weapons, along with increasing variety in yield and 
thus application, and the aircraft that could now deliver this unprecedented destruction. 
He goes on to warn that the technology is not a secret possessed by the US, but one 
shared by several allies, and the Soviet Union—a state that has already tested many 
atomic weapons and had now matched the US with a thermonuclear test. The 
implications of this fact lead to a dilemma, “Even against the most powerful defense, an 
aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise 
attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to 
cause hideous damage.” This statement reveals the president’s concurrence with the 
discourse on defense that began with Bernard Brodie as early as 1946. Such a situation 
leads vulnerable states to rely on deterrence through assured retaliation to prevent a 
surprise attack from ever being carried out. The situation of mutual terror that obtains is 
exactly what the latter part of the speech sought to address. In keeping with the UNGA’s 
own statement regarding the desirability of nuclear states to meet and discuss prospects 
for ending the arms race, the president stated that the US would meet with other involved 
states to privately discuss the arms race. This segued into Eisenhower’s idea for an 
international pool to which the nuclear states would contribute fissile material for 
peaceful research in order to share the benefits of nuclear technology with the rest of the 
world. The endeavor would provide impetus to explore the potential of nuclear power, 
and provide a building block for cooperation between the superpowers in reducing the 
danger posed by the arms race. Returning to the theme he had been arguing needed to be 
central Eisenhower states, “Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United 
States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for 
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peace.”135 This would be the last of eleven times that the president used the word ‘hope’ 
in some form in the speech.  
 Alongside the preparations for the Atoms for Peace speech, the administration 
also labored to produce the new basic National Security Strategy—a document completed 
in October 1953 and known as NSC 162/2.136 Taken together, the new security strategy 
and Atoms for Peace constituted the new discursive edifice on which nuclear weapons 
policy would be built throughout the 1950’s. The summary of Atoms for Peace above 
stresses Eisenhower’s own insistence that the speech, and the State of the Union given a 
few weeks later on January 7, 1954, promote a feeling of hope. All the while, the 
proposals in Atoms for Peace, and the strategy set out by NSC 162/2 advanced a notion 
of peace that included a permanent arms buildup that itself would sow instability, and 
would reinforce the tension central to the Cold War. The discourse on the intransigence 
of the Soviet Union led to an elite discourse that discounted any possibility for real peace 
in favor of continued efforts to gain an upper hand in the Cold War. All the while the 
administration also tried to cultivate a discourse of hope among the public: one which 
painted US prospects as hopeful, with an end to the Cold War being prevented only by 
Soviet rejections of good faith US efforts for compromise. In addition, and part and 
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parcel of this effort to influence the public discourse, the administration sought to shape 
perception of atomic power as a potential boon to the emerging hopeful world. 
 Massive retaliation was the central means by which NSC 162/2 sought to deter 
Soviet aggression into the west, prevent WWIII, and avoid the economic pain associated 
with continuous buildup for conventional war. Nowhere did the document discuss plans 
for long-term peace—instead the primary goal was to advance the US and the West’s 
relative position via-a-vis the Soviet Union—a goal that discounted or ignored any 
possibility of long-term peaceful coexistence in favor of a continued tension in which the 
US occupied a more advantageous position. The new strategy offered hope, but only 
hope for a more favorable Cold War, with peace defined as the lack of major hostilities, 
not the absence of tension and the looming threat of war. 
 Against this backdrop it become clear that the proposals of Atoms for Peace were 
never meant to be accepted. Instead, as Dulles had stated in his memo on September 17, 
1953, the proposals might make a good piece of propaganda.137 However, per his own 
conditions, they would have to be designed in such a way to be unequivocally 
advantageous to the US—a condition that would necessarily preclude acceptance by the 
Soviet Union. Robert Cutler, head of the NSC Planning Staff, noted, “The virtue of 
making the proposals lies not so much in the likelihood of their acceptability by the other 
side, but in the opportunity provided to the US—once the proposals have been made and 
not accepted—to put into effect a new and better (for the long run) basic policy than we 
have now.”138 The new policy would be one in which the US relied more heavily on 
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nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear retaliation as a means to deter the Soviets, 
stave off nuclear war, and save money. The administration thought the conventional 
buildup begun under Truman unsustainable, but apparently had no vision for peace 
outside of a military buildup. Evidently, Eisenhower and company had no plans to share 
their own vision of the future of superpower relations. Instead, Eisenhower’s first year in 
office witnessed the rise of competing dominant discourses. For elites, nuclear weapons 
were rapidly coming to be understood as a deterrent to a major nuclear attack on US soil. 
Coupled with assumptions about Soviet behavior and the discourse dictated a protracted 
cold war. The public on the other hand had much less exposure to the critical discursive 
artifacts on which the concepts of deterrence, mutually assured destruction, and Soviet 
intransigence would rest. Instead the public would build a less well-defined set of 
discourses based on deep unease with the very notion of nuclear technology. Although 
the administration planned on shaping public understanding on the issue, they would find 
themselves as just one of many voices forging the meaning(s) of nuclear weapons and 
technology in the minds of the American citizens.     
1954 – 1956: From Theory to Practice 
 Following the adoption of the NSC 162/2 and the delivery of “Atoms for Peace” 
Eisenhower and his administration confronted the challenge of implementing massive 
retaliation as a strategy, as well as sorting out the details of sharing “peaceful” nuclear 
technology with other states. While the administration had played a role in ending open 
conflict in Korea, new challenges arose in China. These challenges would prompt 
Eisenhower and company to continually reexamine and rearticulate their beliefs about the 
utility of nuclear weapons, as well as sharpen and extend developing norms around their 
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usage. This section will consider several major moments during the years of 1954 and 
1955 in which events in the world prompted the reappraisal, extension, clarification, and 
application of the emerging nuclear weapons policy.  
 The rapid evolution of nuclear weapons technology, coupled with a new 
commitment by the US to share and elaborate upon the “peril” that the evolving situation 
presented, led Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister, to propose a “standstill 
agreement” on nuclear weapons test explosions in the pacific to the Indian Parliament on 
April 2, 1954. The administration had been aware of the idea at least since February. On 
February 5, 1954, Thomas Murray, Commissioner of the AEC, wrote Eisenhower 
arguing that a nuclear test moratorium might lessen tension in international relations, and 
limit the proliferation of large nuclear weapons.139 He notes however, that the idea might 
be untimely given that it would be only a few weeks before the Castle Series of nuclear 
tests at the Pacific Proving Ground, approved by Eisenhower on January 26.  
 The Castle Series began on March 1, 1954 with Castle Bravo, a 15 megaton blast 
that far exceeded its intended yield of 4-8 megatons.140 In addition to its surprisingly 
large yield, changes in the prevailing winds blew a massive radioactive plume across the 
Marshall Islands. The plume caused residents of the nearby atolls of Rongelap and 
Uskirit to suffer radiation sickness. Residents of Rongelap, located about 130 nautical 
miles from ground zero, included more than two dozen US servicemen at a weather 
station. The blast also rained radioactive fallout on a Japanese fishing vessel called the 
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Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon No. 5). One of the crew of that vessel died of 
complications from radiation sickness just a few months later back in Japan. 
 The event caused a major international uproar. In Japan, where residents were still 
rebuilding their society after the decimation of WWII and specifically the atomic bombs 
that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the outrage manifested into a powerful 
movement to ban the bomb. Radioactive fallout became well known as “ashes of death”, 
as the massive movement known as the “Suginami Appeal” gained traction.141 By 
August, 1955, the time of the First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen 
Bombs, the movement had gathered 32 million signatures in favor of banning the bomb. 
Only a month later activists formed Gensuikyo, the Council Against Atomic and 
Hydrogen Bombs.142 This organization received widespread non-partisan support across 
Japan, and marked the beginning of decades of anti-nuclear weapon activism originating 
in Japan.  
 As Bravo would be only the first in a series of seven nuclear tests in the Castle 
Series, by the time the latter tests were taking place, the administration had become aware 
of growing public and international concern. On April 5, 1954, Strauss suggested that the 
president reassure the public that the remaining tests (of which there would be three) 
were only to prove “scientific principles,” and that the US had no intention of testing 
increasingly large yield weapons.143 In the same note to the president Strauss also quickly 
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stated the administration position (which had ostensibly been previously discussed) on 
the prospect of an agreement to disarm. Strauss argued that any agreement to disarm 
would be unenforceable, and could lead the US to unilaterally disarm resulting in national 
suicide with the Soviets seizing their advantage. 
 A few weeks later on April 23 Strauss wrote the president about a conversation he 
had with Bernard Baruch.144 Baruch had contended that as knowledge about nuclear 
weapons diffused, fear of surprise attack would increase. While he argued that the 
Soviets might not fear such attack from the US at present, they might soon fear attack 
from the French or a rearmed Germany. Given the prospect of the ability to construct 
nuclear weapons rapidly spreading to other states, the Soviet Union might be convinced 
that the present would be the best chance for “world wide atomic disarmament.” Strauss’s 
argument built upon conclusions reached by the Oppenheimer panel and others that 
nuclear technology would spread, and that once states acquired some level of nuclear 
infrastructure the speed of their weapons production would increase rapidly. Strauss did 
not completely agree with Baruch’s conclusion, but nonetheless felt the substance worth 
forwarding to the president: 
I think the premise of his argument is sound although I believe the time scale to 
be much longer than he thinks. For while it is true that weapons have been made 
“cheaper” the difference is relative and the costs of plants and processes are still 
astronomical in terms of the resources of small nations. The real difficulty of the 
proposal, assuming one could find a suitable intermediary, would be the ever-
present hurdle of how to deal with the inspection and international control aspects 
so long as the Russians maintain the Iron Curtain policy, which I assume is 
essential to that kind of government.145 
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Strauss at once revealed the genuine interest of the administration in considering routes to 
disarmament, as well as the ways in which their convictions about the Soviets precluded 
entertaining the necessary components to any chance of disarmament. Strauss explicitly 
did not dispute the notion that the early 1950’s would probably be the only time when 
disarmament required the cooperation of just two countries. He did argue though that this 
period would last longer than Baruch had indicated, and more importantly he agreed with 
many in the administration that inspection and international control were impossible. The 
argument essentially bought the administration time. If no other country would be 
acquiring nuclear weapons in the near future, the favorable period in which only two 
states would have to cooperate would last longer, and the US would be able to afford to 
discount any possibility of pushing forward with meaningful disarmament talks for the 
foreseeable future. Such a set of circumstances made arms control less urgent, and set the 
stage for the protracted tension of the ongoing Cold War. Strauss would continue to be 
one of the primary driver’s behind the Eisenhower administration’s stances into the 
future.146 
 Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s call for a nuclear test moratorium hailed others 
from the administration to weigh in on disarmament, and to further clarify their 
interpretations of the world and beliefs about possibilities for US nuclear weapons policy. 
On April 30, Radford submitted the JCS’s analysis of the Nehru’s moratorium to the 
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Secretary of Defense.147 The analysis recommended that the US, “not enter into any 
agreement providing for the limitation of atomic armaments outside of a comprehensive 
program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all 
armaments, conforming in general to the principles set forth in NSC 112.” On June 4, 
Secretary of Defense Wilson submitted an analysis on the same question.148 The Defense 
Department advised against a moratorium arguing that it would be to the US’s 
disadvantage for several reasons, foremost among them that the US would need its 
nuclear capability until there was an agreement for a total worldwide nuclear 
disarmament. In addition, the analysis contended that the Soviets would be able to spin 
US agreement to a moratorium as a move to stymie the Soviet nuclear program, thus 
eliminating any propaganda advantage. In any case he argued, the agreement would be 
unenforceable as there were still technical difficulties to accurate detection of foreign 
tests. On June 23, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles submitted an additional 
analysis of the effects of the moratorium.149 At a meeting of the NSC on June 27 he 
argued that he had attempted to make his analysis unanimous and nearly succeeded.150 
Dulles argued that committee agreement stemmed from two shared assumptions: first that 
abolition of weapons must take place under a broader plan for general disarmament; and 
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second that a moratorium from the present until January 1956 would be advantageous to 
the US, but any longer would be advantageous to the Soviets.151 Eisenhower agreed with 
the widely shared recommendation of his staff, but took issue with the first of the 
assumptions identified by Dulles. While Dulles, Radford, Strauss and others agreed that 
abolition of atomic weapons would have to be tied to general disarmament, Eisenhower 
argued that he would go along with abolition without general disarmament if anyone 
could come up with a method of carrying it out with certainty. Since nobody could put 
forth such a certain plan, the president agreed with the conclusions of the meeting, and 
formalized the decision to reject a test moratorium “at this time.”152  
Nehru's call for a moratorium showed the trajectory of nuclear discourse being 
constructed by Eisenhower and his staff by forcing the administration to clarify their 
interpretation of the type of threat posed by the Soviet Union. Joseph Stalin’s death in 
March 1953, as well as Eisenhower’s repeated emphasis on words like “hope” and 
“peace” throughout the fall and winter of 1953, left openings for a discourse of a less 
threatening, possibly cooperative Soviet Union. Confronting the call for a moratorium on 
testing forced the leadership to reveal their ongoing view of the Soviets—which they did 
by extending and rearticulating the essential Cold War discourse of US efforts at peace 
stymied by the intransigent imperialist enemy. The next section will examine another 
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serious challenge to the fledgling nuclear policy and discourse being forged by 
Eisenhower and his team. 
Quemoy and Matsu 
 While the administration had the luxury of making nuclear weapons policy and 
extending nuclear discourse on a strictly theoretical and strategic basis during late 1953 
and early 1954, a new crisis emerged to challenge these views yet again, this time with 
potential real world consequences that could extend well beyond rhetoric. In September 
1954, China attacked the small island of Quemoy off the coast of China in the Taiwan 
Strait. 153 The territory was under the control of anti-communist Chinese nationalists. The 
nationalists shared the US agenda of preventing Communist China from making 
territorial expansion and had received $1.6 billion in aid to that end since 1949. 
Throughout the end of 1954 and into the spring of 1955, the crisis tested the wits and the 
nuclear policy of the administration forcing an extension of the discourse on what would 
be appropriate use of nuclear weapons, and shifting focus away from disarmament, and 
toward nuclear strategy. The shift from a broad debate over disarmament to one about 
potential use of nuclear weapons in battle would provide insights into the 
administration’s role in constructing and challenging the nascent taboo on the use of 
nuclear weapons in battle, as well as extending and clarifying existing policy. 
 Quemoy and Matsu are two groups of islands located close China’s southeastern 
coast. Following World War II, Chinese nationalists hostile to the communist regime had 
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retreated to Taiwan and in the process adopted the islands—which hug the mainland 
coast in the Taiwan Strait, as forward positions in the ongoing conflict with the mainland. 
The US had been backing the claims of the nationalists since 1949, providing $1.6 billion 
by the time of the crisis at the end of 1954.154 In September, the communists began a 
significant offensive against the nationalists. The offensive forced the US to confront the 
choice between doing nothing—abandoning its support of the nationalists and possibly 
looking weak to the Sino-Soviet bloc, or launching a major military intervention, thus 
risking escalation to all-out war with China, and potentially global nuclear war with the 
Soviet Union. 
 Even as the crisis developed in late 1954, the administration worked on a revised 
basic national security strategy—NSC 5440—that would provide a strategic background 
as the crisis unfolded.155 Although some of the conclusions of the new strategy would 
remain contentious well into 1955, several points raised in the document helped frame the 
situation in the Taiwan Strait. First, Soviet air power could now deliver “widespread 
devastation” on the US and the “free world.” This devastation would not necessarily be 
“crippling,” nor given their current capabilities—enough to provide mutual deterrence—
although such a situation could be expected within a few years. With regard to China 
specifically, NSC 5440 stated “Communist China remains bitterly hostile to the US and 
ostensibly committed to the conquest of Formosa.”156 In addition the document 
contended that the Soviet Union would prioritize keeping China in the communist bloc. 
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Given these appraisals of the threat posed by the communist countries, the authors argued 
US military policy should be aimed at preventing aggression through deterrence. They 
feared that the US could be forced into general war, and that local conflicts could lead to 
total war, and thus nuclear destruction. 
 Even as the new national security strategy details were being hammered out by 
the NSC, the situation in the Taiwan Strait deteriorated. As events unfolded in the fall of 
1954, Eisenhower had taken the public position that the US would defend the nationalists 
against communist aggression, but left vague whether that meant only the main island of 
Taiwan, or if defense would extend to Quemoy, Matsu, and the Dachens another 
nationalist-held group of islands north of the strait. In December, feeling pressure to 
clarify his position, Eisenhower signed a secret “mutual defense” treaty with the 
Nationalists promising US protection of Taiwan as well as Quemoy and Matsu, as long as 
the Nationalists did not attack the Chinese mainland without US permission. In January 
1955, the Chinese attacked the Dachens. The attack led the administration to reconsider 
the secrecy of its support—evidently the Chinese were convinced that the US would not 
intervene. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles decided that the US would defend 
Quemoy and Matsu as long as the Nationalist withdrew from the Dachens, which were 
further north and thus more difficult to defend. By March the situation appeared worse 
with Dulles reporting that war was imminent.  
 At the March 10, 1955 NCS meeting, consistent with this assessment, Secretary 
Dulles recommended that the US public be prepared both for war and the possibility that 
nuclear weapons would be used.157 He argued that nuclear weapons were necessary given 
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the limitation of the US conventional capability. Eisenhower and Radford agreed. They 
realized there would be opposition from allies and world public opinion, but argued the 
benefits outweighed such considerations. They were also aware that the Nationalist leader 
Jiang had assured US officials in the Far East that his people would accept the use of 
nuclear weapons as “a war necessity.”158 Building on this recommendation, the 
administration began a process of talking about nuclear weapons to the public. According 
to Chang this public relations effort served both as a message to deter the Chinese as well 
as preparation of the US public.159 The following week on March 15, Dulles stated in a 
news conference, “We believe that our most effective contribution to the defense of the 
entire area is by a strategic force with a high degree of striking power…US policy is not 
to split that power up into fragments.”160 The following day Charles von Fremd of CBS 
News asked Eisenhower about Dulles’s remarks to which he replied, “Now, in any 
combat where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military 
purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a 
bullet or anything else.”161 This rhetoric built on the discourse which had come to include 
tactical nuclear weapons as an integrated piece of US military doctrine. Under Truman, 
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the US had a de facto policy of first use of nuclear weapons to counter a major 
conventional attack. The national security strategy adopted by NSC 162/2 in October of 
1953 which argued for the conventionalization of nuclear weapons “as available for use 
as other munitions,” in conjunction with the direct public statements of Dulles and 
Eisenhower as the Quemoy and Matsu crisis unfolded in the spring of 1955, made the 
new policy of the US a de jure policy of first use of nuclear weapons even in response to 
a conventional attack. Ironically, the episode would end up strengthening the fledgling 
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons by forcing the public, both in the US and 
abroad, to confront the reality of the US armed and ready to use nuclear weapons to 
defend islands “of questionable value for the defense of Taiwan” and per Eisenhower 
within “wading distance of mainland China.”162 
 The crisis came to peaceful conclusion when on April 24, 1955 the Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai announced that the Chinese wanted peace with the US, and that they 
would negotiate for peace in the Taiwan Strait. The decision may have been due to 
Chinese fears of provoking general war with the US. They also may have been told by 
the Soviets that the islands would be considered a local conflict and no support would 
come from Moscow in the case of war with the US.163 In any case, it appears that had war 
taken place, Eisenhower was prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons. The 
administration had incorporated first-use policies into nuclear doctrine, made the case to 
the public for the conventionalization of the nuclear weapons, and settled privately that 
they would respond with a nuclear weapons if the Chinese attacked the islands. Through 
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the crisis, the administration exposed their willingness to use nuclear weapons, but also 
their respect for the keepers of the nascent nuclear taboo—the public—both international 
and domestic. At every step Dulles and others considered the public impact of the 
potential use of nuclear weapons, and while they seemed to believe that they would be 
able to sway public opinion to the point where a nuclear attack on China would be 
politically acceptable, they were also cognizant of limits on their latitude of action 
imposed by domestic and world public opinion—and by extension the power of the 
fledgling nuclear taboo.164   
The Nuclear Fallout Problem 
 Even as the crisis with China and Taiwan unfolded, the administration had begun 
to cope with a new threat to their unfettered participation in an arms race: the public’s 
gradually increasing awareness and fear of radioactive fallout from nuclear testing. This 
section will consider the emergence of nuclear weapons policy against the backdrop of a 
public, both domestic and abroad, increasingly uneasy with the potential danger posed to 
them by nuclear testing. While the Castle-Bravo test in March 1954 that rained fallout on 
Japanese sailors and Marshallese islanders was a major event inciting the public’s fear, 
many in the government and elsewhere had been aware of potential danger of radioactive 
fallout since the earliest days of the atomic bomb. As early as 1945, reporters had raised 
questions about the hazards posed by radiation at the Trinity test site in southern New 
Mexico. In the aftermath of that first atomic test, General Groves set a dangerous 
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precedent, sending Patrick Stout, an army counterintelligence agent, into the Trinity blast 
crater, created only two months prior. Although he emerged apparently unharmed, thus 
“proving” Groves’ point, he would die in 1967 of leukemia—a tell-tale illness often 
resulting from exposure to radiation. The precedent would be one of conducting 
experiments directly, and often without consent, on the effects of radiation on US 
military personnel. According to Clarfield and Wiecek, the AEC and the Defense 
Department established a pattern: “lay people or scientists would protest some facet of 
official nuclear policy; the AEC (or NRC, JCAE, DoD, etc.) dismissed the objections as 
unfounded and poured on a public relations rebuttal; the protests continued to mount; and 
eventually the AEC gave way, implicitly admitting the validity of the protester’s views 
by lowering dosage ceilings.”165 For the present study, the phenomena identified by 
Clarfield and Wiecek is notable for the way in which it connects public outcry with 
limitations on policy by the administration. The Eisenhower administration had to 
contend with evolving limitations posed by the growing awareness of the public at the 
widespread danger posed by atmospheric testing (not to mention an unfettered nuclear 
arms race). These limitations shaped the possibilities for advancing the US nuclear 
arsenal, even while the administration itself actively sought to shape public perception of 
all things nuclear. Through this dialectic, the Eisenhower nuclear weapons policy, as well 
as international norms of behavior with regard to nuclear testing, would emerge. This 
section will consider the administration’s discourse on radiation, and its impact on the 
broader construction of nuclear weapons policy during the 1950’s.   
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 Although Groves, and other members of the nuclear establishment were aware of 
the potential danger of radiation early in the atomic age, such knowledge only slowly 
diffused to the public. Just about a year before the Lucky Dragon debacle, Herbert Clark, 
a professor at Renlasser Polytechnic Institute measured up to 2 roentgens of radiation in 
rain puddles near his laboratory in upstate New York, 2,700 miles from the Yucca Flats, 
Nevada test site following the “Simon” shot—a 43 kiloton atomic test on April 25, 
1953.166 From that same series of tests, Operation Upshot-Knothole, radioactive fallout 
rained down on St. George, Utah, only about 100 miles east of the Yucca Flats test site. 
The fallout killed local sheep and stoked growing public concern. Two years later, the 
cast and crew of the The Conqueror, an RKO Radio Picture movie production starring 
John Wayne, were exposed to radioactive fallout after filming on location near St. 
George, Utah. By 1980, some 91 of the 220 cast and crew and contracted some type of 
cancer including John Wayne.167 
 The administration saw these events not as a threat to public health and safety, but 
as a potential impediment to their conduct of the nuclear arms race with impunity. In 
response they made a public effort to downplay the danger, and to squelch research that 
did not agree. In their 1953 semiannual report, the AEC contended that “the radioactivity 
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released by fallout has proved not to be hazardous.”168 Although publicly downplaying 
the danger, they also contracted with the US Public Health Service to survey radiation 
near test sites. Any findings were to be considered secrets under the Atomic Energy act, a 
sure method to keep the danger under wraps.169  
On February 15, 1955, the AEC released a formal public announcement on the 
nature and danger of radioactive fallout.170 The report, approved by Eisenhower and 
delivered by Lewis Strauss, argued that although radioactive fallout posed a major danger 
to those in its path, the detonations at the Yucca Flat test site had yielded, “no significant 
fallout.” In addition, per the report, the radiation off site, presumably experienced by 
those in St. George, Utah, had been, “less than one third of the greatest amount of 
radiation which atomic energy workers are permitted to receive each year under the 
Atomic Energy Commission’s conservative safety standards.”171 In addition to 
addressing fears of those for whom the tests were local events, the AEC weighed in on 
the effects for the rest of the US from the nuclear testing, “the average amount of 
radiation exposure received by residents of the United States by all nuclear detonations to 
date has been about the same as the exposure received from one chest X-ray.”172 Given 
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this comparison the AEC did not consider this worth serious concern. Evidence compiled 
later showed a significant spike in leukemia among children that lived in Utah between 
1959 and 1967, especially among those born between 1951 and 1958.173  
 The February 15 report of the AEC also took up specifically the issue of 
strontium-90 (sr-90) and iodine-131, two radioactive substances present in nuclear 
fallout. The report acknowledged correctly that sr-90 is similar in chemical structure to 
calcium, and hence will tend to collect in the teeth and bones of affected individuals. In 
addition, it can be ingested if deposited on the surface of crops, or in water consumed by 
crops and later humans. With regard to the amount of danger posed by sr-90 through 
atmospheric testing, the AEC argued, “The amount of radiostrontium (sr-90) now present 
in the soil as a result of all nuclear explosions to date would have to be increased many 
thousand times before any effect on humans would be noticeable.”174 With regard to 
iodine-131, which had been ignored due to its relatively short half-life, the AEC 
contended, “Even though this product may be widely spread after a nuclear explosion, the 
possibility of serious hazard is limited by its relatively short half-life.”175 Although the 
report admitted that iodine-131 would tend to gather in the thyroid gland, they failed to 
connect such a danger to children specifically, a connection made by E.B. Lewis. Lewis 
worked alongside Nobel laureate Linus Pauling at Cal Tech where their work predicted 
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much more dire consequences than suggested by the AEC, especially in terms of 
increases in risk of leukemia and fetal abnormalities.176  
 As before, the administration expressly considered the public reactions of both 
allies and adversaries from around the world. On March 2, 1955, an NSC document 
considered the reaction from specific countries around the world. That document noted, 
“reaction to the AEC announcement was surprisingly mild. Most Free World countries 
accepted it soberly and without much comment. The only country that showed alarm was 
Japan, which is always particularly sensitive to atomic matters.”177 The authors suggested 
that the muted reaction might be a result of their specific effort to dispel fears rather than 
cause them, as well as competition from other international news such as the UK’s plan 
to build a hydrogen bomb, and the political crisis in France. Given these reaction they 
conclude, “While additional US public statements specifically designed to counter 
unfavorable trends are not required at this time, the problem should be kept under 
continuous review by the Operations Coordinating Board, and a further report should be 
furnished to the NSC at the end of ninety days.” Unfavorable trends would seem to be 
those similar to that they encountered in Japan where the press, “received the report with 
alarm headlines and maps of the potential fall-out centered on Tokyo.” They also noted in 
particular a report in which “left-wing university professors” decried the omission of the 
tragedy of the Lucky Dragon and Rongelap natives devastated by the Castle Bravo 
test.178  
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 Interest in moderating these reactions led the administration to keep up its efforts 
to downplay the danger posed by testing, and emphasize its commitment to “cleaner” 
hydrogen bombs. In an October 24, 1956 press release, Eisenhower addressed concerns 
with the danger of fallout directly,  
The continuance of the present rate of H-bomb testing—by the most sober and 
responsible scientific judgment—does not imperil the health of humanity. On the 
amount of radio-active fall-out, including Strontium-90, resulting from tests, the 
most authoritative judgment is that of the Independent National Academy of 
Sciences. It reported last June, following a study by 150 scientists of the first 
rank, that the radiation exposure from all weapons tests to date—and from 
continuing at the same rate—is, and would be, only a small fraction of the 
exposure that individuals receive from natural sources and from medical X-rays 
during their lives.179 
 
Only a week before this address by Eisenhower, CD Jackson had submitted a speech 
written for the president that was never delivered.180 The speech argued that all efforts to 
reduce armaments by the US had been stymied by the Soviet Union. The situation had 
forced the US, out of security, to continue enlarging its own nuclear arsenal of hydrogen 
bombs. He argued however, that the US was pursuing “small, clean H-bombs” with little 
radioactive fallout. The need for cleaner hydrogen bombs is puzzling however, because 
as the AEC argued,  
the total amount of radiation received by residents of the United States from all 
nuclear detonations to date, including the Russian and British tests and all of our 
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own tests in the United States and the Pacific, has been about one-tenth of one 
roentgen…It is about the same as the exposure received from one chest x-ray.181  
 
The position betrayed a policy of insisting that no fallout threat existed from current 
hydrogen bomb design tests, but also promising cleaner bombs with less fallout. The 
double move of denying that bombs were unleashing dangerous fallout, while also 
promising to reduce fallout, indicates that the administration understood the danger posed 
by radiation especially in the areas downwind from even the smaller tests taking place at 
Yucca Flats, not to mention the massive hydrogen bombs that had been detonated in the 
South Pacific as part of Operation Castle. This hypocrisy had been pointed out as early as 
1952 by a layperson named Helen Dodds responding to press reports about soldiers being 
used in radiation experiments, “if the men running this experiment say there is no danger, 
then why do they build such elaborate shelters for themselves, farther away from the 
explosion area than the troops which have no protection?”182  
 In 1957, the British tested a series of nuclear devices that yielded their first truly 
successful thermonuclear blast.183 The successful test led to major public outcry 
punctuated by a protest march beginning in London on Good Friday (spring) of 1958 and 
going through Easter.184 Organized by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the three 
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day march attracted up to ten thousand concerned citizens, and led to the adoption of the 
“peace sign” for nuclear disarmament: ☮. The symbol would become the calling card of 
peace movements and activists around the world to this day. At nearly the same time, the 
Soviet Union declared that it would observe a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear 
testing. The self-restriction evidently followed a disaster at Kyshtym, a region about 
1,000 miles east of Moscow, just north of Kazakhstan. On September 29, 1957, a storage 
tank exploded at the Mayak nuclear complex leading the evacuation of multiple local 
villages.185 The event presented a challenge for the US, which learned of the event vis-à-
vis U-2 spy plane flyovers and CIA operatives on the ground. While it could have been 
used as a propaganda tool to demonstrate Soviet atomic incompetence, or buttress claims 
of US nuclear superiority, fears that it would instead fuel public anxiety over testing led 
US officials to conceal the catastrophe from the US public until the late 1970’s. The 
disaster may have played a role in bringing about a temporary halt of Soviet testing of 
nuclear weapons which precipitated a corresponding testing moratorium by the UK and 
the US (after it concluded its planned and ongoing series of tests). 
 By the end of the Eisenhower administration, efforts to downplay the impact of 
atmospheric testing were being drowned out by voices in the public who were 
increasingly successful at conveying the real danger and stoking public anxiety. In 1956, 
Adlai Stevenson’s presidential campaign championed a nuclear test ban. On April 23, 
                                                 
185 The Kyshtym disaster only became public knowledge in the west in the late 1970’s. Until the end of the 
Cold War, accounts of the disaster were limited and anecdotal. Some included reports of a nuclear 
explosion—either a failed weapons test or a reactor meltdown. Official reports from both the US and Soviet 
Union now agree that it was a chemical explosion caused by problems with cooling processes at Mayak. 
The explosion compounded the consequences of existing soil and water contamination and likely led to the 
evacuation of the local communities. For a brief contemporary account see: Steve Jones, “Windscale & 
Kyshtym: a double anniversary,” Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 99 (2008: 1-6). For a technical 
analysis and an explanation of confusion about the event see: Diane Soran and Danny Stillman, “An 
Analysis of the Alleged Kyshtym Disaster,” Los Alamos National Laboratory (January 1982). 
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1957, Albert Schweitzer, a famous and highly respected humanitarian and physician 
delivered “Declaration of Conscience” on Radio Oslo in Norway. The radio address pled 
for a halt to nuclear weapons testing, with each new explosion cast as “a catastrophe to 
the human race, a catastrophe that must be prevented.”186 Although the administration 
played some role in limiting the reach of the Schweitzer’s message in the US, 
“Declaration of Conscience” and subsequent messages made major impacts on public 
opinion abroad, and added vigor to anti-nuclear movements around the world.187 Popular 
culture capitalized on the public’s interest and anxiety with a litany of B-movies and 
books with nuclear disaster and dystopian themes.188  
The administration reacted with efforts to silence and redact a growing body of 
scientific literature detailing the threat posed by radiation, as well as simultaneously 
arguing, that whatever the risk, it would be worth it to keep ahead of the Russians. These 
efforts led primarily by Strauss and the AEC would be increasingly less successful as the 
decade wound down. The events in the South Pacific, the radiation of St. George, Utah, 
and an unstoppable flood of published scientific study contributed to a counter-
hegemonic discourse within the public that would challenge the prevailing elite 
discourse. The elite discourse developed during the Eisenhower administration, namely 
                                                 
186 Lawrence Wittner, “Blacklisting Schweitzer,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 51, No. 3 
(May/June 1995): 56. 
187 Everett Holles, director of public relations for the AEC, declined to cooperate with CBS to broadcast 
Schweitzer’s message. Wittner’s account argues that a memo sent by Holles makes plain the AEC’s 
intervention in the free dissemination of the broadcasts (May/June 1995: 57). 
188 Throughout the 1950’s Hollywood produced low budget science fiction movies rife with nuclear 
anxiety. Examples include such films as Them!, a 1954 Warner Brothers story of giant ants emerging from 
a desert atomic test, and Beginning of the End, a 1954 movie about enormous grasshoppers emerging after 
consuming radioactive wheat. In these and others, filmmakers responded and contributed to a growing 
sense of fear of radiation and the broader nuclear arms race. See Paul Brians, Nuclear Holocausts: Atomic 
War in Fiction, 1895-1984 (Kent State University Press, 1987). 
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that the threat posed by the Soviets justified risks associated with testing—and that any 
risks should be downplayed to the public for their own long-term good, would finally 
come crashing down following the Cuban Missile Crisis which took place in October of 
1962. That crisis pushed the US, UK, and Soviet Union into signing the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty which banned atmospheric testing, on July 31, 1963. Although the danger posed 
by nuclear testing would continue to plague the public even after the treaty had been 
signed, the 1960’s saw the matter fade from the forefront of public consciousness.189  
Conclusion 
 The Eisenhower presidency is the first in the US in which the dialectic between 
the public and the elite framed the emergence of nuclear weapons policy. In 1953, the 
administration spent considerable effort trying to conceive of a method of sharing with 
the public its own knowledge, while accomplishing two things: avoiding a public panic, 
and keeping technical secrets under wraps. With regard to the former, the administration 
would find throughout the decade that the notion of nuclear war had already heightened 
awareness and anxiety in the public, and that their efforts to shape public opinion would 
be undermined by scientists, popular movies, and the disastrous effects of nuclear testing 
on people and the environment. With regard to keeping nuclear secrets, the 
administration had been warned on day one that once other states worked out the 
foundational science and engineering, their growth in nuclear capabilities would proceed 
rapidly. Indeed, by 1960, both the Soviets and British had exploded thermonuclear 
devices, with the Chinese program close behind.  
                                                 
189 France and China did not sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty and continued atmospheric testing. In 
addition, underground testing continued. Although generally depositing less fallout, venting accidents 
associated with underground tests continued to contaminate the environment near the Nevada Test Site 
(Clarfield and Wiecek 1984: 229).  
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 However, before any mention can be made of much of the administration’s efforts 
in any other realm of nuclear weapons policy, this study has underscored elite discourse 
about the Soviet Union as powerful and foundational. Since well before Eisenhower took 
office, the hegemonic discourse among elites about the Soviet Union was that it was an 
uncooperative and backward superpower bent on expansion and destruction of the West. 
Though various articulations put it differently, the central argument that no negotiation 
could be had with the Soviets persisted throughout the 1950’s. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for 
Peace” speech contained proposals known beforehand to be unacceptable to the Soviets. 
The president saw the speech as a chance to make people more hopeful even as he 
launched a nuclear arms race—because the intransigent Soviets left him no choice. The 
power of the discourse on the Soviets foreclosed competing discourses by normalizing 
the notion of Soviet intransigence into “common sense.” This hegemonic discourse 
precluded the consideration of any alternatives including anything approaching genuine 
efforts at cooperation.  
 In the Quemoy and Matsu crisis in 1954-1955, the president revealed a refined 
view of the prospects of using nuclear weapons, as well as the weakness of the real but 
still delicate nuclear taboo. Although no nuclear weapons were used, the evidence shows 
that Eisenhower had committed himself to using nuclear weapons to defend the small 
islands. Because the administration sent mixed signals, even to US subordinates, the 
Chinese could have easily misunderstood US intentions and invaded the islands 
triggering a nuclear response. From that point forward it is not worth speculating, but it is 
possible that the Soviets would have become involved, and the risk for global nuclear war 
and its attendant consequences would have increased. Eisenhower and Dulles seemed to 
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ignore this possibility, instead arguing for the possibility of limited war and the utility of 
nuclear blackmail. Concurrent with this view they attempted to prepare the US public for 
the use of nuclear weapons in March 1955, a course of action that had the ironic effect of 
extending the taboo. This effort pitched the discourses emerging from the elite at odds 
with discourses in the public and among allies. Administration efforts to blur the line 
between nuclear and conventional weapons instead alarmed allies and frightened the 
American public. Anti-nuclear movements in their nascent phases built on these 
provocations, with more people in more countries heeding their alternative discourse.     
The assortment of fledgling anti-nuclear movements as well as their anti-nuclear 
discourse would be strengthened throughout the decade by dozens of nuclear test 
explosions, many of which were coupled with radiation experiments on unwitting 
military personnel, others of which led to environmental contamination, sometimes at 
catastrophic levels. These consequences—the result of a still insufficient understanding 
of the radiological effects of nuclear explosions—as well as willful ignorance were 
justified by the dominant elite discourse on the Soviet Union. The administration 
accepted some risks would be posed by testing, but believed that maintaining an edge in 
the arms race, including nuclear superiority outweighed any other considerations. 
Eisenhower and other elites did not realize the scope of the contamination initially, and 
even as evidence came in, the AEC obfuscated and falsified. From the administration’s 
standpoint, there were bound to be some complications and costs to staying ahead in the 
nuclear arms race, but to fall behind would mean annihilation. The complications and 
costs would continue to mount throughout the decade however, even while the AEC’s 
attempts to downplay the danger posed by nuclear testing failed.  
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The administration failed in its effort to impose its own discourse on nuclear 
weapons testing onto the public. In part because of the opaque nature of the nuclear 
weapons development complex, the public mostly learned about nuclear weapons from 
events which could not be kept secret, namely the explosions themselves. These 
explosions ended up being destructive far beyond heat and blast effects, radiating 
communities and military personnel, alarming the greater scientific community, and 
sending deep waves of anxiety through the public. By the time the administration's 
strategy of Candor was underway, a discourse quite different had taken hold in the public. 
Since John Hersey published “Hiroshima” in The New Yorker in 1946, public opinion had 
been shaped by myths of the unprecedented threat posed by nuclear weapons and 
technology. “Candor” and “Atoms for Peace” were doomed to failure by the 
administration’s insistence on continuing large-scale testing in Nevada and the South 
Pacific. These tests opened up one of the “pathways” to the nuclear taboo—societal 
pressure.190 As opposition groups both in the US and abroad began to apply pressure on 
the administration to halt testing and ratchet down the nuclear arms race, they changed 
the set of incentives facing policymakers. While Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, 
Radford, and many others in the administration openly argued in favor of using nuclear 
weapons in Korea and later to defend Quemoy and Matsu, they were also deeply 
concerned with repercussions from the public at home and abroad. In their most serious 
discussions in NSC meetings and elsewhere, the conversation about using nuclear 
weapons always considered the public opinion consequences. In March of 1955, the 
administration’s efforts to normalize or “conventionalize” nuclear weapons failed on that 
                                                 
190 Tannenwald (2007: 64) 
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account, and ironically contributed to a strengthening of the nuclear taboo in at least three 
ways. First, European allies expressed concern that the US would inadvertently trigger a 
global nuclear war in which Europe would surely be a casualty. Diplomatic pressure 
reiterated the potential loss of allies that using nuclear weapons could mean. Second, the 
efforts were another mobilizing moment for anti-nuclear movements in the US, UK, 
Japan and elsewhere. As these movements grew, so too did their capacity for affecting 
the nuclear weapons policy decisions. Third, the administration continued setting a 
precedent of engaging the public on nuclear weapons policy. Although one could argue 
that the “Chance for Peace” and “Atoms for Peace” speeches only provided token details 
about the realities of nuclear power and weapons, the precise content is less important for 
this point than the fact that the US president wanted to talk with the public about nuclear 
weapons. Had Eisenhower not pushed for candor with the persistence and enthusiasm 
with which he did, the US nuclear program and its assessments of the Soviet Union could 
have been shrouded in even greater secrecy. His choice to open a dialogue with the public 
instead invited public response, and provided an opening for a sharpening of the 
discourses making up the public’s general nuclear anxiety in the early 1950’s, providing a 
check on the actions and behavior of the administration. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
FROZEN DISCOURSE: REAGAN CONFRONTS THE NUCLEAR FREEZE 
MOVEMENT 
 
Until the arms race stops, until we have a world with peace and justice, we will 
not go home and be quiet. We will go home and organize.  
—Randall Forsberg, June, 13, 1982 
 
I just have to say that I don't think there could be any winners. Everybody would 
be a loser if there's a nuclear war. 
 —President Ronald Reagan, March 31, 1982 
 
 
This chapter deploys discourse analysis to reexamine nuclear weapons 
policymaking during the Ronald Reagan administration, from his early encounters with 
the problem of nuclear weapons to his apparent turnabout in rhetoric and policy as 
president during the mid-1980’s.191 Nuclear weapons politics during this epoch 
developed against a backdrop of rapidly advancing technology and a dynamic security 
environment, as well as one in which social constraints on nuclear weapons policy were 
also in flux. Such dynamics were complicated further by competing interpretations of the 
level of threat from the Soviet Union, the technological capabilities—both current and 
future—of the US, and the prescriptions implied by this state of affairs. As president, 
Reagan inherited a somewhat thawed Cold War with the Soviet Union, three decades of 
nuclear weapons development, and an advancing space program which provided both 
chances to solve military problems with new technology, and opportunities for fanciful 
and expensive indulgences into science fiction. The possible and the impossible mixed as 
a political establishment with varied and evolving interpretations of the interests and 
                                                 
191 For a discussion of the definition of nuclear weapons policy used here and by others, see Chapter I. 
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capabilities of the US and Soviet Union deployed both genuine and misleading rhetoric to 
advance ever-changing objectives. 
Why this case study? 
 Although this period has been studied extensively by historians, political 
scientists, and others, several factors motivate the current undertaking. First and 
foremost, the process by which the Reagan administration constructed foreign policy, and 
specifically its policy on nuclear weapons, is not settled. For some, Reagan drove foreign 
policy with a clear vision. Others claim that he lent only a vision of the strong US and the 
threatening Soviet Union—a guide then loosely interpreted by the hawks and Committee 
on the Present Danger (CPD) alumni that made up the Reagan foreign policy team.192 
Also problematic for explanations of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy is the 
abrupt turnabout in fundamental appraisals of the Soviet Union and the means that the 
Reagan administration brought to bear on nuclear weapons policy and foreign policy. 
Any attempt to explain or understand this period must address, the extent to which there 
was a change in policy during Reagan’s second term, as well as what or whom drove the 
change. This chapter will argue that discourse analysis provides leverage in approaching 
the “Reagan Reversal.”193 
 In addition, the discourse approach will provide an avenue to critique material 
explanations. The pieces of discourse examined here instead show that policymakers 
faced profound uncertainty regarding what the impact a military buildup would have on 
                                                 
192 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1997), 1-5. 
193 Ibid. 
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the Soviet Union; the nature of current and future of missile defense technology; and the 
political power of those oppose the new direction. These sources of uncertainty led 
political leaders to rely on narratives built on rhetoric, assumptions, and stories about the 
world and the US nuclear weapons’ role therein. Economic or realist interpretations of 
this case would quite properly emphasize such variables as economic and industrial 
capacity, allies, conventional capabilities and other material sources to explain the 
buildup and eventual turnabout. This approach does not ignore such material realities, but 
contends that it is only when material realities are incorporated into discourse that it 
makes any difference for the social world. The contribution of this work then will be to 
approach a well-researched case with a new focus. With this new focus, new pieces of 
discourse may be brought to the fore, and novel conclusions about the forging of nuclear 
weapons policy in the US may emerge.  
Second, this work will have the benefit of hindsight. While extensive research has 
uncovered many of the relationships and causal processes, cases that are relatively new 
are worth revisiting often. Documents related to this period have trickled out over the last 
twenty-five years, and many people involved in the policymaking process have only 
recently retired, penned telling memoirs and provided revealing interviews.194 Such 
novelty means that controversies and source data remains, and stories are yet to be told. 
Studies such as this are meant to ensure that these novel materials may be usefully 
incorporated in the historical debate over the Reagan foreign policy legacy.  
                                                 
194 See for example George Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: 
Charles Scribner and Sons, 1993); and Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: 
Penguin Group, 2011). 
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Third, while political scientists and others have spilled a great deal of ink 
describing and analyzing the Reagan administration and its policies, it is worthwhile to 
reexamine such work as new tools of inquiry become available. When Reagan left office 
in 1989, the discipline of political science had only just begun to explore the possibilities 
afforded by constructivism, and insights drawn from the methodologies of sociology, 
anthropology, philosophy and others. Here I will deploy variants of discourse analysis as 
well as insights from various interpretive methods to investigate nuclear weapons 
policymaking during the Reagan era. Although these approaches have been used for 
decades in other disciplines, they have only recently been applied to topics in 
international relations.195  
Making sense of the two Reagans 
In this chapter I offer a novel approach to the empirical problem presented by the 
seemingly inconsistent and contradictory policy and rhetoric of the Reagan nuclear 
weapons policy. The arc of the Reagan campaign and presidency show what Joseph 
Cirincione has called the two Ronald Reagans.196 In the decades before taking office and 
during his first term, Reagan spoke of the Soviet Union in adversarial terms, arguing that 
the US should remain vigilant militarily with increasing defense budgets and a larger 
nuclear weapons arsenal with the latest in delivery systems. Yet by his second term, the 
emphasis had shifted toward arms control and nonproliferation efforts. In October 1986, 
                                                 
195 See for example Jenny Edkins, Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political 
Back In. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers (1999); Charlotte Epstein, The Power of Words in 
International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse (MIT Press, 2008); Lene Hansen, Security as 
Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (New York: Routledge, 2006); and Jutta Weldes et. al. 
eds. Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
196 Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (Columbia University Press, 2008), 38-40. 
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Reagan and Gorbachev had a near-breakthrough that exposed the potential for arms 
control at the Reykjavik, Iceland summit. In 1987 the two superpowers signed the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The ongoing cooperation additionally 
paved the way for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), proposed by Reagan in 
1982, that would finally be signed by President George H.W. Bush in 1991.  
Several explanations have been posited for the turnaround or the Reagan 
Reversal.197 Cirincione suggests that it could have been the triumph of Secretary of State 
George Schultz’s influence over that of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.198 
Conservative analysts such as Irving Kristol argue that the Reagan defense buildup 
demonstrated to Soviet elites that the US had the political will and economic capacity to 
win the Cold War, and that they therefore folded. In other words, Reagan’s turnabout is 
explained by his policy’s success in changing Soviet foreign policy.199 Gaddis takes a 
similar view, arguing that the Reagan buildup hastened the disintegration of the Soviet 
empire.200 Others have argued that the buildup itself, the centerpiece of Reagan’s first 
term, actually led to a longer Cold War. From this view, Reagan’s policies emboldened 
members of the Soviet Politburo and other agencies who advocated a corresponding 
Soviet buildup. Such convictions made for staunch opposition to Gorbachev’s plans for 
                                                 
197 Fischer (1997) 
198 2007: 40 
199 For Kristol’s view see "It Wasn’t Inevitable," American Enterprise Institute, On the Issues (June 2004). 
Also note that Margaret Thatcher famously argued at a Heritage Foundation event, “He (Reagan) won the 
Cold War without firing a shot” (Daniel Wirls, Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense from Reagan to 
Obama, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
200 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). Wirls calls the 
perspective that Reagan’s buildup won the Cold War “triumphalism,” and argues that this point of view 
became central to Reagan’s “iconic status” in the Republican party, and remained as one of the drivers of 
persistently high defense spending through the Obama era (Wirls 2010: 23-6). 
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glasnost and perestroika and may have prolonged the existence of the Soviet Union.201 In 
spite of the opposition, Gorbachev’s platform, as well as steadily crumbling economic 
and political structures in the Soviet Union, made it possible for Reagan to pursue more 
cooperative policy in his second term. The approach offered here will suggest continuity 
rather than disruption in the Reagan foreign policy, and especially in those components of 
foreign policy that constitute nuclear weapons policy. Instead of the rapid reversal, there 
is a gradual evolution in the Reagan approach to the problem of what to do with nuclear 
weapons. Along the way, his interactions with discourses on missile defense and arms 
control affected—but did not replace—the way in which he would articulate policy as his 
presidency proceeded. This chapter will show the roots of the various strands of discourse 
which would eventually be woven together by Reagan and others to constitute policy. 
The next section will summarize how discourse analyses’ shift of focus toward the 
ensembles of ideas and formulations and the actors which create and recreate them can 
provide a compelling account which incorporates the assumption that the world is 
socially constructed, and that the formulation of the policy question came under 
conditions of uncertainty. In contrast to other accounts which claim to ferret out 
causation, the approach utilized here shows an arc of nuclear weapons policy discourse in 
which actors juggled and manipulated multiple competing discourses in order to 
construct policy. 
Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis is well-suited for investigating nuclear weapons politics. Since 
the international strategic environment, tradition, and history provide few determinative 
                                                 
201 Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, Princeton Studies in International 
History and Politics (Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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imperatives for those constructing nuclear weapons policy, policy makers have latitude to 
consider a wide range of possibilities. Under these conditions policy emerges, neither out 
of the ether nor from some kind of international dictate, but from the prevailing sets of 
arguments and ideas available to the elite—discourse.202 In Reagan’s case, the president 
and his administration built on the work done by them and others in the 1970’s of producing 
doubt in US capabilities, and certainty in the strength of the Soviet Union, conditions that 
then made certain policy choices necessary. In lodging a critique of Carter and positing their 
own worldview they not only prescribed policies, but redefined the interests and identity of 
the US and the ethical responsibility that such an identity entailed. As the critiques, policies, 
and means are articulated, they contribute to the forging of state identity, and provide a 
backdrop for continuing the discourse, or building an alternative. The continued propagation 
of the Reagan administration’s discourses gave the discourses themselves power, but also led 
to the rise of alternative or competing discourses—especially one that supported and 
constituted the nuclear freeze movement, and by extension the nuclear taboo. 
                                                 
202 Discourse can be thought of as sense-making practices (Epstein 2008: 4), or as “an interrelated set of 
texts, and practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being” 
(Marianne Jørgensen & Louise Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2002), 3). The texts to which Jorgensen and Phillips refer can be speeches, 
conversations, books, symbols, videos, or pictures. These artifacts become meaningful through the process 
of intertextuality—a concept that captures the interconnectedness of texts. Texts build and modify existing 
meanings and categories. Meaning produced in texts derives from both the text itself, and its spatial and 
temporal location in the social space. Common linguistic, conceptual, or symbolic constructions may be 
used repeatedly over time and in varied genres and arenas. These connections produce legitimacy for both 
the new and old text: the new by invoking existing meanings, and the old by being referenced or re-
articulated.  Consistent with Phillips and Hardy, the study of discourse deployed here is “three-
dimensional”—texts build on and extend existing discourses and are situated within a particular historical 
and social context (2002: 4). Texts on their own are meaningless—it is only through reference to existing 
texts and their context that meaning emerges. The discourse that emerges not only creates historically 
contingent meaning, but negates other possible articulations and meanings. In the context of foreign policy, 
construing issues as problems for the state to address, officials construct foreign policy problems that 
present a challenge to the ongoing discourse constituting state identity. For more on the discursive 
approach in this chapter see Chapter I.  
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Discourse analysis applied to this case reveals a few important points about the 
arc of Reagan’s thinking, action, and rhetoric around nuclear weapons. First, the role of 
missile defense as central to all of Reagan’s understanding should not be diminished. 
Whether discussing deterrence as an abstract concept, or viewing actual nuclear weapons 
at military sites, Reagan took it upon himself to consider what “defense” meant in the 
context of nuclear weapons, and often lamented the US’s lack of an effective defense. 
Other accounts have trouble with why missile defense played such a central role in 
policy. Instead it is assumed that organizations, or hawkish policy makers drove missile 
defense, all the while missing the pivotal role of Edward Teller’s personal interactions 
with Reagan that began in 1967. Second, although his appraisal of the Soviet Union’s 
capabilities and intentions were largely consistent with that of Paul Nitze, Caspar 
Weinberger, and other Republican hawks as they conceived of the problem in the late 
1970’s and early 1980’s, Reagan’s rhetoric often criticized the morality or goodness of 
the Soviet Union. This unique and pointed conception, a piece of his discourse on US 
foreign policy, paved the way for the massive military buildup and for the proposal of 
SDI, and contributed to the terms of the confrontation with opponents of his policies. In 
other words, the buildup, SDI, and later meeting with Gorbachev were made possible by 
the evolving discourse being continuously created and powerfully recreated by Reagan. 
Such policies did not snap into existence, rather they emerged from the discursive milieu. 
In spite of Reagan’s ominous appraisal of the Soviet Union early in his presidency, his 
later cordial relations with Mikhail Gorbachev is best understood as an evolution of 
discourse. This is because the notion of a threatening and aggressive Soviet Union had 
been constructed and reinforced in social reality as a discursive creation of the members 
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of CPD and the hawkish Right. The actual intentions of Soviet policy makers and their 
military and industrial capabilities while interesting, did not drive the Reagan foreign 
policy. Any real insight into material realities would have been refracted by Reagan’s 
national security apparatus, who then incorporated any insights into the discourses on 
which Reagan based policy. In addition to his own national security experts, this chapter 
will also consider the extent to which Reagan’s evolving discourse incorporated and co-
opted the discourse on nuclear weapons policy created and favored by the nuclear freeze 
movement. A focus on discourse reveals the intertextual links and connections between 
the freeze movement and Reagan. The movement led Reagan to reiterate his much earlier 
stated desire to abolish nuclear weapons, and per Schultz, led him to reconsider a place 
for arms control in his platform.203 
The ways in which Reagan wove together these various elements of discourse and 
argumentation led directly to the major nuclear weapons policy outcomes during the 
Reagan administration. Tracing the various discourses on nuclear weapons policy 
illuminates the divergence between slowly changing material circumstances, and a 
rapidly evolving political landscape. For example, while workable national missile 
defense was nowhere near possible at the time (and remains elusive and unlikely), the 
concept, or discursive object of missile defense, powerfully affected the confrontation 
between Reagan and the nuclear freeze movement, and later between Reagan and 
Gorbachev. In short, the discourse mattered. It mattered in leading Reagan to accept that 
                                                 
203 Reagan told George Schultz in private in the fall of 1983, “If things get hotter and arms control remains 
an issue, maybe I should go see Andropov and propose eliminating all nuclear weapons”.  He is referring to 
Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov who succeeded Leonid Brezhnev two days after Brezhnev’s death 
on November 12, 1982. See George Schultz, Turmoil and triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (Charles 
Scribner’s Sons: New York, 1993), 372. 
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missile defense should be a significant component of the buildup, and thus 
denaturalizing—or removing from the “common sense”—powerful critiques of the 
potential of missile defense from Nixon, Richard Garwin and Hans Bethe, and others.204 
Discourse shaped the character and content of interactions between US and Soviet 
diplomats attempting to navigate a dynamic international security environment. It was a 
discursive process that took place when the nuclear freeze movement inspired responses 
from Reagan that made possible a move toward cooperation and arms control, and away 
from antagonizing the Soviet Union with rhetoric, and building up the military. And 
finally, the relationship between Gorbachev and Reagan which is so central to the history 
of the Cold War and the role of nuclear weapon in international politics can be 
understood more clearly if one examines the discourses from which the two leaders 
spoke. Here it matters because a focus on discourse rather than the material interests or 
strategic calculation, lends greater clarity into the two Reagans problems—namely that 
there were never two Reagans, instead there were always multiple and competing 
discourses. As a powerful actor, Reagan reshaped and recombined these discourses in 
novel ways, but he was also powerfully limited from ignoring the nuclear freeze 
movement, and from even considering a host of other strategies relative to defense by the 
existence and accessibility of discourse. 
 
 
                                                 
204 Richard Garwin & Hans Bethe argued that the Sentinel system that was touted by Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara in the late 1960’s would be unworkable, easily overcome by determined adversaries, 
and expensive (“Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems”. Scientific American. Vol. 218: 3, March 1968). President 
Richard Nixon seemed to agree, as he scaled back the Sentinel missile defense program in 1969. See "The 
President's News Conference," March 14, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1951. 
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Texts that constitute the discourses 
The following table lists the key texts used in this case study. While there are 
many texts consistent with the discourses and effects noted here, the texts mobilized here 
were selected with an eye for the clarity with which they articulated major points of 
argumentation, as well as their impact. Milliken offers useful guidelines in selecting and 
analyzing texts.205 Texts provide meaning by locating objects in space, and 
differentiating objects from each other—creating a self, and (possibly multiple) others, 
which constitutes identity. When collecting texts in order to establish the existence of 
some discourse, the researcher should consider the analysis sufficiently complete when 
additional texts continue to draw the same differentiations as those that have come 
before. In other words, texts bring objects into social existence and map these objects 
relative to each other in a social space. When the addition of new texts no longer alters 
the map of that social space, the analysis should be considered complete.206 Establishing 
a consistently mapped social space requires starting with those texts with wide reach, and 
frequent prominent re-articulation and re-creation by others.207 If enough texts are 
considered, the categories that emerge should be congruent with those of other non-
discursive studies, and should increase the reliability of the interpretation.    
                                                 
205 “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” European 
Journal of International Relations Vol. 5 (1999): 225-54. 
206 Ibid.: 234 
207 Lene Hansen also provides useful guidelines for selecting texts in a case such as this. They suggest that 
texts should be selected from the time under study, especially those which are “frequently quoted and 
function as nodes within the intertextual web of debate”. In addition and consistent with discourse analysis 
historical material should also be included to establish context See Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: 
Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 73-4. 
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Table 1 – Timeline of key texts mobilized to identify discourse and effects 
(Reagan primary material in bold) 
Missile Defense 
1967 - September - McNamara outlines Sentinel 
1967 - October - Meeting with Edward Teller at LLNL 
1968 - March - Richard Garwin and Hans Bethe critique missile defense in Scientific 
American 
1969 - March Nixon News Conference - Renames Sentinel "Safeguard" 
1976 - August - GOP Convention Remarks, Reagan frames nuclear weapons in 
terms of missiles 
1979 - July 31 - Reagan asks about missile defense at NORAD 
1979- August - Anderson prepares missile defense option for Reagan's foreign policy 
plan 
1979 - Fall - Wallop and Codevilla send Reagan "Opportunities and Imperatives of 
Ballistic Missile Defense" 
1982 - January - Teller and "Kitchen Cabinet" meet with Reagan to push missile 
defense 
1983 - March 23 - SDI Speech 
1986 - October - Reykjavik breakthrough stunted by Reagan's insistence on 
keeping SDI 
Nuclear Freeze Movement 
1980 - Dr. Randall Forsberg publishes "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race" 
1980 - November - "Freeze resolution" appears on ballot in 62 Massachusetts towns; 59 
approve 
1982 - March - 180 Vermont town meetings vote on freeze; 159 vote in favor 
1982 - March - Senators Kennedy and Hatfield introduce Freeze Resolution to 
Congress 
1982 - March  - Reagan says that there can be no winner in a nuclear war; calls 
the freeze dangerous to US 
1982 - June - Reagan states in an interview on French television that he is the 
leader of the freeze movement 
1982 - June - Nearly a million attend nuclear freeze rally in Central Park 
1982 - November - Reagan argues that the freeze had been concocted and 
launched by Soviet agents to weaken US 
1983 - March - FBI report contends the agency found no evidence connecting the 
Soviets to the freeze movement 
1983 - September - Reagan touts arms control to UN; Argues that zero-option is 
best solution to nuclear weapons 
1983 - October - Reagan tells Schultz that maybe he should propose eliminating 
nuclear weapons to Andropov 
1985 - November - Gorbachev and Reagan meet for first time at Geneva Summit; 
agree to continue meeting 
1986 - October - Gorbachev and Reagan meet at the Reyjavik Summit; agree on 
need to reduce nuclear arsenals 
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This chapter is part of the larger dissertation project aimed at showing how the 
often opposing discourses that emerge from elite policymakers and the broader public 
interact to make possible certain kinds of nuclear weapons policies such as 
modernization, and buildups, but strongly proscribes other policies such as developing 
more useable nuclear weapons and especially using nuclear weapons in combat—a 
powerful normative prohibition that has been dubbed the nuclear taboo.208 Although the 
current work is not aimed at showing the emergence of the nuclear taboo, the ongoing 
confrontation between Reagan’s administration and supporters and the nuclear freeze 
movement and associated peace movement groups is a chance to look closer at the 
operation of the nuclear taboo and its impact on broader nuclear weapons politics. By 
looking closely at the discourse associated with cases of political conflict over nuclear 
weapons, we can gain greater understanding of the processes of norm construction and 
maintenance, the robustness of the nuclear taboo during this era, and the various ways in 
which opponents challenge and alter those norms through reconfigurations of existing 
discourse.  
 The next section focuses on Reagan’s early encounters with the concept of 
missile defense. Those encounters interacted with his formative experiences with nuclear 
weapons politics in which he supported the internationalization of nuclear materials and 
technology. The third section deals with Reagan on the campaign trail. During this time 
he learned more about missile defense, and drew from a variety of hawkish groups on the 
right who advocated a military buildup to counter a looming Soviet threat. The fourth 
section details Reagan’s first term in which he continued the themes of Soviet threat and 
                                                 
208 For the most comprehensive discussion of the nuclear taboo, see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: 
the United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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military buildup, as well as articulating on several occasions a critique of the state of 
deterrence. The fifth section focuses on the nuclear freeze movement and its 
confrontation with Reagan’s discourse. Finally, the implications of the study are then 
considered in the conclusion. 
Reagan Before the Presidency: The Emergence of Missile Defense 
In 1959 the Soviet Union began developing limited missile defenses to protect 
Moscow in the case of a US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. Eight launch 
sites were planned, from which A-35 missiles would be deployed to intercept an 
incoming attack. The Soviets enjoyed several successful tests against single missiles as 
early as 1960. However, during the course of development it became clear that the 
system—even with missiles carrying 1-megaton yield warheads—would be ineffective in 
the face of multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).209 Nevertheless, 
development proceeded and they achieved preliminary operational status of “Galosh” by 
1971.210 
 All the while, the development process accompanied by political debate in the 
Soviet Union mirrored that of the United States. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson all funded research and development of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. In 
1967, Johnson yielded to pressure to deploy a system in response to the Soviet “Galosh” 
                                                 
209 Such a system would have also been overwhelmed by a large attack where the numbers of incoming 
ICBM’s would greatly exceed the available number of defensive intercept vehicles. Although the claim had 
been made by Brodie as early as 1946, it is not clear to what extent the Soviet Union considered the 
problem during the construction of Galosh. See Bernard Brodie, Frederick Sherwood Dunn, et. al., The 
Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, 1946). 
210 For a listing of Soviet and Russian missile defense systems see Sean O’Connor, “Russian/Soviet Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems,” Air Power Australia (December 2009), http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-
ABM-Systems.html#mozTocId357155. 
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with the US counterpart “Sentinel.” Because such a move would have looked provocative 
given the arms race, Secretary of Defense McNamara argued in his announcement of the 
program that the intent would be to counter the novel Chinese nuclear threat. In doing so, 
he walked a fine line between a light ABM system, oriented against China, and a heavy 
ABM system which would be porous and vulnerable to the much larger Soviet threat.211, 
212 The Chinese-oriented variant, he argued, would be cheaper and more reliable, and 
would have the added benefit of being able to protect US Minuteman missiles against a 
Soviet attack. In addition, the light system would be clearly ineffective against the Soviet 
arsenal—thus not a threat to the Soviets, and not likely to exacerbate the arms race. 
 Nixon inherited the Sentinel program following his election in 1968. Shortly after 
taking office on March 14, 1969 he delivered a speech in which he argued for major 
changes to the Sentinel program. In particular he took issue with McNamara’s 
characterization of Sentinel as providing an adequate defense against a Chinese nuclear 
attack. In a speech where he changed the name of Sentinel to “Safeguard” he argued with 
regard to Sentinel as laid out by McNamara:  
The program also does not do some things which should be clearly understood. It 
does not provide defense for our cities, and for that reason the sites have been 
moved away from our major cities. I have made the decision with regard to this 
particular point because I found that there is no way, even if we were to expand 
the limited Sentinel system, which was planned for some of our cities, to a so-
called heavy or thick system—there is no way that we can adequately defend our 
                                                 
211 Light seems to have referred to a smaller array of sites aimed at protecting military targets from a 
Chinese attack. Heavy ABM systems would require greater infrastructure and more sites, but would 
theoretically defend cities against a larger Soviet attack. See Robert Hutchinson, Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: The No-Nonsense Guide to Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons Today (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003). 
212 Robert McNamara’s full statement in which he discusses nuclear strategy and the prospects for missile 
defense see: September 18, 1967 “Remarks made before United Press International Editors and Publishers 
in San Francisco,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 23, No. 10 (December 1967): 26-31. 
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cities without an unacceptable loss of life. The only way that I have concluded 
that we can save lives, which is the primary purpose of our defense system, is to 
prevent war; and that is why the emphasis of this system is on protecting our 
deterrent, which is the best preventive for war.213 
 
Such a conclusion echoed that reached by members of the scientific community in the 
year previous. In the March 1968 issue of Scientific American, Nobel-laureate Hans A. 
Bethe and Richard Garwin argued that the Sentinel system announced and publicized by 
McNamara would be ineffective even in the more modest task of defending against a 
Chinese attack. They wrote, 
It does not seem credible to us that, even if the Chinese succumbed to the “insane 
and suicidal” impulse to launch a nuclear attack on the US within the next decade, 
they would also be foolish enough to have built complex and expensive missiles 
and nuclear warheads vulnerable to the light ABM system now presumably under 
construction (a system whose characteristics and capabilities have been well 
publicized).214 
 
 Essentially, the well-known limitations of the Sentinel system would simply lead a 
belligerent enemy to develop an offensive system capable of defeating Sentinel. In spite 
of evidently agreeing with this larger conclusion, Nixon chose not to abandon missile 
defense completely, but instead to shift the focus from protecting cities to protecting 
retaliatory forces. Ironically, Sentinel as articulated under McNamara implied a strategy 
for potential adversaries of targeting cities with enough warheads to overwhelm any 
defense. Residents of Boston, Seattle, and Chicago pushed back as word of the projects 
leaked from political officials and concerned scientists.215 Nixon’s statement above 
                                                 
213 Nixon, Richard: "The President's News Conference," March 14, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and 
John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1951. 
 
214 Garwin & Bethe (March 1968: 21) 
215 Devolpi et. al. point to Newell Mack, a physiology graduate student from the University of Washington, 
as well as physicists John Erskine, and Alvin Saperstein as key local leaders in the opposition to Sentinel. 
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concurs with the conclusions about defense against nuclear attack first forcefully 
championed by Bernard Brody in 1946, that, “No adequate defense against the bomb 
exists, and the possibilities of its existence in the future are exceedingly remote.”216  
Reagan’s First Encounters with Nuclear Weapons and Missile Defense 
 While this debate raged in scientific and policy journals as well as in cities from 
Washington to Los Alamos to Seattle, Ronald Reagan had been developing his own 
unique understanding of nuclear weapons. By 1945, Reagan had become vocal in his 
conviction that nuclear weapons should be abolished, and nuclear power should be placed 
under international control. Warner Bros. studios actually prevented Reagan from leading 
an anti-nuclear rally in Hollywood in December of 1945. Reagan planned to read an anti-
nuclear poem, but was prevented from doing so by the studio who argued it would breach 
his contract.217 Although his personal political views would become more conservative as 
he entered formal politics, Lettow argues that his stance that nuclear weapons should be 
abolished remained.218 Such an argument is certainly supported by Reagan’s second term 
in which his focus shifted toward arms control and diplomacy. In addition, these early 
convictions would be the bedrock on which Reagan would build his broader 
understanding of nuclear weapons policy. 
 
                                                 
See Devolpi et. al. Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry (Fidlar 
Doubleday, 2005). 
216 Bernard Brodie, et. al. eds. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. 1st ed. Publications, 
Yale University Institute of International Studies. (New York: Harcourt, 1946), 19-21. 
217 Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House 
Incorporated, 2005), 3-5. 
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The GE Years 
 During the 1950’s and early 1960’s Reagan continued to develop as an orator and 
a politician. 1954 Reagan took a job as the host of General Electric Theatre, an 
anthology show sponsored by General Electric (GE). In addition to hosting the show he 
also toured GE plants all over the US giving speeches and meeting employees as part of a 
larger effort at corporate unity. The show succeeded in part because of its charming 
host—the only host the show ever had—and in part due to the Hollywood stars the new 
host brought to the program.219 In his capacity as traveling spokesperson for GE, he met 
with managers, employees, their families. While records of his speeches are sparse, 
anecdotal evidence suggests he often talked about his experiences with people in 
Hollywood or GE’s product line. During this time Reagan polished his chops as an 
orator, and cultivated his common touch. 
 In addition to sharpening his rhetorical skills, the GE plant tour began Reagan’s 
transition from Democrat to Republican. GE vice president Lemuel Boulware built the 
company’s employee relations philosophy, called Boulwarism, as part of the same effort 
to keep the corporate empire unified that brought Reagan into the fold. GE disseminated 
Boulwarism as a set of management ideals through a school in Ossining, New York, as 
well as on-site classes. Reagan however, absorbed many of the core concepts of the 
philosophy through ferocious reading of company pamphlets, manuals, and literature in 
an effort to be sharp as a speaker.220 In addition GE sponsored a book club that featured 
                                                 
219 The show began as a radio show, and shortly after became a television show in early 1953, though 
neither had a host until Reagan took the reins in September of 1954. See General Electric Theatre, “Internet 
Movie Database.” Accessed October 23, 2016. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0045395/. 
220 Reagan’s reading benefitted from hours spent riding in trains and cars, as he refused to fly. A 
tumultuous flight in 1937 convinced the future president to insist that GE include in his contract a clause 
that he would not be required to fly. See Thomas Evans, The Education of Ronald Reagan: The General 
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mostly conservative texts on economics and related topics. Boulware curated the book 
club’s list which included works from Henry Hazlitt of the Wall Street Journal, Claude 
Robinson and others. From these texts Reagan absorbed conservative orthodoxy on the 
virtues of free markets, the problem of government overreach, and the need for low taxes. 
His chats with employees on the line gradually evolved into more formal speeches, and 
those led to speeches to non-employees, and more politically minded civic organizations 
such as the Lions, and the Kiwanis. By 1960 Reagan had realized that his role and the 
“sermons” he had been delivering on behalf of GE were incompatible with the voting 
pattern of his life to that point. In 1960, Reagan “completed the process of self-
conversion,” and would be a registered Republican for the rest of his life.221  
Governor Reagan and Edward Teller 
 California elected Reagan governor in 1966. In 1967 he made an historic trip to 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) where he toured the facilities and met 
with director Michael May and “father of the hydrogen bomb” Edward Teller.  At that 
meeting Teller briefed Reagan on the possibilities for missile defense from his 
perspective.222 Martin Anderson, a close policy advisor to Reagan argues that an oft-cited 
1979 trip to NORAD was not Reagan’s introduction the idea of missile defense. He 
mentions both the visit with Teller at LLNL in 1967, and also that, “He was fully familiar 
with Nixon’s ‘68-’69 stuff on missile defense and all the things that had been made. He 
                                                 
Electric Years and the Untold Story of His Conversion to Conservatism. Columbia Studies in 
Contemporary American History. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 74-5. 
221 Evans (2006: 113) 
222 Stephen Knott & Jeffrey L. Chidester. At Reagan's Side: Insiders' Recollections from Sacramento to the 
White House (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, (2009), 103. 
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was fully aware of it.”223 The “stuff” to which Anderson refers includes the pointed 
conclusion argued by Nixon’s “Statement on Deployment of Antiballistic Missile 
System”:  
Although every instinct motivates me to provide the American people with 
complete protection against a major nuclear attack, it is not now within our power 
to do so. The heaviest defense system we considered, one designed to protect our 
major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. fatalities from a 
deliberate all-out Soviet attack. And it might look to an opponent like the prelude 
to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrent.224 
 
 Teller however, probably gave a much different account. During the trip to LLNL 
in 1967, Teller’s research briefing concerned defending against nuclear attack with 
nuclear explosives.225 As George Schultz writes in retrospect, “Reagan listened intently, 
asked many questions, but made no comments pro or con. This may have become the 
first gleam in Ronald Reagan’s eye of what later became the Strategic Defense 
Initiative.”226 Teller continued to champion the idea of missile defense through the 
1980’s, publishing his ideas regularly and maintaining regular contact with Reagan. 
Reading through Teller’s work, one is struck by the clear connections with the thinking 
and discourse of Reagan. He argues that the Soviets have strategic superiority, that there 
is reason to doubt the strength of the US nuclear deterrent, and that Soviet defenses have 
become quite effective. He additionally argues that the Soviets could take steps to 
                                                 
223 Ibid. 
224 Nixon (March 14, 1969) 
225 Lettow reports that several scientists from LLNL including Teller himself briefed Reagan on Spartan 
and Sprint missile systems. Per Teller, “his questions showed very little knowledge of the subject but real 
interest in the subject” (2005: 19). 
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manage the effects of a nuclear war by utilizing civil defense. Finally, he is confident that 
contemporary advances in technology will make national missile defense possible either 
through nuclear anti-ballistic missiles, or through laser technology (also nuclear 
powered).227  
 There are at least a couple of reasons why Teller’s words would be especially 
powerful for Reagan. First, Teller is known as the “father of the hydrogen bomb.” By the 
time of Reagan, he had established himself as one of the world’s foremost nuclear 
scientists. The evidence and arguments he mobilizes are consistent with his technical 
background. Whether his assertions were true or not, the words were wrapped in a veil of 
scientific rigor that set his mode of argumentation apart from Reagan’s other advisors 
who nonetheless advocated similar policy. Second, Teller’s outspoken nature on missile 
defense came from staunch confidence that missile defense would be possible in a short 
timeframe. In fact, he believed that by the late 1970’s the Soviets had completed a system 
that could stop 50% of missiles attacking Moscow, with upgrades taking that number 
over 90% imminently. He also touts Soviet work on laser technology as being close to 
being able to attack missiles during their boost phase.228, 229     
                                                 
227 Greg Herken, “The earthly origins of Star Wars,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October 1987): 20-
28. 
228 For a closer look at Teller’s thinking which he shared with Reagan see, see Teller’s publications: 
“Dangerous Myths About Nuclear Arms”, Reader’s Digest 121 (November 1982): 139-44; and "SDI: The 
Last Best Hope," Insight (Washington Post) (October 28, 1985). For a critique of his point of view see 
Frank Von Hippel, “The Myths of Edward Teller,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1983): 6-12. 
229 Inter-continental missiles path from launch to explosion is described as having three phases: boost, mid-
course, and terminal. During the boost phase, the missile has not yet left the atmosphere and is slow, hot, 
and bright and can often be seen from space or detected remotely. Shooting down missiles in the boost 
phase requires a super fast moving projectile, or more likely a laser. During mid-course, missiles are 
moving through space outside of the atmosphere and would be easy to attack, but for hundreds of decoys 
which may make the actual missile impossible to identify. The terminal phase or re-entry phase takes place 
as missiles re-enter the atmosphere heading toward the target. Since, missiles will re-enter much faster than 
any decoy, this phase provides a defender with the ability to identify and shoot down the actual threat. The 
126 
 
 In July 1981, Teller began meeting with Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham of High 
Frontier—an organization advocating space based defense, as well as business elites Karl 
Bendetsen, William Wilson, and Joseph Coors—a group that made up Reagan’s private 
brain trust, dubbed the “kitchen cabinet.” Teller, Graham, and the kitchen cabinet met at 
Heritage Foundation offices where they discussed the threat posed to the US by the 
Soviet Union, missile defense, and space based weapons.230 On January 8, 1982 the 
kitchen cabinet briefed Reagan on the Soviet threat, the possibilities for nuclear powered 
lasers and other high-tech weapons, and the prospect of “new Manhattan project” to build 
it all.231 In November of 1982, Teller penned an article for Reader’s Digest in which he 
argued that myths had grown up around nuclear arms—myths he intended to dispel.232 
He proposed to dispel the “myth” that “stopping US weapons research and development 
will help make the world safer from the destructive effects of nuclear weapons.”  Instead, 
Teller argued that research was making progress toward using nuclear explosions to shoot 
down incoming missiles.233 Teller’s history as a scientist in the Manhattan project, as 
                                                 
problem at this phase however is that the missile will be traveling at speeds of up to 4.3 miles/second or 
around 15,000 miles/hour making reliable interception exceedingly difficult. See Richard Garwin, 
“National Missile Defense: Prospects and Problems,” Presentation at IEEE Aerospace Section Plenary, Big 
Sky, MT, March 6, 2005. 
230 The importance of the kitchen cabinet is evidenced by their occupation of and subsequent eviction from 
the Executive Office Building in Washington. From January until March of 1981 the group worked out of 
the government office, until a legal opinion issued to the White House argued that private citizens should 
not work out of government offices. Such meetings would subject the conversations taking place therein to 
Freedom of Information Act requests. Per the opinion, the White House moved the group’s workspace to 
the offices of the Republican National Committee Building (Howell Raines, “Reagan’s ‘Kitchen Cabinet’ 
is told to Vacate Office in US Building,” New York Times, March 21, 1981).  
231 Herken (October 1987) 
232 Von Hippel (March 1983) 
233 Teller (November 1982) 
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well as one of the key figures in developing the hydrogen bomb, make his lobbying 
efforts particularly important especially when it is considered that his considerable 
intellectual stature was being mobilized along with the efforts of longtime friends of 
Reagan.234 
Reagan on the Campaign Trail 
In addition to interactions with Teller and the laser lobby, Reagan’s exposure to 
other actors pushing for missile defense led to alterations in his own framing of the threat 
posed by Russian nuclear weapons, and to a critique of the notion of deterrence as policy. 
The sections below consider major discursive moments before Reagan’s presidency and 
clarify the role that missile defense would play in Reagan’s unique perspective on the 
immorality of deterrence as policy. In particular, Reagan is noted by several sources to 
have considered deterrence akin to two gunslingers facing off in an old west saloon, with 
guns pointed at each other permanently—a situation he rejected as immoral. According to 
John Sears, director of his 1980 campaign, “it was (Reagan’s) instinct that we should get 
the edge in all places, and the idea of a missile defense appealed to him along these 
lines.”235 Reagan’s SDI speech wouldn’t come until 1983, but even before being elected, 
Reagan had been incorporating the pieces of the discourse behind SDI into his own 
rhetoric. 
 
 
                                                 
234 Herken (1987: 22) 
235 Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 102. 
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1976 GOP Convention Speech 
At the conclusion of the 1976 Republican National Convention, Reagan made 
some impromptu remarks which previewed the type of rhetoric that would come to 
characterize his approach with regard to nuclear weapons and the threat they posed vis-à-
vis the Soviet Union. He recounted his thinking about what he might put in a letter to be 
placed in a time capsule to be opened one hundred years later in 2076. In thinking about 
what to include in the letter, he contemplated describing current problems to those who 
opened the capsule in the future: 
We live in a world in which the great powers have poised and aimed at each other 
horrible missiles of destruction, nuclear weapons that can in a matter of minutes 
arrive at each other’s country and destroy, virtually, the civilized world we live 
in.236  
 
Considering the response of those people one hundred years in the future, opening the 
letter that Reagan described being asked to write, Reagan suggested they might say 
either, “Thank God for those people in 1976 who headed off that loss of freedom, who 
kept up now 100 years later free, who kept our world from nuclear destruction.” Or if 
“the challenge” was not met, they would not be permitted to read the letter at all because 
it referred to “individual freedom”. In this moment Reagan set up the problem of Soviet 
missiles as a challenge with ramifications for the next century or more.  
 The unrehearsed remarks certainly convey a sense of urgency and fear regarding 
the prospect of nuclear disaster. The wording though, also betrays his specific concern 
with ballistic missiles. Rather than a concern with the condition of deterrence, the 
fragility of MAD, or even the prospect of being bombed by aircraft or a bomb snuck into 
                                                 
236 “Address at the Republican National Convention in Kansas City”. August 19, 1976. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
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an American harbor, Reagan specifically connects the nuclear threat to the problem of 
ballistic missiles. In the second quote above he speaks more generally of “nuclear 
destruction”, but in the first he constructs a specific image of nuclear-armed missiles 
“poised and aimed”. In addition, the speech emphasizes that it is freedom that is at 
stake—failure to address the challenge posed by nuclear tipped missiles will lead to a loss 
of individual freedom, so total as to prevent future people from even reading Reagan’s 
words. This preoccupation with missiles as the particular delivery systems that would 
undo US security betrays the seriousness with which Reagan had taken his discussions 
with Edward Teller. From the perspective of discourse analysis the 1976 speech shows 
intertextual links with Reagan’s trip to LLNL in 1967, and is a moment when Teller’s 
ideas were carried from a private briefing with a governor to the a prominent national 
stage vis-a-via an immensely important primary concession speech.237  
Lobbying for Lasers 
Reagan continued to be engaged with the unfolding of arguments about ballistic 
missiles throughout his bid for president. In 1979 he received an article called 
“Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense” written by Senator Malcolm 
Wallop of Wyoming and an aide, Angelo Codevilla—a member of the New Right, and a 
self-taught nuclear strategist.238, 239 The piece argues that the concept of MAD had 
                                                 
237 According to Teller, he and others briefed Governor Reagan on anti-ballistic missiles. The system 
described to Reagan involved waiting for incoming ballistic missiles to re-enter the atmosphere in order to 
discriminate between actual threats and decoys. Upon re-entry the real missiles could be identified and shot 
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distracted from the reality of an actual attack. From this perspective it would be 
irresponsible to abandon technology that would be able to mitigate or limit the damage 
from such a strike. The argument built on the premise that Soviet missile technology 
would be able to launch a disarming first strike “without necessarily targeting population 
centers,” and that the Soviets were working even more fervently on a missile defense.240 
Additionally, the paper hailed the recent success of US scientists in the field of laser 
technology which, they argued could be effectively deployed on satellites to defend 
against any Soviet missile attack. At the time the paper was published, Wallop and 
Codevilla were meeting with Edward Teller and Senator Harrison Schmidt (R-NM) in a 
group known as the “laser lobby.” Reagan reportedly read the paper and made notes 
before returning it to Codevilla, though he would continue to meet with laser lobby until 
its dissolution in 1982.241 From this group Reagan would be exposed to Teller’s optimism 
that laser technology, specifically given recent breakthroughs at Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratories, would provide a workable defense.242 In addition, Wallop and 
Codevilla were able to couple this optimism for laser defenses with an appraisal of Soviet 
intentions and capabilities consonant with others on the Right including Reagan himself. 
Herken points to Teller’s persistent contact with the president and particularly a meeting 
which took place in January 1981 and included Teller as well as members of Regan’s 
                                                 
240 Wallop (1979: 14) 
241 The group could not agree on the type of laser to unite behind: nuclear short wavelength or chemical 
long wavelength. 
242 Teller backed the development of nuclear powered lasers which would be more easily deployed, but 
came with the drawback of requiring a nuclear explosion (Herken 1987: 21). 
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“kitchen cabinet” as key event in Reagan’s eventual response.243 The pressure that began 
with Teller in 1967, continued with conversations between Reagan and Lt. General 
Daniel Graham—an advocate of space-based defense—as early as 1976, and continued 
pressure from the laser lobby as well as Reagan’s own kitchen cabinet provided integral 
pieces with which Reagan would use as he championed SDI and struggled to reshape the 
existing nuclear weapons discourse.  
Reagan Goes to NORAD 
 In 1979, Douglas Morrow, a screenwriter and friend of Reagan’s suggested that 
he visit the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado during 
the presidential campaign. The literature offers at least two interpretations of the impact 
the visit on Reagan. Frances FitzGerald points to a memorandum written by Martin 
Anderson, a senior policy advisor to Reagan, for the campaign a few days after the trip to 
NORAD which proposed three options for Reagan to consider in response to “the time of 
peril” presented by the Soviet Union. The memo took an early shot at the overarching 
problem of how to respond to the Soviet Union, given the future administration’s dire 
appraisal of Soviet intentions. Notably, the third of the options was “Develop a Protective 
Missile System.”244 Of the details provided by Anderson with regard to such a program, 
FitzGerald argues that Anderson was “talking through his hat where weapons systems 
were concerned.”245 Notwithstanding, Anderson frames the program strictly in terms of 
                                                 
243 Reagan’s kitchen cabinet consisted of Karl Bendetsen, William Wilson, and Joseph Coors (of Coors 
Brewing Co.). They were personal friends of Reagan and advocated for missile defense given their 
appraisal of a Soviet threat. 
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defense, and argues that the “idea (of defense) is probably fundamentally more appealing 
to the American people than the questionable satisfaction of knowing that those who 
initiated an attack against were also blown away.” In addition to the memo, FitzGerald 
makes a case for the importance of the NORAD trip for Reagan’s thinking by noting that 
Reagan asked Anderson after reading the memo about the feasibility, timeframe, and cost 
of a defense system. Also, John Sears—Reagan’s campaign manager—remembers 
Reagan suggesting the inclusion of ABM systems in his speeches. They did not include 
the plan at that time, but the memo and Reagan’s questions are suggestive of the impact 
of the NORAD visit. 
 Anderson disagrees with the FitzGerald characterization of the importance of 
Reagan’s encounter with arguments about missile defense at NORAD. The notion that 
NORAD as the moment that the idea “crystallized” for Reagan is for Anderson, “totally 
wrong…a misrepresentation of what happened.” He argues at that point that Reagan had 
met with Teller in 1967, and had been familiar with Nixon’s work on the issue. The 
NORAD trip from this perspective then, only “drove it home.”246 And while Anderson 
downplays the independent impact of the trip, he also recounts the manner in which 
Reagan conceptualized the threat posed by nuclear weapons on the return flight from that 
trip: 
The way he put it was, if you become president, and if there is any kind of an 
indication of a nuclear missile attack on the United States, the president has two 
choices, both of which are equally bad. One choice is, you can let the missiles 
land in whatever city they’re aimed at and watch tens of millions of people being 
killed and make what happened to the World Trade Center in New York look like 
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nothing, and then complain about it. Or, you can launch your retaliatory strike 
and, in his words, cause Armageddon. He was serious about Armageddon.247  
 
Reagan’s characterization of the threat posed by nuclear missiles as being a binary choice 
between being destroyed, and destroying the enemy in addition to being destroyed led 
him to a third option—missile defense. In Reagan’s own words, “The only way is missile 
defense. You have to stop it. Either tear down the missiles or stop them as they’re coming 
in.”248  
 In another instance during an interview in 1979 with Los Angeles Times writer 
Robert Scheer, Reagan lauded the capabilities of NORAD while at the same time 
championing missile defense. Reagan brought up NORAD as the source of his answer to 
a question about the number of bombers that would elude US air defense if the Soviets 
attacked. Interestingly, Reagan shifted the conversation from bomber attacks to missiles, 
then after citing the tracking technology employed by NORAD, argued, “the irony that 
here, with this great technology of ours, we can do all of this yet we cannot stop any of 
the weapons that are coming at us…I don’t think there’s been a time in history when 
there wasn’t a defense against some kind of thrust…”249 
 Although missile defense is only one piece of what made up Reagan’s nuclear 
weapons policy, the interactions through which he came to understand missile defense 
were closely tied to those in which he framed his understanding of nuclear weapons. 
These episodes show his consistent dissatisfaction with the concept and practice of 
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deterrence, a position captured by his repeated use of the analogy of nuclear deterrence as 
a gunslinger standoff.250 The events provide a window into the discourses from which 
Reagan would draw after his election when he would begin to constructing his formal 
nuclear weapons policy. 
President Ronald Wilson Reagan 
Reagan’s election in 1980 enabled the implementation of  a whole set of policies 
consistent with the positions of a coalition of foreign policy and defense analysts and 
commentators that had been organizing throughout the 1970’s around a critique of the 
Carter administration. Although the coalition had eclectic membership including hawkish 
democrats, business people, Christian groups, and others, they united around a 
coordinated attack on what they considered Carter’s feckless foreign policy. This point of 
unity “would be the backbone of the Reagan campaign,” and would provide popular 
support for Reagan’s early presidential policy making.251 Direct mailings were a key to 
the success of this new coalition of right leaning groups. These mailings were a tool by 
which elite conservatives were able to construct a discourse ripe for mass consumption 
that would also imply their favored policies. It is also an example of top-down discursive 
construction stands in contrast to what will be discussed below: the concurrent bottom-up 
process of discourse construction taking place in the nuclear freeze movement. 
In addition to efforts to convince the broader public of the need for a more 
muscular foreign policy, efforts were underway within government to also convince 
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elites. In 1976, CIA director George H.W. Bush assembled the “Team B,” a panel of CIA 
outsiders with hawkish views to conduct a threat assessment alongside the CIA’s regular 
National Intelligence Assessment (NIE). Paul Nitze, one of the organizers of CPD, 
headed the group which found that Soviets had spent more than the US on defense in the 
1970’s, and were willing to use their military superiority. In addition, they argued US 
ICBM’s would soon be vulnerable to a first strike from Soviet nuclear forces. Such views 
were repeated and elaborated by an increasingly broad coalition of conservative groups 
representing both hawks and business leaders in groups such as the Heritage Foundation 
and the Hoover Institute. This coalition of forces used its resources to challenge Carter on 
foreign policy, notably in a debate over ratification of the Panama Canal treaty.252 The 
positions taken by the coalition, consistent with the NIE as revised by Team B, were also 
largely consistent with rhetoric coming from Reagan during his presidential campaign.  
 Ultimately the public chose Reagan in a landslide over Carter in 1980. Though 
some have argued that foreign policy did not figure prominently in the result, Reagan and 
the right had campaigned unambiguously on a platform of reasserting US military 
strength, and checking Soviet power.253 Reagan’s economic conservatism certainly 
played an important role, however it is important not to discount the clarity with which 
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his vision for foreign policy had been conveyed to the constituency that would give him 
the presidency. 
Early First Term Reagan Nuclear Discourse 
 
On January 29, 1981, the new president gave his first press conference in which 
Sam Donaldson asked Reagan what he believed the intentions of the Soviet Union to be. 
His response carried into the presidency the rhetoric and conceptualization of the Soviet 
Union popularized by Team B, CPD, and others in the right coalition that had coalesced 
during the 1970’s. He declared,  
I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution, and including the 
present leadership, that has not more than once repeated in the various 
Communist congresses they hold their determination that their goal must be the 
promotion of world revolution and a one-world Socialist or Communist state, 
whichever word you want to use. Now, as long as they do that and as long as they, 
at the same time, have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they 
recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves 
the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that, and that is 
moral, not immoral, and we operate on a different set of standards, I think when 
you do business with them, even at a detente, you keep that in mind.254  
 
The statement doubled down on the conclusions of the 1970’s by arguing that over time 
the Soviets themselves had pursued expansion of their ideology, and that they 
additionally lacked the morality that would enable détente.  
 Reagan continued the theme of US moral superiority in a radio address on nuclear 
weapons given on April 17, 1982.255 In that speech he cited Soviet aggression in 
Afghanistan, Soviet intervention in labor uprisings in Poland, and Soviet arms racing as 
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evidence that the Soviet Union was not a “true peacemaker.” By contrast, he portrayed 
the US as aiding WWII enemies in rebuilding, and “sharing trade aid and technology to 
help the developing peoples of the world and actively seeking to bring peace to the 
Middle East, the South Atlantic, and to southern Africa.” Given this characterization of 
the Soviet Union, in addition to an upset military balance as a result of US military 
restraint and Soviet military buildup in the 1970’s, the president could argue freely for a 
military buildup. In spite of the thrust of the address going toward painting the picture of 
an aggressive Soviet Union, he goes on to note that negotiations on what will later 
become the INF Treaty were underway. Finally, in a move that foreshadowed Reagan’s 
hard move toward missile defense as a centerpiece of the buildup, he states, “perhaps one 
day we can achieve a relationship with the Soviet Union which doesn't depend upon 
nuclear deterrence to secure Soviet restraint.” 
 Although broadly consistent with the right coalition’s rhetoric that had played an 
important role in bringing Reagan into the White House, the radio address also reveals 
some elements that were uniquely Reagan; as such, they also represented transformations 
and reconfigurations of the conservative discourse. In the first place, clearly drawing 
from his own religious background in addition to discourse within the New Right, 
Reagan conceives of the superpower competition as moral versus immoral. Such a move 
clears the way for a foreign policy based on a strong military by preventing real 
engagement with Soviet circumstances. Instead, Reagan casts Soviet behavior as the 
selfish groping of an immoral society. US behavior then is untethered by concern for the 
well-being, or appreciation of the unique circumstances of their competitor. In addition, 
this marks another instance of Reagan articulating his distaste for deterrence. While the 
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discourse from the Republican coalition championed the policies that followed from 
Reagan’s convictions, their prescriptions stemmed from a view of Soviet intentions and 
their belief in the military leverage necessary to negotiate with the Soviets. Given his 
repeated use of the gunslinger analogy, Reagan’s distaste for deterrence seems abstract—
such that his desire for a nuclear weapons buildup and intent to include missile defense as 
a component of overall nuclear strategy would have existed without any assumptions 
about Soviet aggression or the need to negotiate from strength. George Keyworth, 
Reagan’s science adviser, said that Reagan “felt extremely uncomfortable in an ethical 
sense…from the view of the man who controls the button…it sent shivers up his 
spine.”256 In this way, Reagan extended and transformed the discourse that emerged in 
the late 1970’s from one built off of a certain construction of the Soviet threat, to one 
which also included an abstract criticism of the condition of nuclear deterrence. 
Strategic Defense Initiative or Star Wars? 
 On March 23, 1983, Reagan surprised close advisers with an address that outlined 
what became the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).257 He began by assailing the state of 
the military, arguing that it had decayed even while the Soviets had built up an 
increasingly offensive force. He segues into the presentation of SDI by again attacking 
the very concept of deterrence:  
… since the advent of nuclear weapons, those steps (to address the threat posed 
by Soviet power) have been increasingly directed toward deterrence of aggression 
through the promise of retaliation. This approach to stability through offensive 
threat has worked. We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war 
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for more than three decades. In recent months, however, my advisers, including in 
particular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have underscored the necessity to break out of 
a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security. Over the course 
of these discussions, I've become more and more deeply convinced that the 
human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and 
human beings by threatening their existence. Feeling this way, I believe we must 
thoroughly examine every opportunity for reducing tensions and for introducing 
greater stability into the strategic calculus on both sides.258 
 
Deterrence is seen as something that must be risen above—something that is below the 
human spirit. He goes on to add that continuing to rely on deterrence, even if arms 
limitations are somewhat successful, is a “sad commentary on the human condition.” This 
critique of the way in which deterrence has been used in the past again builds on a moral 
argument from Reagan. He continues on arguing that such a program would be consistent 
with arms control talks and reductions: “our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed 
by strategic missiles…could pave the way for arms control measure to eliminate the 
weapons themselves.” The prescription of missile defense answers both Reagan’s 
critiques of deterrence and Reagan’s existing underlying desire to see nuclear weapons 
wholly eliminated—a desire about which he would become more directly vocal during 
his second term. 
The Nuclear Freeze Movement 
 A coalition of groups on the right including CPD, Team B, and others paved the 
way for Reagan’s 1980 election with their powerful and vocal critique of Carter’s foreign 
policy. The policy mandate that emerged from the election would lead to the massive 
defense and nuclear weapons buildup that has come to characterize Reagan’s first term. 
However, such a major policy shift (a shift which actually began under Carter) 
simultaneously brought to the fore a cadre of opposition groups. These groups included 
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Mobilization for Survival, American Friends Service Committee, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, the Federation of Atomic Scientists, and the Council for a Livable World.259 
While these groups generally agreed that they were opposed to the hawkish policies of 
the new administration, they had varying goals ranging from the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons, to simply ratifying the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II). 
Ironically, the differences in the groups’ aims may have prevented any meaningful 
cooperation but for the audacity of the Reagan buildup. Eventually these groups were 
united largely behind the efforts of Dr. Randall Forsberg who wrote the “Call to Halt the 
Nuclear Arms Race” in late 1979, and published it in April 1980.260 “Call” became a 
widely circulated recruiting tool with limited aims and a concise message. That message 
resonated with millions around the world enabling the organization of countless peace-
oriented groups. The nuclear freeze movement emerged in earnest by 1981. Although 
most argue that it lost power after Reagan's 1984 re-election, the freeze managed to make 
a significant mark on the overall thrust of US nuclear weapons policy. 
 This section will examine the emergence of the nuclear freeze as a dissenting 
discourse to the hegemonic understanding being implemented and propounded by the 
right and especially Reagan himself. While Reagan had previously constructed his 
understanding of nuclear weapons and the initial policies that would be implemented 
under his administration through conversations with Teller, Weinberger, Nitze and other 
hawks, the freeze movement would force him to confront a new and powerful set of 
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arguments with sweeping popular support. While the “success” of the freeze movement 
itself can be debated, the timeline of freeze activities and responses by Reagan in both 
rhetoric and action suggest that the freeze managed to substantially impact the discourse 
from which policy would spring, leading to novel possibilities for arms control and for 
cooperation between the US and Soviet Union.261 The following subsections will trace 
the emergence of the nuclear freeze out of the various peace groups operating during the 
late 1970’s; show how elite discourses, including those of Reagan and Congress 
integrated, transformed, and co-opted the popular discourse being actively constructed by 
freeze activists; and finally consider whether and how the transformed hegemonic 
discourse paved the way for the arms control and cooperation that would characterize 
US-Soviet relations in the latter half of the 1980’s.  
Forsberg Makes the “Call” 
 The Vietnam War precipitated a massive anti-war, anti-militarism movement that 
united millions of people, influenced policy, and made a mark on a generation. This 
groundswell of peace activism however, abated in the mid-1970’s only to be replaced by 
the largest anti-nuclear movement in US history. So why did the US public go from 
minimal and disorganized opposition to nuclear activity in the mid-1970’s to the 
tremendous freeze movement by 1981? From the perspective of Dr. Randall Forsberg, the 
years following the conclusion of Vietnam were characterized by a reluctance of 
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Americans to criticize their state and by extension their nuclear policy.262 From this view, 
a lack of interest and uncritical view of nuclear weapons policy led to tepid support for 
SALT II, a set of talks that resulted in an agreement criticized as weak by many in the 
arms control community. By 1979, increased international tension, an increasingly 
hawkish Carter administration, and the rise of the conservative right culminating in the 
election of Reagan in November 1980, had motivated and mobilized a new set of 
activists. 
 Forsberg began giving talks to peace groups arguing for a nuclear freeze, a 
position consistent with similar calls for a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons 
production coming from several major groups in the late 1970’s while a graduate student 
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.263 She had become interested in the politics of 
arms control while working as a typist in Stockholm, Sweden at the newly created 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. In that setting Forsberg learned about 
the politics of arms control and the challenges confronting scattered peace groups. In the 
US at the same time, anti-nuclear power groups gained traction with demonstrations at 
local nuclear power facilities. Their efforts were bolstered by the Three Mile Island 
accident in Pennsylvania in March of 1979. Mobilization for Survival, among the most 
prominent groups operating at this time, organized protests against the nuclear arms race 
and nuclear power. In 1978 they organized a protest at the United Nations that drew over 
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20,000 supporters.264 In addition, they pushed for a unilateral moratorium on the US’s 
production of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it was at their annual meeting in December of 
1979 that Forsberg argued that widespread public support could be won if they would 
focus on a bilateral rather than unilateral moratorium. The argument generated 
enthusiasm among the peace groups and activists, and Forsberg began drafting a call to 
action. In April 1980, the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies published “Call 
to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race”, a document that would serve as the intellectual 
foundation for the nuclear freeze movement, as well as a recruiting and public relations 
tool.265  
 “The Call” is an important and powerful artifact of discourse. As a piece of 
writing, it succinctly captures the scope and danger of the arms race between the US and 
Soviet Union, and argues “The US and Soviet governments should announce a 
moratorium on all further testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapon and 
nuclear delivery vehicles, to be verified by national means.”266 Contrary to the prevailing 
discourse propounded by CPD, “The Call” suggests such a freeze was possible because 
of a condition of parity between the two superpowers. Additionally, the document 
contends that such measures are verifiable with means already utilized under SALT I and 
II. The last page of the four page document includes an eclectic list of prominent 
endorsers of the freeze including legislators, religious leaders and organizations, 
scientists, and others. And finally, “The Call” suggests courses of action that the reader 
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can take, including sharing “The Call”, finding endorsements, canvassing, and other 
activities typical of grassroots movement.  
 A few notable characteristics of “The Call” likely contributed to its sweeping 
appeal. First, it is short. The entire document is a mere four pages, only three of which 
are devoted to the text of the message. In the section “The Case for a Nuclear-Weapon 
Freeze” under “Popular Appeal” Forsberg justifies the brevity, contending that 
agreements such as SALT II are “too technical for the average person.”267 Instead, the 
aims and the proposed means of “The Call” are simple, and thus ripe for wide popular 
consumption. Second, and related is that “The Call” offers a complete solution. Not only 
does it set up the danger and suggest action, it also justifies that action, contends that 
verification will be possible, and suggests both of the superpowers as well as the reader 
can take actions immediately to make the goals a reality. Forsberg had spent more than a 
decade by this point observing in-fighting and disagreements among peace and anti-
nuclear oriented groups. “The Call” seems to have been calibrated to assuage conflicting 
concerns among extant peace activists, as well as inviting a new generation of people to 
invest in affecting change in the nuclear arms race. Third, “The Call” contained clear 
instructions for the reader to reproduce, re-order, and spread the document around. It 
states, “Make copies of the Call and send them to three friends. Identify three leaders in 
your community. Send them the Call and follow up by telephone or in person.”268 
Discourses gain power through repeated articulations, and especially articulations by 
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powerful people.269 The proposals outlined in this document would shortly be supported 
by tens of millions of people from around the world. From the perspective of discourse 
analysis, Forsberg became a powerful actor with her own articulation of the weaker cadre 
of anti-nuclear discourses that had come before. The newly articulated discourse on the 
nuclear arms race would present novel challenges to the Reagan administration and 
would set the stage for the emerging nuclear weapons policy, one which would have to 
deal with the power of the nuclear freeze movement.  
 Forsberg’s articulation would not reach Reagan on its own however. From early 
1980 until 1982, the message in the call would be reinterpreted and acted upon in a 
variety of ways. Specifically, while many were content to spread the message and share 
copies of “The Call,” others sought to work within government institutions to begin 
implementing the nuclear freeze. This took place at the local level, with town and 
municipalities addressing the issue with meetings and referendums; it also took place at 
the federal level with freeze resolutions in Congress. The content of these varied 
applications of the principles espoused by Forsberg reveal at once the strengths and 
weaknesses of the movement. On one hand, the movement proceeded rapidly from 
meetings populated nearly exclusively by dedicated activists, to ballots and town hall 
meetings with the broader public. On the other hand, as with many social movements, the 
lack of central control led to uncoordinated efforts and left the message open to co-
optation.  
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 In November 1980, the freeze resolution appeared on the ballot in 62 western 
Massachusetts towns, 59 of which approved; in the fall of 1982 the freeze resolution 
would be a ballot measure in dozens of jurisdictions (including 10 states, 9 of which 
approved), mostly in Northern and Western states. That summer, nearly a million took to 
Central Park to support the nuclear freeze in the largest political rally in US history to 
that date.270 At the outset of this tremendous growth phase, the initial placement of the 
freeze on the ballot came from the efforts of Randall Kehler, Francis Crowe and others at 
the Traprock Center in Deerfield, Massachusetts.271 The space in which they met had 
been the Woolman Hill School which closed in 1979 and re-purposed as a space for 
education in non-violent demonstration methods. Kehler and others chose to use the 
forum to work against the nuclear arms race, which they considered “the ultimate 
manifestation of violence.”272 Their efforts were behind the issue being included on 
ballots across Western Massachusetts in 1980. This early and pivotal referendum 
succeeded soundly. In addition to winning 59 out of 62 contests, 59% of ballots cast were 
in support of the freeze, and thirty out of thirty-three towns that had supported Reagan, 
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supported the freeze.273 This early success emboldened the movement and precipitated a 
national meeting in March 1981 where Kehler would be selected national coordinator. 
The Freeze in Congress 
In March of 1982, the issue made its way into Washington with a freeze 
resolution being introduced to Congress. In the Senate, Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and Mark 
Hatfield (R-OR) led the effort. In the House a similar effort got underway behind 
Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) and Ed Markey (D-MA). While many democratic legislators 
were interested in taking advantage of the popularity of the freeze movement, they also 
had to balance their enthusiasm against a public that either feared the Soviet Union or 
believed that in any case the US should negotiate from strength.274 In all, thirty-two 
freeze proposals came before Congress in 1982. The eventual resolution contained 
amendments concerning verification and other details, as well as language suggesting the 
freeze would not be “the overriding objective.”275 In addition to the negotiated 
amendments, the freeze movement-backed resolution that emerged, the Zablocki 
resolution, would compete with the Jackson-Warner resolution—a substitute that 
mirrored the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution with some important changes. Rather than a 
“mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons,” Jackson-
Warner called for “a nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of 
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forces.”276 The difference effectively allowed the US to continue testing and production, 
as well as waiting for the conclusion of an arms control treaty in which both sides would 
reduce their forces to a level at which they agreed was equal. The different wording 
agreed with the Reagan administration’s contention that the Soviet Union had nuclear 
superiority, and thus “equal” would have to involve the Soviets reducing more and first. 
As this was the position of the administration in the START proposal unveiled in May, 
the watered-down resolution that passed in 1982 was tantamount to an endorsement of 
status quo policy.  
Following the 1982 midterm elections, the House with a composition more 
favorable to freeze advocates, once again considered a freeze resolution. Although the 
1983 edition passed the House, it had again been buried under additional amendments 
which weakened and diluted the final version. Kehler, the first national coordinator of the 
Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign summed up the difficulty with the proposal in 
Congress, “I feel like I’m on a comet, but I don’t know whether I’m leading it or on its 
tail.”277 Although Forsberg and Kehler both testified before congressional committees, 
neither would be able to steer the debate. That debate often became a referendum on 
Reagan’s policies, rather than a meaningful conversation about the merits of the 
Forsberg’s notion of the freeze.278 Unable to manage the negotiation that compromised 
the core aims of “The Call,” the freeze movement would have to look for other ways to 
directly affect policy. However, in spite of the failure of any congressional resolution to 
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accomplish in policy the freeze’s stated aims, the debate had taken place alongside 
dozens of state and municipal referenda, which were widely successful. Two important 
results entailed: public popularity for the freeze continued to hover around 80% through 
1982, and the Reagan administration responded. 
Public Opinion 
 Among the principle reasons that the Reagan administration responded to the 
nuclear freeze movement with a softening of rhetoric on nuclear weapons is that the 
nuclear freeze movement had made a substantial impact on public opinion. From late 
1981 through 1984 the overwhelming majority of those polled supported the bilateral 
moratorium on new nuclear weapons advocated by the freeze movement. Like the CPD 
had done in the 1970’s, the freeze movement used direct mailings, and a vast grassroots 
network to spread their message and garner support. The result would be a powerful 
discourse that president could not ignore. This section will consider a useful approach to 
public opinion formation that has been applied to the nuclear freeze movement. Although 
the approach offers a valuable insight into the values undergirding public opinion on 
nuclear weapons during this era, at base both are concerned with the way in which 
transformed discourses penetrated public life.  
Rochon and Wood draw on Zaller’s “receive-accept-sample” model of public 
opinion formation to explain the sharp rise of support for the nuclear freeze movement in 
1980 and 1981, followed by its rapid decline in popularity and influence beginning in 
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1984.279, 280 The Zaller model works from the premise that opinions form as a function of 
the amount of information a person receives, the messages from that information that the 
person accepts, and the sample that the person draws from when they express an opinion. 
The amount of information that a person receives varies with their level of political 
awareness. Highly aware individuals are exposed to or aware of a greater volume of 
political communication and are more selective in which messages they internalize. By 
contrast less politically aware individuals are exposed to less political communication 
and are less selective in their internalization or acceptance of the messages contained 
therein. All groups then sample from the collection of considerations at the top of their 
mind, or those that are most readily accessible. The sample could be a response to a 
survey question, or an expressed opinion about a particular policy. The impact of 
considerations on opinion relies on elite discourse and the intensity of opposing 
messages. The model thus begins with elite discourse which tends to reach more aware 
individuals more readily (receive), who then pick and choose what messages to 
internalize (accept), and then form political attitudes from the mix of considerations at the 
forefront of their mind (sample).  
 The Zaller model posits that in judging an issue people draw from the relevant 
values at the forefront of their mind. Rochon and Wood argue that the values that 
supported attitudes toward nuclear weapons during this issue were “(1) mistrust of the 
                                                 
279 By 1982 the nuclear freeze movement had the support of 79% of Americans (Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations 1982). That number held steady through 1984 with Gallup measuring support at 78% at 
that time (Rochon & Wood 1997: 30). However, after Reagan’s reelection in November 1984, interest in 
the freeze began to abate, and by 1987 the nuclear freeze movement had been absorbed by the National 
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE).  
280 Forsberg referred to the dramatic rise and fall of the nuclear freeze movement the “swinging of the 
pendulum” (1987). 
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Soviet Union and (2) avoidance of nuclear war.”281 The question then becomes which of 
these two values are sampled at any given moment, a sample that will be a function of 
whether messages invoking one of the two values were received and accepted or not. The 
dynamics in support for the nuclear freeze during the 1980’s then is not a situation in 
which values were changing much, but rather a function of competing elite discourses. 
Team B, the Center for Present Danger, and Reagan himself had been cultivating a 
discourse of Soviet nuclear superiority since the mid-1970’s including pushing the notion 
of a window of vulnerability.282 The effort, while useful for justifying a defense buildup, 
would also invoke the conflicting value. In other words, Reagan succeeded at building 
mistrust of the Soviet Union and thereby securing the presidency and his defense 
strategy; however, in doing so the administration reminded people of the specter of 
nuclear war. This would bring both values to the forefronts of peoples mind and set the 
stage for attitudinal change amidst a major public debate on the issue.  
 The Zaller model on its own explains a great deal of the changes in the political 
attitudes of Americans during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. However there are two 
important things left out. First, the model does not address the impetus for a mass 
movement, only attitudinal change. While the ebb and flow of American reactions to 
survey questions is interesting and clearly in need of explanation, this study is examining 
the ways in which these changes led to policy change and elite discourse change. Second, 
the model is excessively focused on an uncritical notion of elite discourse. Certainly, 
                                                 
281 Rochon & Wood (1997: 33) 
282 Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War, 1st ed. (New York: Random 
House, 1982), 66-82. 
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elites have an important role to play in driving public opinion. That said, the nuclear 
freeze movement came from grassroots efforts by people, especially Forsberg, who were 
not elites before the movement got under way. The grassroots structure of the freeze 
brought people into the movement by reaching out to community and religious leaders, 
local activists, educators, and others. Attitudinal change came from the agenda of Reagan 
and the right, as well as local activists whose message resonated with many and spread 
quickly. But the leaders behind the freeze movement, as well as those who would become 
leaders within and around the movement, contributed greatly to shaping the discourse to 
which many Americans were exposed. The work of transforming and rearticulating the 
discourse on nuclear weapons policy came not only from typical elites in Washington and 
within the national defense apparatus, but also from local community leaders and 
organizers. Given the argument that the discourses on which nuclear policy would be 
built in the mid and late 1980’s reflected not just elite discourse, but also the grassroots 
discourse cultivated by the nuclear freeze, the next section will consider the interaction of 
the Reagan administration with the nuclear freeze movement. 
 In addition, by aiming to explain only attitudinal change as expressed on surveys, 
the Zaller account focus differs from that of discourse analysis in that the latter is a 
relational approach. Zaller’s is a theory of how individual’s attitudes come to change over 
time. While such an account is useful, here the question is what ideas and practices did 
actors draw from and how did they reproduce and change those ideas and practices. 
Rather than suggest how the outside might change the set of values in one’s head, and the 
propensity of a person to choose one or the other among competing values in one’s head, 
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this approach asks how those values are articulated in discourse and which actors made 
them so through powerful rearticulations and rearrangements of existing discourse. 
Reagan and the Nuclear Freeze Movement: Collision of Discourse 
Shortly after Senators Kennedy and Hatfield introduced the bipartisan freeze 
resolution to Congress, on March 31, 1982, Reagan responded to questions about the 
freeze movement and the prospect of nuclear war—first answering a question from James 
Gerstanzang of the Associated Press as to whether nuclear war would be winnable or 
survivable: “I just have to say that I don’t think there could be any winners. Everybody 
would be a loser if there’s nuclear war.”283 Here, Reagan is in full agreement with what 
Wirls considers the bedrock assumption of the peace movements at this time. This 
moment is notable—the movement pushed Reagan to take a position in rhetoric that was 
contrary to the prescriptions of planning documents that would emerge only a short time 
later from his own administration.284 His disagreement then stemmed from his view of 
the implications of such an assessment. Later in the press conference, Reagan got a 
chance to explain how his assessment of the Soviet Union’s capabilities and intentions 
led him to disagree with the policy prescriptions of the freeze movement: 
The truth of the matter is that on balance, the Soviet Union does have a definite 
margin of superiority, enough so that there is risk and there is what I have called, 
as you all know, several times, "a window of vulnerability." And I think that a 
freeze would not only be disadvantageous—in fact, even dangerous to us with 
them in that position—but I believe that it would also militate against any 
                                                 
283  Ronald Reagan: "The President's News Conference," March 31, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and 
John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42346. 
284 A five year defense plan leaked to the New York Times in May of 1982. The document outlined the 
Reagan administrations overall strategic position. Among other topics it lays out a plan for the conduct of 
protracted nuclear war with the Soviet Union. 
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negotiations for reduction. There would be no incentive for them, then, to meet 
with us and reduce.285 
 
The first sentence echoes closely the rhetoric produced Caspar Weinberger, Paul Nitze, 
and others during the run-up to Reagan’s election. In criticizing the Carter foreign policy 
they argued repeatedly that the US had fallen behind the Soviets in military capabilities 
opening a window of vulnerability which the Soviets could decide to take advantage of at 
a moment’s notice.286 While campaigning Reagan argued that should the window open 
wide enough, “the Russians could just take us with a phone call”.287 
 Vulnerability here betrays Reagan’s disagreement with those in the peace 
movement.  From Wirls’ perspective, the peace movement’s convictions about the utility 
of nuclear weapons “amounted to an argument for minimal deterrence.”288 The argument 
that both sides had irrationally sized arsenals implied that similar effects could be had 
with much smaller arsenals. Advocates of the “nuclear revolution” contend that the size 
of nuclear arsenals is irrelevant past the point where effective deterrence is 
accomplished.289 Reagan’s conviction on this topic however came from a conception of 
deterrence as “a dynamic process of balancing incentives and counterincentives…this 
                                                 
285 Reagan (March 31, 1982) 
286 Scheer provides an excellent genealogy of the “window of vulnerability” discussion. He notes that 
physicist Hans Bethe, as well as former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and others disagreed with 
the argument that the Soviet Union had either attained or first strike capability or that the US had fallen 
behind. Bethe is quoted as saying, “I would like to state that there is no deficiency in armaments in the US, 
that we don’t need to catch up to the Russians, that, if anything, the Russians have to catch up to us” (1982: 
73). 
287 Scheer (1982: 66) 
288 1992: 68 
289 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 42-4. 
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implied that MAD or any notion of sufficiency was insufficient and imprudent.”290 No 
amount of weapons should be considered enough, as there are always events and 
circumstances for which plans and strategies must be made. Through this logic Reagan 
justified his nuclear weapons buildup and his disagreement with the policy prescriptions 
of the freeze movement.  
 As the freeze movement continued to change minds and gain support throughout 
1982, Reagan’s rhetoric adjusted to the greater threat the movement now posed for his 
policies and even his 1984 campaign. On October 4, 1982 he told a group of veterans in 
Columbus, Ohio: 
They were demonstrating on behalf of a movement that has swept across our 
country that I think is inspired by, not the sincere, honest people who want peace, 
but by some who want the weakening of America, and so are manipulating many 
honest and sincere people. It is the nuclear freeze movement and the peace 
movement. Well, I, too, want a nuclear freeze after we have been able to negotiate 
the Soviet Union into a reduction on both sides of all kinds of weapons—and then 
have a freeze when we're equal and not freeze them now in a superiority that 
would bring closer the chance of nuclear war.291 
 
Here, Reagan argues plainly that a freeze on the building of new nuclear weapons would 
make nuclear war more likely. In addition, the freeze would weaken America’s position 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, reiterating the charge that the Soviets had military or nuclear 
superiority that they would try to exploit. Just a few weeks later he told reporters at a 
                                                 
290 Wirls (1992: 33) 
291 Ronald Reagan: "Remarks in Columbus to Members of Ohio Veterans Organizations," October 4, 
1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43088. 
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press conference that the nuclear freeze movement had been concocted and launched by 
Soviets seeking to weaken the US and preserve their advantage.292  
In spite of the offensive launched by the Reagan administration to discredit and 
undermine the efforts of the freeze movement, public opinion and the actions of Congress 
led Reagan to make changes in rhetoric and tactics. In September of 1983 he declared to 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly that, “Nothing is more in keeping with the 
spirit of the UN Charter than arms control.” He went on:  
I believe that to relieve the deep concern of peoples in both Europe and Asia, the 
time was ripe, for the first time in history, to resolve a security threat exclusively 
through arms control. I still believe the elimination of these weapons-the zero 
option—is the best, fairest, most practical solution to the problem.293  
 
 Just a few weeks later, he referred directly to the impact being wrought by the 
nuclear freeze movement when he told George Schultz in private, “If things get hotter 
and arms control remains an issue, maybe I should go see Andropov and propose 
eliminating all nuclear weapons.”294 Although media coverage of the freeze movement 
had diminished by late 1983, Reagan had begun to embrace arms control which 
“horrified” Schultz and ranking members of the administration. 
 
                                                 
292 For Reagan’s comments see: "The President's News Conference," November 11, 1982. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41985. An FBI report released in March 1983 found no evidence 
of the Soviet connection to the nuclear freeze movement. Although the FBI had made this conclusion by 
late 1982, Reagan contended that Leonid Brezhnev had proposed the freeze on February 21, 1981, and that 
the World Peace Council had started the movement. For additional details see Judith Miller, “President 
Says Freeze Proponents May Unwittingly Aid the Russians,” New York Times (December 11, 1982). 
293 Ronald Reagan: "Address Before the 38th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New 
York, New York ," September 26, 1983.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40523. 
294 He is referring to Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov who succeeded Leonid Brezhnev two days 
after Brezhnev’s death on November 12, 1982 (Schultz 1993: 372). 
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Conclusion 
The Reagan military buildup provides an excellent view into the prevailing 
discourses that shaped possibilities for foreign policy and especially nuclear weapons 
policy during his presidency. Reagan drew from and extended two discourses to justify 
the defense buildup that characterized his first term. Drawing from a variety of scientists 
and policymakers, most notably Edward Teller, Reagan rearticulated and powerfully 
extended the existing discourse on missile defense. While distinct possibilities for high 
tech missile defense systems were under debate, Reagan stripped away the distinction 
with the vague and powerful SDI. His oft-stated motivation for supporting missile 
defense came from his “visceral” objection to deterrence. A variety of sources have 
confirmed that Reagan found deterrence troubling on a moral level, and that missile 
defense offered a way out. Missile defense as a solution to the moral problem of 
deterrence is a discursive articulation that is uniquely Reagan. Second, he built upon the 
conclusion of CPD, Team B, and others on the political right that argued the Soviet 
Union had opened or would soon open a “window of vulnerability” in military 
capabilities for the US. Reagan’s re-articulations however took these conclusions a step 
further, again arguing in moral terms. For Reagan, the Soviets lacked morality and were 
thus worthy of their “evil empire” moniker. The discussion of Soviet morality (or lack 
thereof), and the word “evil”, were brought into the discourse by Reagan, and worked 
powerfully to shape the foreign policy debate and limit the possibilities for dissenting 
discourses. 
 Though powerful, Reagan’s discourse brought competing conceptions of the 
threat, and the appropriate policy to the fore. The nuclear freeze movement quickly 
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forced Reagan to reintroduce his own desire for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 
With a concise message that was easily conveyed to the masses, the nuclear freeze forced 
a change in the direction of policy by mobilizing millions and soundly winning over 
public opinion. Confronted with a public that overwhelmingly supported a nuclear freeze, 
and a reelection bid looming, Reagan’s rhetoric immediately began to soften. While he 
may have carried the conviction that nuclear weapons should be abolished since the 
1940’s, he had been quiet on that point during his campaign and first term. It was only 
after the nuclear freeze effectively hijacked the discourse on the appropriate role for 
nuclear weapons that Reagan changed his tune. The freeze movement had a similar effect 
on Gorbachev, though the Soviet leader may have been more receptive to their ideas 
initially. The impact of these discursive confrontations is evident in the stark relief of 
Reagan’s second term. The arms control successes of the late-1980’s and the emerging 
relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev owe much of their existence to those in the 
nuclear freeze movement who were able to manipulate the discourse, and powerfully 
affect the policymaking process. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE GEORGE W. BUSH CHALLENGE: LOW-YIELD AND BUNKER-BUSTING 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
 
It is not now possible to predict with confidence future deterrence requirements. 
The future may prove to be far more dangerous than benign: nuclear deterrence 
may become more important for the United States and a robust nuclear capability 
may be essential to support deterrence objectives. 
 —Keith Payne et. al., National Institute of Public Policy, January 2001 
 
 
Even before the Cold War reached its official conclusion with the formal 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, officials in the US had begun to grapple with the 
future of US identity. They did not put it in those terms of course, but there was a 
consensus about the problem, if not the solution: without the USSR as a peer competitor 
and superpower adversary, who was the US? From the analytical perspective of this 
dissertation, the early 1990’s were a political moment: a time with high uncertainty and 
open possibilities for the future.295 The Cold War had come to a peaceful conclusion (at 
least relative to the popular notion that it would end in WWIII), and the future of 
international relations, and the role of US foreign policy lacked clarity. In 1990-91, the 
first Gulf War seemed to convey mixed messages for US policymakers. On one hand, the 
war had been won quickly and cheaply with investment and participation by US allies. 
On the other, the war seemed a preview of the complex world of dangerous and intense 
regional conflicts that would follow the Cold War. The Clinton years would be a period 
                                                 
295 Edkins builds on Zizek in defining the political moment as, “a moment of openness…in which the 
absence of one social order had not yet been succeeded by the presence of another…It is at this point the 
subjectivity arises”. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union provided this moment of 
openness in the US when the state’s identity vis-à-vis international politics was indeterminate. Such 
moments are fleeting—quickly being replaced by a new order which imposes legitimacy and erases the 
recent uncertainty of its own creation. The new order, “retroactively produces the grounds which justify it.” 
For details see Jenny Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999), 8.  
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in which conflicting interpretations of the Gulf War and other events would lead to an 
emerging rift over the role in which US military power—and nuclear weapons—should 
and would play in international politics. Political battles over appropriate force sizes and 
the wisdom of base-closures to realize the peace dividend foreshadowed the showdown 
over nuclear weapons policy that would begin in the early years of George W. Bush’s 
presidency.  
Within a year of taking office, the Bush administration had launched the first 
sustained challenge to the nuclear taboo by the US of the post-Cold War era. Although 
the challenge commenced shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, those 
events did not cause the challenge as it were. Instead, this chapter will build the argument 
that the challenge to the nuclear taboo emerged with the rise of neoconservatism in the 
1990’s. During this era, future members of the Bush administration cultivated a new 
discourse that re-defined US identity with a new “self” consistent with a new threatening 
“other.” That new discourse would serve as the basis for more than four years of pressure 
on Congress to fund a new generation of nuclear weapons which would include both low-
yield nuclear weapons, and nuclear deep earth-penetrating weapons or bunker-busters.  
This chapter investigates the emergence and content of the discourse that would 
challenge the nuclear taboo during Bush’s first term. The anti-nuclear discourse which 
constitutes the nuclear taboo defeated the upstart discourse cultivated by Bush, Dick 
Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and others, but not before they made a concerted effort to 
upend the trajectory of US nuclear weapons policy with new weapons that opponents 
argued would make nuclear weapons use more likely, and thus undermine the security of 
the US. This work will trace the Bush challenge against the backdrop of the individual 
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pathways of the nuclear taboo to show the taboo’s activation. This approach highlights 
the piecemeal process by which the various forces that would rearticulate the nuclear 
taboo to address the emerging challenge. Activation of the taboo discourse took time, and 
actually seemed to follow minor policy successes by the Bush administration.  
This chapter will first address the potential material explanations and argue that 
they are included in a discursive analysis of the case. Next, the content of the Bush 
challenge will be explored from the emergence of the discourse at the heart of the 
challenge in the early 1990’s to its defeat in Congress in 2005. Then, the events will be 
considered through the lens of the “pathways” to the nuclear taboo—the various distinct 
social processes that support the international norm against nuclear weapons use.296 In 
each section, individual pathways to the nuclear taboo are considered against the 
evidence in the Bush challenge. Finally the conclusion will sum up the evidence and 
consider the contribution of the discourse approach to understanding the unfolding of 
nuclear politics during the early Bush administration. 
The Material Case  
Although this chapter aims to make the case that the Bush challenge was defeated 
by the powerful discourse that constitutes the nuclear taboo, others might argue that the 
proposed programs failed due to material circumstances and constraints. Far from 
ignoring these arguments, the discourse-focused approach employed here is useful not 
only for understanding the ideational components of the nuclear taboo and their effects, 
but also the ways in which “material facts” or “knowledge” are incorporated into 
discourse. The following are some of the prominent material arguments that might be 
                                                 
296 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 
1945 (Oxford University Press, 2007), 64-7. 
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used against the broader conclusions of this chapter—namely that the nuclear taboo 
discourse, which has been cultivated and rearticulated in various ways since the 1950’s, 
defeated the Bush challenge.  
One could make the material argument that the failure of RNEP came only after 
cost projections made during the FY05 appropriations debate showed the program would 
require a total of $484 million through FY09. These costs likely pushed some proponents 
to abandon their support in light of the benefits to deterrence the weapons were supposed 
to net. One could also argue that proponents only wanted new nuclear weapons to ensure 
funds would continue to flow to the nuclear weapons complex, preserving jobs and the 
parochial economic benefits of the investment. Indeed, it seems some proponents were 
willing to abandon support for RNEP when they secured funding for conventional 
programs in their home districts.297 Finally, it could be that proponents of the program 
abandoned their support when research showed that the proposed weapons would be 
unable to accomplish the tasks for which they would have been designed. Indeed, reports 
from the National Academy of Sciences and the Federation of American Scientists 
published during the course of the debate raised serious doubts about whether RNEP 
would ever be able useful militarily.298 The analysis that follows does not necessarily 
                                                 
297 See for example Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) during the FY2005 budget cycle. For example see 
Jonathan Medalia, “Water Power: Why Congress Zeroed ‘Bunker Buster’ Appropriations,” Comparative 
Strategy Vol. 26, No. 3 (2007), 243; John Fleck, “Nuclear Weapons Budget Grows Despite Cuts to Bomb 
Modernization Plans,” Albuquerque Journal, November 23, 2004. 
298 For analyses of the material utility of mini-nukes and bunker busters see Nelson, whose analysis showed 
that attacking deeply buried facilities “does not appear possible without causing massive radioactive 
contamination. See Robert Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons,” Journal of the 
Federation of American Scientists, Public Interest Report, Vol. 54, no. 1 (January/ February 2001), 
https://fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n1.pdf. For greater scientific detail see Robert Nelson, “Nuclear ‘Bunker 
Busters’ Would More Likely Disperse Than Destroy Buried Stockpiles of Biological and Chemical 
Agents,” Science and Global Security Vol. 12 (2004): 69-89; and Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, 
“Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review’s New Missions,” International Security, 
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refute each of these material explanations, but shows how they are either subordinate to, 
or subsumed by the larger discursive argument. Essentially, by tracing the emergence of 
the two conflicting discourses, we will be able to see the ways in which material concerns 
were integrated into discourse, and the consequences of both material and ideational 
factors as they were both mobilized into the discourses competing for dominance of the 
nuclear weapons policy process.  
The Bush Administration Challenge to the Nuclear Taboo 
 President George W. Bush and his administration began laying out their nuclear 
weapons policy in late 2001 and continued with a series of policy-defining documents 
released throughout 2002. These included the modified Nuclear Posture Review, National 
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17, the new National Security Strategy, and a 
smattering of supporting and clarifying documents. While these documents would be the 
flashpoint for several years of conflict over the appropriate role for nuclear weapons in 
the US arsenal, they themselves had been years in the making, with their central ideas 
having re-emerged during the mid-1990’s.299 This section details the history of efforts by 
a handful of powerfully placed individuals who cultivated and championed the discourse 
that would become the Bush challenge to the nuclear taboo, from their early efforts 
building a critique of Clinton’s foreign policy, to their limited legislative successes, 
through the defeat of the funding for the programs that made up the challenge in the fall 
of 2005.  
                                                 
30, No. 2 (Fall 2005): 84-126. Also see Stephen Schwartz, “Nukes You Can Use,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists Vol. 58, No. 3 (May 2002): 18-9, 69. 
299 While the sources of the Bush challenge will be traced from the early 1990’s, the case study ends in fall 
2005. At that time, the constitutive projects of the challenge lost funding in Congress.  
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The Emergence of the Bush Nuclear Weapons Politics: the 1990’s 
 Cooperation on arms control and a ratcheting down of tension following the 
peaceful conclusion of the Cold War bolstered the robustness of the nuclear taboo during 
the Clinton administration. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program 
addressed the frightening prospect of loose nuclear weapons in former Soviet states.300 In 
the process, the program engaged both congressional leaders and presidents from both 
major parties as it effectively removed nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan. In addition, the program provided support for physical security of nuclear 
weapons and nonproliferation efforts throughout the former Soviet states. On July 3, 
1993 Clinton extended the nuclear testing moratorium begun under his predecessor, 
remarking that his administration “has determined that the nuclear weapons in the United 
States arsenal are safe and reliable.”301 In September 1996 the US and seventy other 
states signed the CTBT, an agreement banning all nuclear test explosions.302 While the 
Senate rejected its ratification in 1999 and the treaty never formally entered into force, 
the US continued its testing moratorium throughout the 1990’s and indeed to the time of 
writing. 
                                                 
300 See Justin Bresolin,“Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program”, The Center 
for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, (2014), https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-nunn-lugar-
cooperative-threat-reduction-program/. 
301 William J. Clinton: "The President's Radio Address," July 3, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John 
T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46803. 
302 Daryl Kimball and Shervin Taheran, “Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
Timeline,” Arms Control Association (September 2016), accessed online May 12, 2017. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclear-Testing-and-Comprehensive-Test-Ban-Treaty-CTBT-
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 All the while opponents of these actions, including many who would serve in the 
George W. Bush administration, were hard at work conceiving of and refining the set of 
ideas that would form the backbone of the forthcoming challenge to the nuclear taboo. In 
1992, Paul Wolfowitz penned “Defense Planning Guidance”, a document that began 
laying out a conservative worldview and associated foreign policy prescriptions for the 
post-Cold War era.303 Although a minor controversy erupted when the document leaked 
to the press leading to a re-write by Dick Cheney, the tone would be carried forward as 
conservatives began assembling their ongoing critique of the emerging Clinton foreign 
policy.  
 In 1996, William Kristol and Robert Kagan published “Toward a Neo-Reaganite 
Foreign Policy” in Foreign Affairs in which they argued that US foreign policy should be 
oriented toward maintaining its role as a benign hegemon.304 To achieve this goal they 
advocated increasing military budgets, contending that as a percentage of GDP, military 
budgets were historically low. They also notably stressed the need for continued 
investment in missile defense. These ideas would go onto form the intellectual foundation 
of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a conservative think-tank founded 
by Kristol and Kagan in 1996. Echoing the ideas of the Foreign Affairs article, PNAC’s 
founding statement of principles, published on June 3, 1997 included the signatures of 
Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld—a harbinger of the role this thinking would play in 
the George W. Bush administration. Rumsfeld, who would become Bush’s Secretary of 
                                                 
303 Paul Wolfowitz, “Defense Planning Guidance,” The National Security Archive: The George 
Washington University (February 18, 1992), accessed online May 13, 2017. 
nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_extract_nytedit.pdf. 
304 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 
(July/August 1996), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1996-07-01/toward-neo-reaganite-foreign-
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Defense, hired Dr. Keith Payne in 1998 after working with him in a panel on missile 
defense.305 In January 2001 Payne published “Rationale and Requirements for US 
Nuclear Forces and Arms Control” under the auspices of the National Institute of Public 
Policy (NIPP). There he argued that nuclear weapons could and should be used to 
complement conventional weapons. In such a role they could be used to attack ballistic 
missile sites, and “deeply buried facilities.” The paper broke with decades of US nuclear 
weapons policy thinking, specifically the notion of nuclear weapons as a last resort rather 
than a complement to conventional weapons. Payne’s articulation would be among the 
major sources for the 2001/2002 Nuclear Posture Review—one of the primary Bush 
administration documents at the heart of the challenge to the nuclear taboo.  
In September 2000, just before the election, PNAC released a longer document 
providing greater detail on their specific policy recommendations.306 With regard to 
nuclear weapons, they argued that the Clinton administration had, “taken repeated steps 
to undermine the readiness and effectiveness of US nuclear forces. In particular, it has 
virtually ceased development of safer and more effective nuclear weapons; brought 
underground testing to a complete halt; and allowed the Department of Energy’s weapons 
complex and associated scientific expertise to atrophy for lack of support.”307 The 
                                                 
305 For more on Rumsfeld and Payne’s meeting, as well as Payne’s nuclear outlook see Fred Kaplan, 
“Rumsfeld’s Dr. Strangelove,” Slate: War Stories (May 12, 2003), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2003/05/rumsfelds_dr_strangelove.html. 
306 Thomas Donnelly, Donald Kagan, and Gary Schmitt. “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces 
and Resources for a New Century.” Project for a New American Century, Washington (September 2000), 
www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf. Per the document, the project 
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document additionally argues that, “there may be a need to develop a new family of 
nuclear weapons designed to address new sets of military requirements, such as would be 
required in targeting the very deep, underground bunkers that are being built by many of 
our potential adversaries.”308 PNAC argued essentially that the US nuclear arsenal had 
been designed to deter the Soviet Union, a political unit no longer in existence. From this 
perspective, the arsenal needed to be adjusted to deter the threats that remained: 
principally rogue states and non-state actors—both of which were known to hide military 
assets and personnel deep underground. These arguments, developed and championed by 
PNAC and Payne, would become the chief justification, and discursive edifice on which 
Bush’s push for bunker-busting nuclear bombs, and his challenge to the nuclear taboo, 
would rest.  
George W. Bush’s own statements about nuclear weapons on the campaign trail 
and early in his presidency stressed two themes: the need to deploy missile defense, and a 
reduction in nuclear weapons. In accepting the Republican presidential nomination at the 
Republican National Convention in Philadelphia he remarked, “I will work to reduce 
nuclear weapons and nuclear tension in the world, to turn these years of influence into 
decades of peace. And at the earliest possible date, my administration will deploy missile 
defenses to guard against attack and blackmail.”309 At his address to a joint session of 
Congress on administration goals on February 27, 2001 he argued, “To protect our own 
people, our allies, and friends, we must develop and we must deploy effective missile 
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defenses. And as we transform our military, we can discard cold war relics and reduce 
our own nuclear forces to reflect today's needs.”310 The president made the case for 
missile defense in greater detail in a speech at the National Defense University on May 1, 
2001, where he argued that the US faced new threats from more countries with access to 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This threat, from Bush’s perspective, was 
being exacerbated by US compliance with Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which 
hamstrung the deployment of missile defense. Bush’s position on missile defense echoed 
that of President and Director of Sandia National Laboratories C. Paul Robinson who 
argued in a March 22, 2001 white paper that missile defense could be valuable in 
“deterring conflicts and limiting escalations” and would “enhance deterrence by 
eliminating an aggressor’s confidence in attacking the US homeland with long-range 
missiles, and thus make our use of nuclear weapons more credible.”311 The sentiment 
shows the organizational basis of support for missile defense, as well as bolstering one of 
the central claims in the Bush administration’s challenge, that deterrence could use 
“enhancement.”312  
With regard to nuclear weapons specifically, Bush stressed the need for 
reductions, but also foreshadowed the challenge to the nuclear taboo to come when he 
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said, “Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies. 
We can and will change the size, composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a 
way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over.”313 The Bush administration 
attempted to cast the need for missile defenses as essential for the protection of 
Americans, remarking in December 2001, “Defending the American people is my highest 
priority as commander in chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to 
remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.”314 The remarks 
notwithstanding, the 2001 NPR shifted the focus to the ways in which missile defense 
could protect military forces, in particular those forces that would need protecting in an 
offensive nuclear strike.315 The focus on building nuclear weapons for war-fighting as 
opposed to deterrence would not be lost on Congress or the public, both of which would 
raise this objection as the debate unfolded through 2005.  
From Bush himself, it would appear that he actually saw the value in reducing the 
overall size of nuclear arsenals—a conviction that would be affirmed when he concluded 
the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), an agreement that bound the two 
superpowers to reduce their deployed nuclear weapons to a total of between 1,700 and 
2,200.316 This reduction in pure numbers though is aside from the fact that per his speech 
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on May 1, “the size, composition, and character” of the nuclear arsenal could still be 
adjusted. Indeed it is this caveat from which the challenge to the nuclear taboo would 
spring. The operative objection raised by journalists, the public, and in Congress, to 
Bush’s proposed change to the US nuclear weapons arsenal came from the contention 
that smaller weapons built with specific tasks in mind would be more useable or meant 
for fighting war rather than deterrence.317 Bush and his supporters on this issue 
maintained that the potential usefulness would “enhance deterrence” or increase the 
credibility of deterrence.318 Adversaries would be more likely to take seriously the threat 
of nuclear attack by the US if the US possessed nuclear weapons sized for specific 
missions that could be launched against an adversary.319 In an interview in September 
2001, C. Paul Robinson argued that Iraq had been deterred from using its biological and 
chemical weapons by a Bush Sr. letter “threatening the gravest consequences.” Given that 
experience he suggested that, “we need lower-yield nuclear weapons that could hold at 
risk only a rogue leader’s leadership and tools of aggression with some level of 
confidence.”320 
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In addition, if deterrence were to fail, the decision makers would have a wider 
portfolio of responses to choose from—a fact that would additionally discourage 
aggressive adversaries.321 This argument built on the contention articulated by Payne and 
that, “There is no single ‘correct’ enduring nuclear force structure compatible with US 
strategic requirements…If the US wishes to maintain an appropriately sized nuclear 
arsenal, it must be able to adapt that arsenal over time to dynamic strategic and foreign 
policy requirements.”322 With this conception of a dynamic strategic environment 
requiring a dynamic nuclear arsenal to deter a more diverse set of actors, the stage was 
set for the challenge to the nuclear taboo that would ensue. 
The Bush administration did succeed in reducing the total number of weapons in 
the US arsenal. However, given the intellectual foundations for the proposed nuclear 
weapons policy constructed by the PNAC and its alumni that would end up in the 
administration, the administration’s nuclear politics would not be characterized by efforts 
at arms control. On the contrary, their efforts worked toward upheaval of the US nuclear 
weapons policy status quo, and effectively, a challenge to the nuclear taboo.  
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Identity in the New Discourse 
 Identity is central to discourse analysis. Discourses produce identity and are 
reinforced by them.323 The discourse cultivated in the 1990’s by future members of the 
Bush administration and their allies constituted a novel conception of national identity. 
The threat blank left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union had opened up space for a 
redefinition of US identity. While some struggled to mold US identity into a benign 
hegemon, or liberal internationalist, the Bush team constructed an identity around new 
radically threatening others: terrorists and rogue states. While these “others” were present 
in Clinton’s discourse as well, PNAC and NIPP went to some lengths to specify that the 
new “others” could not be deterred or were irrational. In any case the tools the US used to 
successfully deter the Soviet Union would be insufficient for the new foes. This of course 
raised new ethical imperatives for their construction of US identity. If the current US 
arsenal could not deter terrorists and rogue states, the arsenal would have to be bolstered. 
Hansen argues that “foreign policy discourses always involve a construction of 
responsibility, even if only implicitly as applicable to toward a national citizenry.”324 
Bush’s new discourse recast security threats to the US. The new threats were of a 
character that the current nuclear arsenal would be insufficient to deter. The ethical 
responsibility that flowed from this conception would require a new generation of nuclear 
weapons—weapons ostensibly capable of meeting the new threats. The 1990’s were a 
period of reinventing the national identity with new discourse—a discourse which 
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explicitly called for the US to manage the new threatening other with a new generation of 
nuclear weapons. 
The Challenge 
The challenge to the nuclear taboo began in earnest when Rumsfeld delivered the 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress on December 31, 2001. Over the course of 
2002, the Bush administration released a series of documents outlining their vision for the 
new nuclear weapons programs of the US. Although the Nuclear Posture Review was 
initially internal to Congress, the document leaked to the public in early March 2002. 
Other documents clarifying and expanding the Bush nuclear doctrine followed. On June 
28, the administration released National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 14, 
which provided planning guidance for agencies overseeing nuclear weapons. This 
document included changes to the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, a more specific 
set of plans for targeting and attack options in line with the new broader US nuclear 
weapons strategy.  In September 2002, two documents from the White House clarified 
the administration’s focus on the danger from rogue states and non-state actors acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction. The September 14, NSPD 17 emphasized the right to use 
nuclear weapons in response to the use of WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons) against the US and its allies. 325, 326 A few days later on September 17, the 
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National Security Strategy of the United States enshrined the updated policy of pre-
emption in the face of perceived hostility, which President Bush had announced publicly 
in his January 2002 State of the Union speech.  
The challenge went from planning documents to Congress in the fall of 2002 in 
the debates over fiscal year 2003 Defense Authorization. In the first place, the nuclear 
bunker buster project or “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)” received $15.5 
million in funding for FY2003, the first installment of a planned 3-year feasibility 
study.327 The funding came with strings attached however, as both houses of Congress 
took steps to retain oversight of the project. The House requested that the National 
Academy of Science look into the impact of the potential new weapons, while the Senate 
requested more study into the military necessity of the weapons and alternatives among 
conventional weapons.328  The conference agreement included both provisions. All the 
while, the same Congress worked to kill a provision that would have allowed research 
and design work on low-yield nuclear weapons. While the House would have permitted 
this work (but not construction of the weapons), the Senate doubled-down on the 1994 
Spratt-Furse provision that banned design and development of nuclear weapons with 
yields of less than 5 kilotons.329 Tellingly, the conference agreement reflected the 
Senate’s position, and the low-yield nuclear weapons were dropped for FY2003.  
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Although the FY2003 Congressional authorization of funding for RNEP provided 
a path forward for the Bush administration, Congress explicitly retained power over the 
project. Per Rep. Tauscher (D-CA), the requirement, “restores Congress’ vital oversight 
role over what could eventually be the development of a new nuclear weapon…since this 
is only the first funding installment for a three-year study, Congress will have ample 
opportunity to revisit this issue.”330 So while the Bush administration succeeded in 
launching their efforts to build nuclear weapons, these efforts hailed opponents in 
Congress to resist the ongoing efforts to make the plans into a reality. 
Although the defense appropriations process for FY 2004 led to continued 
funding for RNEP, the process also came amidst mobilization by opponents in Congress. 
On May 21, 2003, Rep. Tauscher (D-CA) offered an amendment to the Defense 
Authorization bill that would have taken funds from RNEP and used it for conventional 
capabilities. At the time the bill would have provided $15 million for RNEP and $7.5 
million for the advanced weapon concepts, or mini-nuke project.331 Rep. Tauscher argued 
to the House that the plans were flawed for five reasons:  
First, it will produce massive collateral damage; second, even the most powerful 
nuclear weapons cannot destroy bunkers at a certain depth; third, if a bunker is 
filled with chemical and biological agents, it is only common sense to keep them 
underground rather than blow them up and spread them all over the place in a 
mushroom cloud; fourth, an RNEP will cause massive casualties. Detonated in an 
urban area, it would kill tens of thousands of civilians. Last, developing nuclear 
bunker busters would undermine decades of work by the United States to prevent 
nonnuclear states from getting nuclear weapons and encourage nuclear states to 
reduce their stockpiles.332 
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Proponents of RNEP in Congress responded consistent with the justifications made the 
Bush administration. Rep. Heather Wilson (R-NM) noted increasing use of deeply buried 
facilities by US adversaries, and the growth of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. She went on, 
“For deterrence to work, we have to hold at risk those things which our potential enemies 
value and that means holding hard and deeply buried targets at risk. They are out of reach 
of conventional weapons. They are out of reach of current nuclear weapons.”333 While 
Rep. Wilson seemed to voice a concern about the character of the US nuclear deterrent, it 
is quite telling that her district includes a major nuclear weapons laboratory which would 
have received funding through the RNEP program.334 The arguments notwithstanding, 
the House struck down the Tauscher amendment 199-204. On the Senate side, Senators 
Dorgan (D-ND) and Feinstein (D-CA) sponsored an amendment to bar funds from 
RNEP—an effort that was also struck down. RNEP eventually found funding though, in 
the FY2004 budget process. However, the efforts by Congressional opponents to kill its 
funding were partially successful. Congress eventually appropriated only $7.5 million of 
the total funding request of $22.5 million—with the condition that any efforts going past 
the research phase and into development and engineering would require Congressional 
approval.335   
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  The FY2005 budget cycle would prove even more difficult for those advocating 
for new weapons. While the project had begun with cost projections of $45 million 
spread over three years (FY2003 – FY2005), NNSA projections suggested that total costs 
could have approached $500 million by FY2009, with $27.6 requested for FY 2005.336 
As with previous budget cycles, sustained pressure for RNEP came from organizational 
sources. Linton Brooks, Undersecretary of Energy/Nuclear Security and lead 
administrator of NNSA, took on several of the critiques of the program in remarks on 
August 11, 2004. He addressed concerns that RNEP would be a departure from previous 
US policy, “Deterrence requires we be able to hold at risk that which an adversary values. 
Since more and more we see potential opponents putting important military facilities 
underground, our efforts to determine the potential effectiveness of an earth-penetrating 
weapon reflect a continued emphasis on enhancing deterrence.”337 Others at the same 
symposium argued that new design work would be essential to maintaining top talent in 
the US nuclear weapons complex. Per John Harvey of the NNSA,  
Advanced concepts design work, and engineering development of selected 
designs, is essential to train the next generation of nuclear weapons designers and 
engineers. These individuals must remain at the forefront of nuclear weapons 
technology first of all to ensure the safe stewardship of the nuclear stockpile for as 
long as the United States will deploy nuclear forces; second, to provide for future 
national security needs as determined by the administration and Congress; and, 
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third, to ensure that the United States won’t be surprised by the nuclear weapons 
developments of any other country.338  
 
In spite of these efforts, robust opposition to this bill would manifest in Congress. The 
following sections will argue that the FY 2005 defunding of the RNEP program can be 
attributed not only to Senate democrats, but to a broader set of forces aligned against 
nuclear weapons use that together constitute the nuclear taboo. Following the “pathways 
to the taboo” the next sections build the case that the defeat of RNEP in the FY2005 and 
FY2006 budget cycles can be understood best as part of the taboo’s broader impact on 
nuclear weapons politics.339 
Societal Pressure 
The first pathway to the nuclear taboo is through the actions of the domestic 
public. Throughout the history of nuclear weapons, the public—both domestically and 
internationally—has played a major role in altering the trajectory of policy through mass 
movements and demonstration, and by manipulating incentives facing policymakers and 
bureaucrats close to nuclear weapons policy. Early in the nuclear era, the Eisenhower 
administration sought to manipulate public opinion by casting nuclear technology as a 
potential boon to the prosperity of humankind. “Atoms for Peace” was meant to both ease 
public anxiety over the prospect of nuclear annihilation, and to accustom the public to the 
“age of peril,” a time when nuclear weapons might have had to be used in the course of a 
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war with the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1955, that same administration sought to 
convince the public that nuclear weapons should be used “exactly as you would use a 
bullet or anything else.”340 Ironically, the episode aroused more public anxiety than calm, 
and would further constrain the administration’s nuclear intentions in the Quemoy-Matsu 
crisis that precipitated that statement. 
Similarly, the Reagan administration experienced the political power of a massive 
social movement in its confrontation with the Nuclear Freeze movement.341 The wildly 
popular movement, while failing to achieve its stated objective of a moratorium on the 
construction and deployment of any new nuclear weapons, nevertheless may have been 
partially responsible for Reagan’s apparent turnabout in his second term. The latter years 
of the administration saw progress on what would become the START treaty—signed by 
President George H.W. Bush in 1991, and the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987. In both 
the Reagan and Eisenhower cases, the nuclear taboo acted through the pathway or 
mechanisms of public pressure in response to administration steps widely perceived to 
make nuclear weapons use more likely. The Reagan case is particularly salient here as the 
massive movement that checked Reagan’s nuclear weapons ambitions did not mobilize in 
response to an international crisis, but to policy initiatives coming from the White House.  
 To understand the role that the public played in the Bush administration’s 
challenge to the nuclear taboo, this section will examine three vectors through which the 
public influenced policy. These vectors include public opinion as measured by national 
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polling services, the popular press, and Congress; each provides a different type of 
interaction between the will of the broader public and the behavior of elite decision 
makers, and each can potentially contribute to the constitution of the nuclear taboo, and 
its impact on nuclear politics during the Bush administration.  
Polling Data 
The early 1980’s bore witness to a tremendous groundswell of support for arms 
control policies among the US public. Though the veracity of the nuclear freeze 
movement itself declined as the Cold War came to a conclusion, the general preference 
for arms control as opposed to nuclear buildup remained throughout the 1990’s. This 
preference manifested in bipartisan success in addressing the grave threat posed by “loose 
nukes” in former Soviet states. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program 
stands as hallmark achievement in deproliferation efforts.342 At the same time, many 
Americans noted a lack of peer competitors for the US militarily and openly questioned 
the scale of US defense expenditures, and its oversized nuclear arsenal. Expectations of a 
“peace dividend” were never fully realized, but popular sentiment held that the US was 
confronting a less threatening international environment that would require less defense 
spending, and possibly few nuclear weapons.343 
Although polling did not address the popularity of RNEP or mini-nukes 
specifically, a few other questions asked by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 
the early 2000’s are revealing with regard to the feelings of the broader public and the 
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pending programs.344 First, Americans continued to overwhelmingly support “preventing 
the spread of nuclear weapons” as a very important goal of US Foreign policy; in 2002, 
when these policies made their way into Congress, 85% of the public and 89% of elites 
supported this position. In 2004 the public and elites support dipped slightly to 73% and 
87% respectively. Such robust support for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 
helped put the burden on the Bush administration to explain why the US would need new 
nuclear weapons, and why those new nuclear weapons would not aggravate US 
nonproliferation efforts.  
Any new weapons would likely require testing—a question taken up by the same 
set of surveys. Asked in 2002 and 2004 whether the US should participate in a treaty that 
banned nuclear test explosions, just over 80% of the public said that the US should 
participate—in 2004 that figure climbed to 87%.345 Elites showed similar enthusiasm 
with 82% supporting US participation in such a treaty in 2002, and 85% in 2004. Again 
the Bush administration would face the burden of justifying a course of action that, if 
successful, would likely lead to a resumption in nuclear testing. The poll results suggest 
justifying even “a study” that might lead to a nuclear test would be difficult for 
proponents in Congress and the administration. 
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Even closer to the heart of the matter, the survey also asked under what conditions 
respondents believed the US should be able to use nuclear weapons. Public opinion 
remained relatively stable on this question with 22% saying the US should never use 
nuclear weapons, and 57% (in 2004) responding that nuclear weapons should only be 
used in response to a nuclear attack. Among elites there was an uptick among those 
favoring “never use” response, from 22% in 2002 to 25% in 2004. All told, the percent of 
public support for never using nuclear weapons, or using them only in response to a 
nuclear attack came in the high 70’s, with elites marginally more supportive and in the 
low 80’s. The weapons under consideration were attacked by opponents for making use 
more likely, and touted by proponents as providing the president with more options in a 
crisis.346 This survey question suggests that such new weapons, made to be used in a 
combat or at least with tactical uses in mind, would be rejected by a healthy majority of 
the public. This picture of public sentiment helps to explain the failure of the Bush 
administration to enact these programs.  
Popular Press 
 The Nuclear Posture Review leaked to the press in March 2002 leading to 
sustained, widespread reaction. William Arkin of the Los Angeles Times broke the story. 
Although Arkin’s initial coverage focused on facts about the new document rather than 
analysis, he did contend, “the NPR’s call for development of new nuclear weapons that 
reduce ‘collateral damage’ myopically ignores the political, moral, and military 
                                                 
346 Linton Brooks argued to the Senate, “I have a bias in favor of something that is the minimum 
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implications—short-term and long—of crossing the nuclear threshold.”347 He closes by 
arguing that the document is not about “homeland defense” as the Bush administration 
had been stressing, but is instead “an integrated, significantly expanded planning doctrine 
for nuclear war.” Arkin viewed the Nuclear Posture Review as a radical departure from 
past practice, and a direct challenge to the nuclear taboo as enshrined in the norm of not 
building new nuclear weapons or threatening the use of nuclear weapons in new ways. 
Arkin’s perspective is particularly salient as it was among the first public takes on the 
Bush nuclear aspirations.  
 Other articles in the popular press immediately followed the leak and raised the 
question of how much the policies prescribed by the Nuclear Posture Review would 
impact the nuclear threshold—the point at which nuclear weapons are likely to be 
used.348 A related and important question asked at this time was whether nuclear 
weapons’ only use is to deter aggression or whether they can also be employed tactically 
in combat—war-fighting.349 Still others doubted the technical feasibility of damage 
limitation and the possibility of development without testing, while bringing to the fore 
the powerful and often repeated argument that such efforts undermine nonproliferation 
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349 Michael Gordon, “Nuclear Arms: For Deterrence or Fighting,” New York Times, March 11, 2002. 
Gordon also published an article the day previous arguing that the 2001/2002 NPR provided a 
“comprehensive blueprint for developing and deploying nuclear weapons”. The March 10, 2002 article is 
particularly important because it was cited and submitted to the Senate record by Diane Feinstein on 
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and arms control efforts.350 Addressing the House of Representatives during the debate 
on Rep. Markey’s amendment to prevent Congressional allocations supporting RNEP, 
Rep. Frank (D-MA) argued, “We have been trying to preach nuclear non-proliferation, 
but the town drunk is a poor advocate for temperance…We cannot threaten, as we have 
heard, a nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack and the still have any credibility in 
preaching temperance.”351 These critiques were not lost on the general public—for 
example, in April 2002 Boston high school students organized a letter writing “against 
the tactical use of nuclear weapons and the immeasurable damage it will cause.”352  
Normative Power Politics: the International Response 
 The second pathway to the nuclear taboo is through strategic social construction 
by international actors who are threatened by the potential and policies of a nuclear 
armed state. These actors strategically build on the discourse at the heart of the nuclear 
taboo to undermine nuclear policies that could put their own states’ security at risk. This 
section will consider the responses from China, North Korea, and Russia—all states with 
a strategic interest in the potential threat posed by US nuclear policies. 
Shortly after the NPR leaked in March 2002, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing told US Ambassador Clark Randt that China would not submit to “outside 
intimidation including nuclear blackmail” and that the US was “nuclear saber-rattling at 
                                                 
350 See Benjamin Friedman, “Mini-Nukes, Bunker-Busters, and Deterrence: Framing the Debate,” Center 
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the Chinese people.”353 The combination of a perception of more useable nuclear 
weapons, combined with plans for national missile defense and the possibility of theater 
missile defense in Taiwan inspired widespread support for an increase in China’s nuclear 
capability to maintain minimal deterrence.354 Also in March of 2002, the (North) Korean 
Central News Agency characterized the Nuclear posture Review as “an inhuman plan to 
spark a global nuclear arms race” and went on to add “a nuclear war to be imposed by 
nuclear fanatics would mean their ruin in nuclear disaster.”355 In October 2002 
discussions with North Korea, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly presented 
evidence of their highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program, a program to which they 
admitted at this time and attributed to Bush administration hostility.356 North Korea also 
responded to the Bush administration’s new direction with an announcement on 
December 12, 2002 that it would be restarting nuclear facilities and ordering international 
monitors out of the country. On January 10, 2003 North Korea withdrew from the 
NPT.357 Overall, the Bush administration’s new nuclear posture, along with its repeated 
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threats of possible regime change in North Korea, exacerbated existing tension and 
precluded cooperation on any nonproliferation efforts. 
 Russia contained at least two potential targets for the proposed new nuclear 
weapons deep in mountains at Yamantau and Kosvinsky.358 These locations have been 
associated with Russian efforts to make a decapitating US nuclear strike impossible, and 
to maintain the ability to respond to such a nuclear strike in kind while physically 
protecting the leadership. It is not clear to what extent this motivated proponents of 
RNEP, but the potential threat was not lost on the Russians. President Vladimir Putin 
himself warned, “This, to a very low bar, to a dangerous line, lowers the threshold of 
possible nuclear weapons use…In this case nuclear weapons from weapons of nuclear 
deterrence go down to the level of weapons of operational use, and, in my opinion, this is 
very dangerous.”359 Consistent with China and North Korea, the Russians viewed the 
plans as upsetting the status quo, and making the dangers posed by nuclear weapons more 
acute. Although it is unlikely that public objections from US rivals made a great 
difference in the eventual policy outcomes, their responses were consistent with the US-
based discourse that argued that arms control efforts would be harmed and arms racing 
would be exacerbated.  
Individual Decisionmakers: Representative David Hobson  
 While I argue that the nuclear taboo prevented RNEP from becoming a reality, 
this norm acted through a variety of mechanisms, one of which included the actions of 
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the US House of Representatives and in particular Ohio Republican Rep. David Hobson. 
His central role in this outcome stemmed from his personal convictions on the 
appropriate role of nuclear weapons in the US defense apparatus, his unique and powerful 
role in shaping appropriations stemming from his chairmanship of a subcommittee 
central to funding RNEP, and the lack of widespread support for RNEP outside of the 
Bush administration. Lackluster support for RNEP after Hobson zeroed funding in his 
subcommittee’s appropriation bill is revealing of a broader lack of sustained enthusiasm 
for the program, especially in the face of a growing bipartisan opposition. The confluence 
of these forces led Congress to deny funding for RNEP for fiscal years FY2005 and 
FY2006.360 
 Hobson’s personal convictions about the role of nuclear weapons in the US 
arsenal are central to the outcome, as he powerfully repeated and reiterated several of the 
key arguments against RNEP as the appropriations process unfolded. In August 2004, he 
questioned the link between holding terrorists at risk with an effective earth-penetrating 
nuclear weapon, and being able to kill them once they are found. He also pointed out the 
problematic link to nonproliferation efforts, “We cannot advocate for nuclear 
nonproliferation around the globe and pursue more useable nuclear weapons here at 
home. That inconsistency is not lost on anyone in the international community.”361 He 
later expressed concern that new nuclear weapons development interfered with his 
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subcommittee’s priority of maintaining a safe, secure nuclear deterrent and “maintaining 
our nation’s integrity in the international effort to halt the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.”362 These concerns were consonant with many in the arms control 
community and notably counter to that of the Bush administration and many prominent 
Republicans in Congress. 
 While many people held similar convictions to Hobson, and the roles of Ellen 
Tauscher, Diane Feinstein and Edward Kennedy should not be diminished, it was 
Hobson’s position that influenced the eventual policy outcomes due to the power of the 
chair position in the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations 
Subcommittee, and due to a few important details of the appropriations process that 
dampened his opposition. In the House in late May 2004, Representative Ellen Tauscher 
proposed an amendment that would have transferred funding from the RNEP program to 
programs aimed at conventional capabilities.363 That amendment was struck down 214-
204.364 On the other side of Congress on June 15, 2004, Kennedy sponsored a bill with 
same aims, which the Senate struck down 55-42.365 In spite of these failures, the bill that 
passed just a week later on June 25, 2004, did not contain funding for RNEP. Medalia 
offers a convincing and parsimonious account of the apparent support for RNEP with its 
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failure to be funded.366 He points out that when an appropriations bill contains a 
member’s project—usually spending for their home district—there is an unwritten rule 
that the member should then vote for the entire bill. As a result, appropriations bills 
packed with projects vital to representative’s districts or states gain votes as they are 
packed with projects. This leads to an expectation that the bill will be passed and 
decreases the incentive to mount a major opposition. The spending bill that killed funding 
for RNEP (for FY 2005) passed the house with a 370-16 vote.367 
 In addition to a position and process that allowed Hobson to pass a bill consonant 
with his preference on this issue, a lack of pressure from proponents of RNEP permitted 
such a result. The point between Hobson’s withdrawing funding for RNEP in the 
subcommittee’s version of the bill, but before it had been passed, is a telling test of the 
real support for this program. The amendments proposed by Kennedy and Tauscher did 
not require those voting to include funding to make any costly trade-offs. By contrast, 
once the funding had been taken out of the bill in committee, members faced a choice 
between keeping their own projects (or that of a colleagues), or funding for RNEP. Faced 
with such a trade-off, the House voted overwhelmingly in favor of Hobson’s bill that 
zeroed RNEP and betrayed the lawmaking body’s lack of support for the measure.368  
 Republican Representative Zach Wamp is a striking example of the imbalance 
between the investment representatives secured versus what they would get: opposition to 
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RNEP could have threatened funding for a $1.47 billion Spallation Neutron Source at 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory in his state of Tennessee. This example shows that even 
those with an interest in broader investment in the nuclear weapons complex (such as a 
Republican representing a district containing Oak Ridge National Laboratory), could be 
bought off with a vague threat of putting their secured funding at risk. It seems unlikely 
that Hobson would have zeroed funding for such a large project over stated objections to 
his zeroing of RNEP funding. However, the fact that opposition never materialized 
suggests that if there were supporters on the subcommittee, they were unwilling to take 
the chance. Hobson himself characterizes well the broad support for the eventual 
outcome, “When we cut funding for RNEP…critics wrongly assumed this was against 
the will of the majority of the House and Senate, which is simply inaccurate. The 
reductions in the fiscal 2005 omnibus bill were included in the House bill that was passed 
overwhelmingly by the subcommittee and the full committee and finally passed the 
House of Representatives in a 370-16 vote.”369 This evidence suggests that the Bush team 
failed to build a sufficiently strong discourse to overcome the status quo discourse. While 
they were able to recruit some allies in Congress, overall support remained tepid, and the 
proposed programs never made it out of the study phase. 
Other arguments put forth in this debate shed some light on the inconsistent and 
ultimately insufficient support for RNEP.  Proponents of RNEP tended to frame the 
program’s benefits in vague terms; for example, the Republican Senator from Colorado 
Wayne Allard contended, “Irrational rogue nations and non-state actors have emerged as 
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a greater threat to us.”370 Others stressed that the requested funds for the fiscal year in 
question would not be used for building weapons. Senator James M. Inhofe, Republican 
Senator from Oklahoma echoed similar statements from Rumsfeld when he emphasized, 
“This is a feasibility study; it is nothing more than that.”371 By contrast, Senators 
Kennedy and Feinstein used precise language to describe the destruction, radioactive 
fallout, and political consequences of upsetting allies and undermining nonproliferation 
efforts in their Los Angeles Times opinion piece published in September of 2003 in 
anticipation of a congressional confrontation over RNEP.372 The divergent modes of 
arguing show limited, and even timid support for the RNEP program, in the face of 
bipartisan, and determined opposition armed with more detailed analysis.  
The Bush administration would seem to be another logical place for opposition to 
arise. However, according to Hobson, “there has been no pressure from my leadership, 
there’s been no pressure from the White House on me…Some people in the other body 
don’t like my opinions, but we’ve been able to work that out so far.”373 As spending on 
RNEP would have likely taken place mostly at Los Alamos National Laboratory and 
Sandia National Laboratories, both weapons labs in New Mexico, Senator Pete Domenici 
from New Mexico was another potential source of RNEP support. As such, it would take 
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a deal in which other projects were promised funding in exchange for Domenici’s 
accepting the bill.374 Domenici’s arguments however, reveal the mixed basis of his 
support for RNEP, “I remain hopeful that we will only use our stockpile as a deterrent to 
other nuclear states. However, to be an effective deterrent, it must evolve to address the 
changing threats. We also must maintain a group of experts at our national labs that 
understand the complex science to support the engineering and physics to ensure our 
stockpile is a viable deterrent and is safely stored at home.”375 While the first two 
sentences in this quote track closely with the NPR and the arguments supporting RNEP in 
the appropriations debate, the latter sentence betrays Domenici’s greater concern with 
securing funds for the two New Mexico weapons labs, which happen to be two of the 
largest employers in his home state. This conclusion is supported by the eventual 
outcome. Domenici, who was chairman of the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations 
Subcommittee (Hobson’s Senate counterpart), agreed to the House version of the bill 
(Hobson’s, which zeroed funding for RNEP), in exchange for other spending at the New 
Mexico weapons labs.376 The evidence seems to show that Domenici’s support for RNEP 
came from his interest in securing funds, rather than his genuine interest in pushing for 
new nuclear weapons to address any strategic security need.  
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 In Medalia’s conclusion to his piece on the FY2005 appropriations debate, he 
points out, “RNEP played well for its opponents but not for its supporters. There was 
scant evidence of public pressure for RNEP and considerable pressure against.”377 The 
defeat of RNEP in committee resulted partially from Hobson’s personal convictions, but 
also because his fellow lawmakers represented constituencies that were increasingly 
against nuclear testing, against using nuclear weapons use in the face non-nuclear threats, 
and also less likely to support Bush than they had been a year or two earlier.378 Although 
the debate over the appropriate role for nuclear weapons in the US arsenal is larger than a 
single budget fight, this episode revolved around one of the central features of the 
Nuclear Posture Review, and demonstrates the potential impact of the moral convictions 
of individuals empowered by the processes that make up nuclear politics. Hobson’s 
criticisms of the RNEP program were not original, nor did he deliver them in some 
exceptionally eloquent fashion. Instead, the organizational structure of the US Congress 
placed him in a unique position to buck the wishes of the Bush administration and its 
supporters in Congress. In addition, close examination reveals that key supporters of 
RNEP did not find it worth sacrificing projects that benefitted their home states and 
districts, and that even the most interested lawmakers—such as Republican Senator Pete 
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Domenici—were more interested in securing funds with tangible benefits for their 
constituents than “studying” new nuclear weapons. 
Iterated Behavior 
 Although difficult to say precisely, the role of obligation arising out of 
convention—the next pathway to the nuclear taboo—cannot be left out. The challenge 
began with a status quo in which the US maintained a policy of not producing nuclear 
weapons with small yields. Although the US has produced nuclear weapons with yields 
as low as 0.1 kilotons in yield, the 1993 Spratt-Furse provision effectively outlawed the 
production of any nuclear weapons with less than five kilotons.379 In the FY2003 Defense 
Authorization highlighted tension over this rule. The arguments championed by Bush, 
built on the work of PNAC, Payne, and others seemed to imply the need for nuclear 
weapons smaller than five kilotons. The House version of the defense authorization 
actually permitted research and design work on weapons less than five kilotons, but the 
conference bill dropped the language in favor of the senate’s version that reiterated the 
prohibition of Spratt-Furse.380 Nevertheless, proponents intended to proceed with 
research into weapons complying with existing law, by modifying B-61, and B-83 
warheads with hardened cases and explosive-yields around five kilotons, modifications 
which would ostensibly make the resulting weapons effective bunker-busters. 
                                                 
379 For a discussion of the Davy Crockett W-54 warhead and tactical nuclear weapons in policy, see David 
Hoffman, April 1, 2010, “The Little Nukes That Got Away,” Foreign Policy. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/01/the-little-nukes-that-got-away-2/; and for an exhaustive list of US 
nuclear warheads through 2009 see Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads, 
1945-2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 65:4 (2009): 72-81. 
380 Center for Arms Control & Non-proliferation, “Analysis of Fiscal 2003 Defense Authorization 
Conference Report,” November 18, 2002. 
195 
 
 In this and other details surrounding the Bush challenge, the Bush administration 
confronted an entrenched, and powerful status quo. Spratt-Furse is only one among many 
obstacles RNEP proponents were forced to confront as they sought “conspicuous” 
change. Tannenwald notes, “As each successive crisis comes and goes and nuclear 
weapons remain unused, expectations are created about behavior in future crises. The 
burden of proof shifts to those who would advocate a change from the prevailing 
practice.”381 As the burden shifted to proponents and entered the formal policy-making 
process in Congress, it became clear that the weight would be too much to bear. Members 
of Congress, representing a public which considered the administration’s nuclear wish list 
with deep skepticism, piled on the burden with testimony and public statements. Rep. 
Hobson in particular remained unconvinced of the need for new weapons and exposed 
the narrow and weak support behind the challenge. This pathway essentially unleashed 
the weight of a recent history free of nuclear weapons, and moving toward arms control 
solutions. Proponents of RNEP were unable to convince the public or key individuals of 
the wisdom upending the status quo, and were eventually defeated.  
Institutionalization  
 Opponents of Bush’s plan were able to appeal to a variety of institutionalized 
practices and provisions in building the case against new nuclear weapons. The Spratt-
Furse provision in particular carried the weight of law, providing a serious obstacle to 
those that would argue the US needed weapons even smaller than 5 kt.382 In addition, 
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Spratt-Furse provided a method of recalling and mobilizing into debate, a set of 
arguments on the danger of smaller nuclear weapons, and the value of the firebreak 
between conventional and nuclear. These well-articulated arguments supporting existing 
law, would need to be addressed and refuted by opponents who, due to the pathway of 
iterated behavior, would need to convince others of the obsolescence of the status quo. 
 In addition, opponents of RNEP pointed to existing arms control treaties, 
especially the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in building their case against the Bush 
plan. In particular, Article VI of the NPT requires nuclear weapons armed states to pursue 
in good faith, measures to cease the arms race, and to achieve nuclear disarmament.383 
Critics of the Bush administrations’ plan argued that nuclear modernization efforts such 
as RNEP undermine the spirit and possibly the letter of Article VI of the NPT, and both 
undermine the credibility of the US as a leader in arms control and disarmament efforts 
as well as the incentives of other states to comply with the NPT and with other arms 
control measures. Proponents of the Bush plan argued that other states value nuclear 
weapons regardless of the details of US capabilities. As such it does not make sense to 
“lead” on arms control, when rogue states and possibly terrorist groups are not going to 
respond in kind leaving the US less secure than before.384  
Conclusion 
 If the nuclear taboo prevents the usage of nuclear weapons, it must be activated at 
the prospect of using nuclear weapons. This moment make take place during wars or 
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crises, but this chapter shows that issues of usability of nuclear weapons may activate the 
same set of forces that constitute the nuclear taboo outside of the context of war or acute 
crisis.  Members of the Bush administration took part in a decade-long project of 
critiquing post-Cold War US foreign policy—a critique that gave birth to their efforts to 
field new nuclear weapons. This effort had the ironic effect of activating the set of forces 
that had prevented previous presidents, as well as leadership in other states, from using 
nuclear weapons in battle. As their efforts went from planning documents to spending 
bills, the opposition became increasingly effective at framing the new weapons as 
weapons of warfighting as opposed to deterrence. The forces that opposed the new 
nuclear weapons programs had fifty or so years of discourse constituting the nuclear 
taboo on which to build. Echoing the late 1950’s, fear of the widespread environmental 
and human consequences of radiation made its way into Congressional debates. The NPT 
and the US’s responsibilities under that treaty provided an institutional reference point for 
opponents aiming to point out the hypocrisy of the US’s potential new nuclear weapons. 
More recent history saw the US sign the INF Treaty, the START treaty, and the CTBT, 
all efforts which built on anti-nuclear discourse, and in the process powerfully 
rearticulated and extended that discourse into the George W. Bush era. When the efforts 
of the NIPP and PNAC were made into policy by the Bush administration, they 
confronted the prevailing discourse on nuclear weapons politics—one which contended 
that fewer nuclear weapons are better than more, new weapons are destabilizing, and in 
any case the use of nuclear weapons would be morally and ethically wrong. The Bush 
administration’s plans for new nuclear weapons struggled mightily to overcome each of 
these pieces of the taboo discourse. The amalgamation of power and historical 
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contingency placed the onus of demonstrating the need for such new weapons squarely 
on the administration. Keith Payne and others spent the better part of 1998-2005 trying to 
convince the public that the nuclear arsenal that had deterred the Soviet Union for 
decades would an insufficient deterrent to the smaller, weaker, and mostly not-nuclear 
armed rogue states and terrorists that had taken the place of the USSR as the US’s 
adversary. The argument that deterrence needed “enhancement” and that the US arsenal 
could not put at risk the things adversaries “valued” fell flat in public debate. The effort 
did not succeed, and the prevailing discourse which includes and constitutes the nuclear 
taboo was rearticulated, reaffirmed, and reborn in the 21st century.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation has endeavored to illuminate the social emergence of nuclear 
weapons policy in the US against the backdrop of an always-under-construction nuclear 
taboo. To accomplish this, the analysis has focused on discourse: the coherent sets of 
arguments, interpretations, images, and other artifacts that together constitute identity.385 
The identity of the US during the time of study emerged from the articulation of these 
discourses which produced a positive identity—who the country is; a negative identity—
who the country is not (also who the enemy is); and an ethical identity—given the 
positive and negative identity, the set of moral or ethical imperatives or responsibilities 
that entail.386 In this way discourses naturalize claims of knowledge and produce 
“common sense” among adherents. In the early 1950’s for example, it had become an 
almost taken-for-granted “fact” that the Soviet Union had a lead in conventional 
weapons. This notion helped legitimize a nuclear arms buildup, and a continued program 
of nuclear testing—the linchpins of “massive retaliation” and the “new look.” 
 As stated in the introduction, this approach helps deal with the overdetermined 
nature of foreign policy. Foreign policy certainly responds to the imperatives of 
international strategic environment, but it is also the product of various processes within 
the state. This approach contends that the best way to understand competing explanations, 
is to ask the actors themselves—or to examine the discourses that they articulated. This 
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takes seriously the fact that events and decisions in the social world are multi-causal, and 
ask which “causes” mattered—how did the actors see the world, and to what did they 
respond as they made policy and extended the discourse? Asking these questions revealed 
the unique mix of factors that drove policy in each administration. For example, in the 
Reagan administration, the military buildup could be explained as the realization of the 
hawkish right’s politics that helped elect Reagan with their pointed critiques of Carter. 
Such an analysis though would fail to include the role the president’s own personality or 
subjectivity played in shaping the substance of policy. Reagan himself thought nuclear 
weapons should be abolished, considered nuclear deterrence to be immoral, and thought 
it beneath the human race.387 His moral considerations played an important role in 
bringing forth the “Reagan reversal”; however it was also the source of his fascination 
and investment in missile defense—a destabilizing and expensive endeavor that 
undermined efforts at arms control.388 The distinctive mix of motivations which would 
result in both an arms buildup and, later in the 1980’s, arms control, is revealed by 
discourse analysis.389 Ultimately, the complexity of implementing a foreign policy is 
condensed by the policymakers themselves into discourse. Examining the content of 
these discourses can help us understand contradictions, change, and idiosyncrasy—
characteristics that permeate nuclear weapons politics—in a way that other 
methodologies miss.   
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Hypotheses Revisited 
 In the first chapter, three hypotheses were proposed. They are not “falsifiable 
hypotheses” in the positivist sense, but instead conjectures about the way nuclear 
weapons politics works, meant to guide and focus the inquiry. Still, the broad and general 
nature of the hypotheses stands in stark relief compared to the complexity of the actual 
policy process. As such, while this dissertation has uncovered a great deal of support for 
the hypotheses, it has also dwelled in that complexity and will acknowledge ambiguity. 
Support for the hypotheses then is not universal, though in moments where actors seemed 
to act contrary to these hypotheses, the analysis can help understand the content of their 
behavior. This section will consider each hypothesis in turn, reflecting on what can be 
learned from the evidence in each case. 
Hypothesis 1: Elite policymakers make nuclear weapons policy in response to their 
perception of material consequences. Moral and ethical concerns are secondary. 
 This hypothesis came from the observation that it is often new presidents that 
launch challenges to the nuclear taboo, and worried publics that restrain their efforts. The 
analysis here revealed mixed support; the Eisenhower and Reagan cases provide evidence 
in favor of this claim. In both cases, the new presidents and their administrations spent a 
great deal of time and effort before inauguration and in their first years cultivating a 
discourse which constructed the Soviet Union as radical threatening other, one that posed 
an existential threat to the US.390 They both argued that in material terms, the US trailed 
the Soviets militarily in important and dangerous ways—an argument that made an arms 
buildup imperative for both presidents. However, both, in concurrence with the 
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hypothesis above, had stated moral and ethical qualms—qualified though they were—
about nuclear weapons and arms racing. 
 For Eisenhower, while he and Dulles openly complained about the constraints of 
the nuclear taboo, and sought to conventionalize nuclear weapons for use in the first 
Taiwan Strait crisis, they had also taken seriously at least some of the insights 
incorporated into nuclear discourse by Bernard Brodie.391 He was unequivocal about the 
notion that nuclear war could not be won. While this has been a bedrock assumption of 
much anti-nuclear discourse since the 1940’s, it is peculiar position for a person who 
oversaw the largest nuclear weapons buildup in history and seemed ready to fight a 
limited nuclear war with China. Nevertheless, Eisenhower refused to even consider plans 
to launch an attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons.392 Eisenhower’s legacy of 
nuclear buildup, but restraint in confronting the Soviet Union as well as his famous 
farewell address warning about the military industrial complex, betray both deep concern 
about perceived material conditions, but also a backdrop of moral concern that may have 
helped the president manage the hawkish voices in his administration.  
 Reagan adopted a similar outlook to Eisenhower on Soviet material capabilities 
and intentions. As in the 1950’s, the discursive work to produce the Soviets as “other” 
produced an American identity with an ethical component that entailed a responsibility to 
build up militarily. In terms of nuclear weapons this meant new delivery systems like the 
MX missile, and the development of national missile defense—the Strategic Defense 
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Initiative. Reagan’s moral concerns about superpower politics during this time was driven 
by a deeply held notion that deterrence itself was immoral, and that SDI provided an 
avenue to escape. As with Eisenhower, Reagan’s nuclear weapons policies were driven 
first by the notion that the Soviets were materially threatening, and second by moral 
misgivings about the condition of deterrence—which he thought was best answered by 
the implementation of SDI.  
 In the 21st century, the George W. Bush administration built foreign policy with 
the focus almost exclusively on material concerns. From their perspective, the material 
strategic environment had changed, rendering the US nuclear deterrent insufficient and 
potentially ineffective against the “new” threats. This conception of the world and the 
American identity with which it was constituted entailed an ethical responsibility to 
“enhance deterrence” with new types of nuclear weapons.393 As before, investment 
flowed to missile defense, though in this case no evidence suggests that Bush’s concerns 
were based in anything other than the material needs identified by the administration’s 
favored discourse. Moral misgivings about nuclear arms and in opposition to Bush’s 
plans were voiced almost exclusively by those outside of the administration—especially 
by members of Congress and the popular press.  
 The evidence for the first hypothesis is mixed. In all three case studies, nuclear 
weapons policy followed first the material demands raised by the administration’s 
discourse and the identity they cultivated. But only in the Eisenhower and Reagan case 
did moral misgivings enter the discourse from the presidents themselves. In both of those 
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cases the presidents checked the most hawkish voices in their administrations with their 
own limits on what should be done with nuclear weapons. Neither thought a war between 
nuclear armed adversaries could be won, though they ironically would have disagreed 
about deterrence: Eisenhower enshrined nuclear deterrence as policy while Reagan 
sought to overturn what he considered an immoral practice. Bush by contrast seemed 
driven exclusively by material concerns, even while his efforts to field a new generation 
were stymied by the torch-bearers of the nuclear taboo who cited moral qualms about the 
new weapons throughout the debate. 
Hypothesis 2: Building new, and more useable nuclear weapons, as well as threatening 
to use nuclear weapons in battle serves the organizational needs of the military-industrial 
complex. 
 The evidence supports this hypothesis in all three cases. In the first case, Lewis 
Strauss as leader of the AEC for most of Eisenhower’s tenure as president orchestrated a 
decade-long effort to distort and downplay the emerging threat posed by atmospheric 
nuclear tests. The AEC, the national laboratories, and military officials all vigorously 
supported the continued testing of nuclear weapons, and saw efforts such as “Atoms for 
Peace” and later “Project Plowshare” as primarily public relations projects. While they 
seemed to believe that peaceful uses of nuclear power existed, the priorities of this group 
were occasionally revealed. For example, the report from a 1957 symposium on nuclear 
explosions argued that “there is some kind of public relations problem here” and that 
Project Plowshare could help foster “a more rational viewpoint” on the part of the public, 
as well as “highlight the peaceful application of nuclear explosive devices and thereby 
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create a climate of world opinion that is more favorable to nuclear weapons.”394 The 
symposium, and its attendees (largely the AEC and national weapons laboratories) were 
clearly more interested in protecting their latitude to continue conducting nuclear tests, 
than with cultivating “peaceful” uses of the atom. When the US did implement a 
moratorium on nuclear testing in 1958, it came from Soviet prompting, and was opposed 
by the AEC and the nuclear weapons laboratories.395 As such, the US finished the 
Hardtack II round of nuclear tests before beginning its participation in the moratorium 
beginning in October 1958. 
 Lobbying by the military-industrial complex of Reagan began in 1967 when 
Governor Reagan visited Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. There he would encounter 
Edward Teller, who would brief an interested Reagan on missile defense.396 The 
conversation piqued the future president’s interests and would be one on which he relied 
when asking questions at NORAD in 1979 as his presidential campaign kicked off.397 
The conversations also seemed to prime Reagan for additional lobbying from retired 
Army Lieutenant General Daniel Graham. Graham and others in the “Kitchen Cabinet” 
lobbied for a variety of competing types of missile defense systems, and were rewarded 
for their efforts when Reagan announced SDI, a central piece of the Reagan nuclear 
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weapons politics legacy.398 Missile defense provided Reagan a plausible way around 
what he considered the immoral condition of nuclear deterrence between the 
superpowers. The persistence, optimism, and stature of those pursuing their 
organizational goals by lobbying Reagan helped make them successful, and left the 
unmistakable mark of the military-industrial complex on the nuclear weapons politics of 
the era.  
 In the George W. Bush era, members of the military-industrial complex pushed 
hard for a new generation of nuclear weapons. While future members of the 
administration built a discursive foundation for the push for new nuclear weapons in 
think tanks like the NIPP and PNAC during the 1990’s, once the efforts were introduced 
in the administration, it was clear that they would have support from the military and the 
national laboratories. Linton Brooks, as head of the NNSA, and C. Paul Robinson as 
director of Sandia National Laboratories both addressed Congress on the need for new, 
smaller, nuclear weapons that could “enhance deterrence” and would be more 
“useable.”399 Tellingly, as the debate made its way through Congress, proponents of the 
new weapons hailed from Congressional districts that were home to facilities that would 
benefit from the proposed investment. Pete Domenici (R-NM), Heather Wilson (R-NM), 
Zach Wamp (R-TN) and others argued in favor of the new weapons and even admitted 
that part of the motivation stemmed from their interest in employment in their home 
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districts.400 Evidence for the organizational basis of their support—as opposed to 
strategic basis—emerged as all three withdrew support from the new programs when they 
had secured other investments in the labs in their respective districts. It seems unlikely 
that if Congressional supporters of nuclear bunker-busters truly believed in the new 
weapons they would have been so easily bought off with spending on other projects. 
 The dawn of the nuclear era in the United States allowed particular agencies and 
organizations within the national security apparatus to benefit materially from continued 
investment in nuclear weapons and the infrastructure to design, build, maintain, and 
potentially deliver the weapons. This dissertation has shown that in the 1950’s the AEC 
led the effort to clear away the constraints imposed by a public increasingly anxious 
about nuclear weapons. By the 1980’s the nuclear taboo had deepened, but so too had the 
power and breadth of the nuclear weapons complex. When Reagan took office, he had 
already been briefed multiple times by civilian advocates of a nuclear weapons buildup at 
national laboratories, and, perhaps most importantly, on the plausibility of fielding a 
national missile defense system. In the 21st century, the national laboratories—led by C. 
Paul Robinson of Sandia and Linton Brooks of the NNSA—continued their determined 
construction of a discourse of the inadequacy of the US nuclear deterrent, and thus the 
necessity of new nuclear weapons. In each of these cases, agencies argued that the 
international strategic environment demanded their preferred course of action: continued 
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nuclear testing, military buildup and missile defense, or bunker-busting nuclear weapons. 
However, while their claims about the imperatives of the international system were 
always sources of intense public debate—the parochial material benefits to the broader 
nuclear weapons complex that would flow from carrying out these policies was never in 
question.  
Hypothesis 3: The public finds nuclear weapons morally unacceptable and reflexively 
rejects their use.  
 Support for this last hypothesis can be seen developing over the course of the case 
studies in this dissertation. During the Eisenhower era, the nuclear taboo was only 
emerging as a force to be reckoned with for policymakers. Early in the administration, 
norms against nuclear weapons use were strong enough to occupy much of Eisenhower 
and Dulles’ time, but weak enough that the two believed that they could undo the Truman 
effort that created the categories of “conventional” and WMD. The failure of the 
administration to convince the public of the necessity of using “tactical” nuclear weapons 
in the Taiwan Strait in the spring of 1955 signaled a deepening of the nuclear taboo, and 
the galvanizing of public and world opinion against nuclear weapons. I showed how this 
process emerged in part from administration efforts at “Candor.”401 While Eisenhower 
wanted “Atoms for Peace” to provide a hopeful message, the speech tended to pile on to 
the anxiety about nuclear weapons among the public.402 The public was unmoved by 
administration efforts to normalize the use of nuclear weapons during the Quemoy and 
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Matsu crisis in 1955. And by the late 1950’s, a flood of scientific work justified public 
anxiety by showing that atmospheric testing posed a greater danger than had been 
reported by the AEC and Eisenhower himself. By 1960, books, comics, film, public 
intellectuals, and scientific consensus had built the discursive foundation for the nuclear 
taboo as it would exist into the 21st century.403 The case study in this dissertation clarified 
that the interaction between the AEC and the public with regard to radiation and the 
danger of radioactive fallout provided content to the discourse, helping it go from visceral 
and instinctive rejections of nuclear war in the early 1950’s, to a more refined discourse 
in the late 1950’s that included: rejection of nuclear testing and the fallout it produced, a 
rejection of nuclear weapons for warfighting, and deep suspicion of the rapidly escalating 
nuclear arms race. 
 During the 1980’s the nuclear taboo and its attendant discourses were activated 
again. This time, Randall Forsberg and other activists tapped and extended the powerful 
latent anti-nuclear discourse as they built the nuclear freeze movement in response to 
Reagan’s military buildup. Forsberg’s “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race” hailed 
millions to support the nuclear freeze and resist administration efforts to expand the arms 
race.404 The content of “Call” along with the tremendous support that it received were 
reflected in Reagan’s own rhetoric. While Reagan subscribed to appraisals by hawkish 
Republicans that the US had fallen behind the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons, opening 
a “window of vulnerability,” he had also once publicly advocated for the abolition of 
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nuclear weapons.405 The nuclear freeze with its message and its support challenged 
Reagan, and he responded: by softening his rhetoric on nuclear war—noting that he did 
not believe a nuclear war could be won; by attacking the nuclear freeze as Soviet agents 
and others out to undermine US security; and finally by privately suggesting that arms 
control might have become a prudent political choice. While this research doesn’t 
“prove” that arms control activists cultivating a contemporary anti-nuclear discourse 
“caused” Reagan’s more arms control friendly demeanor in his second term, strong 
intertextual links between the efforts of Forsberg and others and Reagan’s own softening 
rhetoric suggest that he was moved. The powerful discourse against Reagan’s early 
policy-prescriptions would become foundational for actual policies such as the INF 
Treaty and the developing START treaty. As with Eisenhower, Reagan faced fierce 
resistance as he tried to convince the public of the wisdom of his proposed nuclear 
weapons policy. Instead it was the nuclear freeze movement, and its millions of 
supporters that would come to characterize the arc of nuclear weapons discourse during 
the Reagan administration.  
 When George W. Bush took office in January 2001, he did so with a team 
planning for the construction of a new generation of nuclear weapons. Those plans would 
never come to fruition, though, in part due to the depth and breadth of the nuclear taboo 
that the plans confronted. Instead of massive protests as in the early 1980’s, the more 
recent confrontation took place overwhelmingly in Congress. There, a determined, 
persistent bipartisan opposition defeated the proposed mini-nuke and bunker-buster 
programs, and in the process exposed their shallow support. While the programs were 
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touted in the Nuclear Posture Review and other official documents, supporters in 
Congress were more interested in the projects as a means to secure investment and jobs 
and their own districts than to address gaps in the US nuclear deterrent. Even more 
tellingly, when the opposition, led by Rep. David Hobson (R-OH) sat poised and ready to 
kill the new programs, proponents from the White House never spoke up.406 David 
Hobson, Ellen Tauscher, Edward Kennedy, Diane Feinstein and others were able to so 
soundly defeat the proposed plans, that its staunchest backers were unwilling to keep 
fighting. As before, the success was built on a foundation of public support. While the 
Bush administration chose not to sign the CTBT, the public supported the treaty by a 
wide margin.407 The new programs would have created smaller, and according to many 
analysts, more useable nuclear weapons—the public became even less enthusiastic about 
using nuclear weapons during this time. All told, more than three-fourths of the public 
rejected the use of nuclear weapons either ever or for anything but as a response to an 
adversary’s nuclear attack. The administration’s effort to redefine “deterrence” to include 
apply to non-nuclear actors, and to additionally require “enhancement” failed.408 The 
existing discourses had no place for such a change, and as such Congressional leaders 
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were on firm ground with their own constituencies, the majority of which saw no need for 
new nuclear weapons. 
Why This Matters 
 In the introduction I argued that this research is important because it takes 
seriously the nuclear taboo as a background condition for the construction of nuclear 
weapons politics; and because it applies discourse analysis to the problem of nuclear 
weapons politics—a methodological move that has the potential to manage the 
overdetermined nature of foreign policy problems by refocusing on the sets of words, 
rhetoric, arguments, images and other artifacts—the discourse—that constitute nuclear 
weapons politics. The more important motivation however, is so that we can understand 
contemporary dilemmas in US foreign policy in order to make better policy in the future, 
particularly when future presidents challenge the nuclear politics status quo and 
particularly the nuclear taboo. 
 In February 2018, the office of the Secretary of Defense released a new Nuclear 
Posture Review.409 As with other statements of new nuclear weapons policy contributed 
by new presidents examined in this dissertation, the Trump NPR seeks to upend the 
nuclear weapons status quo and to challenge the nuclear taboo. The new document bears 
more than a passing resemblance to the 2001/2002 NPR—they were both written in large 
part by Keith Payne. As such, the new version tries to rehash much of the content of the 
2001/2002 Nuclear Posture Review, especially the notion of an increasingly threatening 
international security environment that requires increased investment in a range of 
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nuclear capabilities. These capabilities include missile defense, new low-yield nuclear 
weapons, and integration of nuclear and non-nuclear forces.410 The US nuclear arsenal is 
called upon to deter, not only nuclear threats, but also non-nuclear and cyber threats. The 
document emphasizes two concepts with regard to the new posture: “flexibility” and 
“tailored.”411 Both concepts are aimed at expanding the potential usage of nuclear 
weapons, and where necessary filling identified gaps in capabilities with new weapons 
like the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM).  
 Trump’s new NPT reflects the president’s own statements, as well as the 
2001/2002 NPR’s notion, that deterrence requires more. In the Bush era, Payne and 
others used the phrase “enhance deterrence” to convey their perception of the need to 
bolster its deterrent effect and the inadequacy of the current US arsenal. Trump himself 
remarked in the 2018 State of the Union Address that,  
We must modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal, hopefully never having to 
use it, but making it so strong and so powerful that it will deter any acts of 
aggression by any other nation or anyone else. Perhaps someday in the future, 
there will be a magical moment when the countries of the world will get together 
to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, we are not there yet, sadly.412 
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Trump, knowingly or not, builds on the discourse cultivated before and during the Bush 
era that saw the US nuclear deterrent as insufficient to accomplish the tasks for which 
they had in mind. In the Bush era, these tasks had expanded to include deterring the use 
of chemical and biological weapons, and terrorism. Trump’s State of the Union is not 
specific, but it clearly indicates that he believes that a stronger nuclear arsenal will deter a 
wider set of potential threats. When paired with the NPR, it is clear that the 
administration means to add a low-yield SLBM and a SLCM because they believe that 
these weapons will deter nuclear threats, as well as non-nuclear and cyber threats.  
 As in the Bush case, this pro-nuclear discourse is having to contend with the 
status-quo, which includes the anti-nuclear discourse that supports the nuclear taboo. 
Critical work in the popular press and academic journals has roundly criticized the plans, 
arguing as before that these moves undermine security, weaken the US-led 
nonproliferation regime, and encourage arms racing. However, in the Bush case, 
resistance to building new nuclear weapons and effectively making nuclear weapons 
more usable manifested itself in four-plus years of debates in Congress—debates in 
which the GOP managed to pass research funding for RNEP in FY2003 and FY2004. In 
addition during the Obama administration, while the executive discourse helped conclude 
the New START, and a 2010 NPR which limited the scope of missions for the US 
nuclear arsenal, that administration was forced to work with Congress to pass a massive 
nuclear weapons modernization plan—a plan being extended by the newest NPR.413  
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 History suggests that resistance to Trump will manifest itself in a variety of ways 
because of the prevailing discourse on nuclear weapons. As before, Tannenwald’s 
“pathways” to the nuclear taboo are useful for thinking through the nuclear taboo’s 
impact on Trump’s nuclear weapons policy. First, domestic public opinion is already a 
problem. As of January 23, 60% of Americans do not trust that Trump will not use 
nuclear weapons.414 Under Eisenhower and Reagan, popular opinion led directly to 
popular resistance with the proliferation of organizations opposing nuclear weapons and 
administration policies. Under Trump, we have already witnessed major public 
demonstrations for other causes including violence against women and gun control. 
These concurrent public demonstrations could either blind the public to the issue of 
nuclear weapons use, or contribute synergistically to the broader resistance to policies of 
an unpopular president.415 With regard to world public opinion, the president has shown 
unwillingness to cooperate with foreign governments—even US allies, and is only 
emboldened by the nuclear weapons modernization of US rivals. Trump is also unlikely 
to be moved by his own personal convictions or those of others in his administration. His 
advisors have overwhelmingly become those with whom he already agrees, and, so far, 
few in his own party have challenged his stances on nuclear weapons policy. That said, 
on November 14, 2017, the Senate held a hearing to discuss wresting sole nuclear launch 
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authority from the president.416 While no legislation has emerged from that meeting, it 
does remind us that powerful members of Congress have played key roles in checking 
presidential nuclear ambitions in the past, as in the case of Bush and Rep. David Hobson.  
 In addition to constraints on Trump’s nuclear ambitions imposed by domestic and 
world public opinion and the personal convictions of powerful individuals, the nuclear 
taboo may also constrain Trump through the pathways of iterated behavior, 
institutionalization, and historical contingency. The sum of these pathways to the nuclear 
taboo make it such that the Trump administration, as we saw in the Bush’s challenge, will 
shoulder the burden of convincing others that the US nuclear posture needs adjustment. 
While the Obama administration did set the nuclear arsenal on a course of costly and 
destabilizing modernization, it also embraced arms control and saw a limited role for 
nuclear weapons in foreign policy. Trump can capitalize on modernization, which is 
already underway, but he will face an uphill battle as he tries to do away with and work 
around the nonproliferation regime.417 More specifically, plans for a ground-launch 
cruise missile (GLCM) may violate the 1987 INF treaty—a response to accusations that 
Russia have already violated the treaty.418 Trump campaigned on jettisoning the Joint 
                                                 
416 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker (R-TN) presided over the meeting, 
ostensibly in part because he has stated that Trump’s threats could be “a path World War III.” See Karoun 
Demirjian, “Trump’s Nuclear Authority Divides Senators Alarmed by his ‘Volatile’ Behavior,” 
Washington Post, November 14, 2017. 
417 The NPR, “makes no reductions in Obama’s modernization plan. Instead, the NPR calls for new nuclear 
SLCM and a low-yield SLBM warhead. The NPR also seems to call for retention of the 1.2 megaton B83 
nuclear bomb (which had been slated for retirement once the B61-12 enters service)”. Federation of 
American Scientists Federation of American Scientists, “2018 Nuclear Posture Review Resource,” 
accessed on February 6, 2018, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-posture-
review/#1517582676588-d330650c-fc14. 
 
418 See Kingston Reif, “Trump Sets INF Response Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Arms Control 
Association (January/February 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-01/news/trump-sets-inf-
response-strategy; and “Hill Wants Development of Banned Bombs,” Arms Control Today, Arms Control 
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Comprehensive Plan of Action, or Iran Nuclear Deal. And much of the NPR flies in the 
face of US obligations under the NPT to work toward disarmament. While each of these 
institutional sources might be overcome by an administration determined to implement a 
new nuclear weapons policy, each will pose political risks and provide opponents with a 
venue to challenge the president. Ultimately, Trump presents a greater challenge to the 
nuclear taboo than either Reagan or Bush, because, while the latter presidents promised 
new weapons which might be useable, they did not overtly threaten nuclear armed 
adversaries like North Korea as Trump has done.419 The combination of new weapons 
and nuclear bluster together constitute the Trump challenge to the nuclear taboo and the 
anti-nuclear discourse on which it rests.  
So What Is Next? 
 Opponents of the Trump nuclear plan can look to the nuclear taboo literature to 
understand the best ways to check the ambitions of the president. First, as Eisenhower 
and Dulles recognized by 1952, public opinion—be it domestic or world—is crucially 
important. Trump cannot hope to succeed in his agenda if public opinion remains against 
nuclear weapons and he remains unpopular. Second, Congress has role to play. If it is a 
powerful well-placed individual’s anti-nuclear convictions that check Trump, there is a 
good chance that that person could come from the Congress as Hobson did during the 
Bush case, though there may also be opportunities for charismatic activists to take 
                                                 
Association (December 2017), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-12/news/hill-wants-development-
banned-missile. 
419 On August 8, 2017, Trump told reporters, “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United 
States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” See Peter Baker and Choe Sang-
Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea if It Endangers US,” New York Times, August 
8, 2017.  
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leadership roles as Forsberg did during the Reagan administration. Third, opponents 
should work on strengthening treaties, and reaffirming the importance of US obligations 
under those treaties. While Trump may be able to shake off such efforts, he should not be 
able to do so without stark consequences. Finally, historical contingency may yet support 
the nuclear taboo. Trump’s scandals outside of nuclear politics, including alleged 
collusion with Russia, obstruction of justice, and a host of personal problems, may also 
be the historical contingencies that deny Trump the opportunity to carry out his nuclear 
policy agenda. 
Contributions and Future Research 
 This dissertation has endeavored to show how a discourse analysis approach to 
the construction of nuclear weapons policy in the US could yield deeper insight into the 
social processes that affirms and reaffirm identity, and in the process produce policy. 
Three hypotheses guided the research and focused inquiry on the potential sources of 
nuclear weapons policy: the international strategic environment, domestic political 
institutions, powerful individuals, and international norms. Certainly policy was refracted 
by all of these sources—this research aimed to understand which sources mattered at 
what times, and how the content of policy emerged against a backdrop of political 
conflict.  
 The work presented here has several important implications for both students and 
practitioners of nuclear politics. For those trying to understand why nuclear weapons 
policy has looked as it does in the US or any other country, this work has provided a 
template of where to look. As one might guess, the highest executive officers in a state’s 
security apparatus have a uniquely powerful role in forging nuclear weapons policy. In 
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that capacity, their personalities, conception of nuclear politics, and formative experience 
may contribute greatly to the policy they make. But, other actors matter greatly as well. 
Public opinion, world and domestic, matters a great deal, but what this work highlights is 
that the important question is how the public is mobilized (or not) to address nuclear 
weapons policy. Leaders and activists all would like for the broader public to support 
their position, but it is constructive to consider why Eisenhower and Dulles failed to 
mobilize public support to use nuclear weapons in the spring of 1955, while Randall 
Forsberg mobilized one of the largest movements in US history in the early 1980’s. The 
cases show that in matters of nuclear weapons: changing, manipulating, or coercing 
public opinion is difficult, though mobilizing or leading existing public opinion into 
public action may be possible as Forsberg demonstrated. For anti-nuclear weapons 
activists this suggests that the problem is one of messaging. Public opinion can be used to 
stymie hawkish nuclear weapons plans if the public is mobilized by charismatic 
leadership and well-constructed and simple messaging. For political leadership, this work 
helps delineate the constraints imposed by public opinion. While Eisenhower and Dulles 
were unable to convince the public of the wisdom of using tactical nuclear weapons, they 
were able to use the AEC to confuse the radiation and nuclear fallout problem in the 
public mind enough to get away with nearly a decade’s worth of nuclear tests and a 
tremendous buildup in the US nuclear arsenal. Reagan and Bush likewise had much of 
their nuclear ambitions stymied by a public backlash, but like Eisenhower, were able to 
push through pieces of their plans. In particular, Reagan and Bush found that the public 
was unable to mobilize against missile defense effectively, even though such programs 
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are destabilizing and undermine nonproliferation efforts.420 These arguments, though, are 
more difficult to make as they are not self-evident, and no public movement has been 
able to stop three decades of investment in missile defense. 
 Future research would do well to increase the depth and breadth of this work. 
With regard to depth, more work should be done to understand the ways in which popular 
culture shapes public perception and thus public (in)action on nuclear matters. For 
example, while this work noted the role B-movies released in the 1950’s had in stoking 
public anxiety about all things nuclear, more in-depth work should be done to understand 
the link between popular media and perceptions of nuclear weapons and their uses. Such 
work would build on a broader definition of discourse that includes images, books, music 
and movies. An appraisal of the role of these various media in cultivating nuclear 
weapons policy discourse and ultimately affecting policy over time would bolster our 
understanding of the process of nuclear weapons policy construction.  
 In addition, more cases are needed. While the cases here were selected for the 
ways in which they illustrate the processes under study, limits on time and space 
prevented considering other interesting cases such as the Kennedy administration and the 
Nixon administration, and providing a full account of the Trump administration. But even 
more important, this work should be assessed with regard to the nuclear weapons politics 
of other nuclear-armed states. While the US case is certainly unique in many ways, a 
comparative study would be useful for understanding how these dynamics have 
functioned, or not, in other states.  
 
                                                 
420 For a more complete discussion of the critiques of a US national missile defense system see Philip 
Gordon, “Bush, Missile Defence, and the Atlantic Alliance,” Survival Vol. 43, No. 1 (Spring 2001): 17-36.  
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